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INTRODUCTION 
On May 26, 2018, media from across the globe descended on the 
courtyard of Dublin Castle, Ireland.1 They had traveled to capture the scene 
of thousands of Irish people celebrating the results of the Irish abortion 
referendum, where a landslide majority of 66.4% voted to repeal the 8th 
amendment to the Irish Constitution.2 Inserted in 1983 by a formidable anti-
abortion lobby, the 8th amendment equated the right to life of the "mother" 
and the "unborn child" in the Constitution.3 This amendment translated into 
a legal ban on abortion in all cases except where abortion was necessary to 
avert a substantial risk to a pregnant woman’s life. Women who had abortions 
outside of the permitted exception, and anyone who assisted them, faced up 
to 14 years in prison.4 As a result of these restrictions, approximately 4000 
women traveled from Ireland to other jurisdictions to have abortions every 
year.5 Another 1500 took abortion pills (illegally) at home.6 An unknown 
number of women maintained unwanted pregnancies. But in May 2018, the 
people's vote provided a mandate to repeal the 8th amendment and end its 
punitive impacts on women. Followed by the Irish President’s signing of the 
1 In this dissertation, “Ireland” refers to the Republic of Ireland in contrast to the geographical naming of the 
island. 
2 GOV’T OF IR., Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Referendum Results 1937-2019, 
https://electionsireland.org/results/referendum/refresult.cfm?ref=201836R. 
3  Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, §§7–9 (Act No. 
35/2013) (Ir.) [hereinafter, PLDPA]. 
4 PLDPA, id. at §22(2). 
5 The Irish Family Planning Association estimates that from 1980 to 2017, at least 173,308 women traveled from 
the Republic of Ireland to the UK for abortions, Irish Family Planning Association, Abortion in Ireland: Statistics, 
IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION www. ifpa/Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics. These estimates do not 
include women from Ireland who traveled to other countries, for example, the Netherlands or Spain. 
6 See, Abigail A. Aiken, Experiences and characteristics of women seeking and completing at-home medical termination of pregnancy 
through online telemedicine in Ireland and Northern Ireland: a population-based analysis, 124 (8) AN INT. J. OF OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY, 1208 (2016) [hereinafter, Aiken, Online Telemedicine). 
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Abortion Referendum Bill,7 The repeal enabled the Oireachtas (parliament) 
to legalize abortion, and per its pre-referendum pledge to the public, the 
Oireachtas enacted a model permitting abortion, without restriction as to 
reason, up to 12 weeks into pregnancy, with a 72-hour waiting period.8 
Between 12 and 24 weeks, the model legalizes abortion in three situations: 
where the pregnancy is non-viable when it risks a woman's life or where it 
seriously endangers her health. After 24 weeks, abortion is legal only in cases 
of "fatal fetal abnormality."9 10  
Amongst the crowds of women and men celebrating the Repeal in Dublin 
Castle, international reporters wondered how the island that had long been 
considered Europe's conservative (and Catholic) outpost could have endorsed 
such a drastic change for reproductive rights. Nascent editorials, radio shows, 
and podcasts attempted to provide a definitive answer to the question "how 
the Yes vote was won," almost all providing a different rejoinder. To be fair, 
many factors influenced abortion law reform in Ireland: the diminished 
authority of the Catholic Church; increased public attention to the tragic 
stories of women denied life-saving abortions and women forced to carry non-
viable pregnancies to term; the election of a younger and more diverse 
parliament; recognition that increasing numbers of Irish women were taking 
abortion pills in their own homes; international condemnation; a high youth 
voter turnout; and a poorly organized 'Vote No' campaign. Critically, the 
singular force that brought these elements together to deliver Repeal was the 
Irish abortion rights movement. 
The repeal of the 8th amendment resulted from more than three decades 
of work by Irish pro-choice groups, most of which was carried out in a social 
and political environment that was deeply hostile to abortion rights. In 2018, 
pro-choice activists carried the 'Yes' vote high on the shoulders of a majority 
across the entire country — every constituency but one voted for reform. But 
for those who had long battled against the 8th amendment, the public scenes 
of joy following the referendum results were a far cry from the animosity 
directed towards pro-choice activism in years prior. For decades, the State 
dismissed their advocacy at every turn — in the courts, the legislative 
chamber, the voting booth, and the streets. The Catholic Church publicly 
denounced pro-choice activists. Women who had abortions (usually abroad) 
stayed silent in fear of enmity.11 And even when the Church’s moral 
7 President Higgins signed the 36th Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018 on December 20, 2018. His 
signature officially changed the Constitution. 
8 The Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy Act) 2018 (Act No. 31/2018), [hereinafter, Abortion Act 
2018]. 
9 The dissertation uses the term 'fatal fetal anomaly' to refer to pregnancies that suffer from fatal conditions. Such 
pregnancies are highly unlikely to survive to term or have a very short post-birth life. It is not an exact medical 
term. 
10Abortion Act 2018, supra note 8 at §10-11. 
11 The shame surrounding abortion in Ireland, and the impact of that shame on women, played a fundamental 
part in the Irish abortion story. See infra Chapter 3 at 165-170. See also Christine Zampas, Ireland: She is Not a 
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monopoly dramatically declined in the late 1990s and 2000s, campaigners for 
abortion rights struggled against entrenched social stigma and unwavering 
political inaction.  
Following two decades of defending against anti-choice attempts to enact 
even more abortion restrictions, in the early 2000s, pro-choice campaigners 
began planning a proactive challenge to the 8th amendment. Unable to get a 
proper hearing in the Irish legal system, they looked beyond Irish shores and 
took their claims to the European Court of Human Rights.12 While their 
litigation was largely unsuccessful in securing abortion rights in Ireland, their 
efforts in Strasbourg gave their campaign political and legal traction.13 And 
as activists challenged the State on the international stage, human rights 
advocacy also empowered and legitimized the movement at home. 
Strengthening the force of their demands and generating pressure for 
liberalization both inside and outside the country, international human rights 
advocacy elicited government concessions, increased mobilization, and 
bolstered the possibility of success.14  
Notwithstanding its role as a lever for change, international human rights 
advocacy for abortion had some notable limits. From a pro-choice 
perspective, the scope of international human rights protection for abortion 
is lacking. The law has yet to affirm the right of a woman to choose abortion; 
instead, it requires states to decriminalize abortion and legalize abortion in 
cases where a pregnancy risks a woman's life or health, if a pregnancy is a 
result of rape, or in situations where the fetus has a fatal anomaly.15 To be 
sure, legalizing abortion in such circumstances would have been an 
improvement on Ireland's total ban, but by the time the movement had 
gained enough legitimacy amongst national actors to secure a referendum for 
repeal of the 8th amendment, international human rights law — and its 
limited recognition of abortion rights — ran short as a resource. Offering 
much narrower protections for abortion rights than the guarantee of "free, 
safe and legal abortion for all" sought by the movement, human rights lost 
much of its liberating power. 
This dissertation interrogates international human rights law's limits on 
abortion rights from a feminist perspective. From a women's rights 
perspective, the law's protection gap — the lack of recognition for abortion 
access as an affirmative, unqualified right — is a problem in and of itself. And 
from a feminist perspective, the gap is also indicative of a structural flaw in 
Criminal: The Impact of Ireland's Abortion Law, AMNESTY INT., (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur29/1597/2015/en/ [hereinafter, Zampas, She is Not a Criminal]. 
12 A, B & C v. Ireland, 53 Eur. HR Rep. 13 (2011) [hereinafter, A, B & C v. Ireland] For discussion of this 
litigation, see infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra Chapter 2, Human Rights in Action. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
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international law. This dissertation argues that the law is, for the most part, 
gender-blind and, as such, is ill-equipped to deal with the inequalities 
represented in, and engendered by, abortion restrictions. Exploring how the 
law fails to address the role of gender in both the purpose and effects of 
abortion restrictions, this dissertation critiques the doctrine's inattention to 
the biases underpinning abortion-restrictive regulation and the subordinating 
harms such laws inflict on women.16 And by masking the ways that anti-
abortion regulations institutionalize gender hierarchy, international human 
rights law runs the risk of sanctioning a power structure that disadvantages 
women.  
Feminist scholars have long claimed the abortion right as de rigeur for 
gender equality. Some scholars contend that abortion restrictions constitute 
de jure discrimination against women because there exist no impediments to 
men seeking and obtaining any required medical intervention to protect their 
lives, health, and quality of life, i.e., women's rights are abridged in a way that 
men's are not.17 Another version of this argument is that denying abortion 
involves the bodily co-optation of women for “the use and control of others” 
in a world where law and policy do not make similar demands of men’s 
bodies.18 Others contend that such laws are based on traditional assumptions 
about the "proper roles" that men and women should play in society — that 
women are responsible for children and the home while men's duties lie in 
the world of work and politics.19 Enforcing these stereotypes through law 
engenders many equality concerns. First, mandating that women become 
mothers irrespective of their individual desires negates women's autonomy, a 
right necessary for women's recognition as equal agents in society.20 Second, 
some feminists argue that by coercing women into motherhood — a social 
role that limits women’s ability to participate as equals in the public sphere 
— abortion restrictive regulation constrains women’s ability, as a class, to gain 
economic, political, and social power on an equal basis with men.21 Under 
 
16 See infra Chapter 3. 
17 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29-44 (1992). The author acknowledges that abortion restrictions can significantly impact 
men who are transgender and non-binary persons. But as the dissertation will demonstrate, abortion restrictions 
are animated by and perpetuate gender hierarchy between women and men. It is necessary for an equality 
theory on abortion to address the social category of women rather than a non-gendered personal form. The 
author hopes that just as Catharine MacKinnon's theory of sexual assault is of use to gender-diverse persons, the 
gender theory of abortion rights in this dissertation addresses the harms suffered by gender identity minorities 
who cannot realize their reproductive freedom. 
18 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971); Andrew Koppleman, 
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1984). 
19 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) [hereinafter Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body]. Reva Siegel, Equality and 
Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & 
L. 63 (2013); For an in-depth discussion, see infra Chapter 3. 
20 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 409, 417–18 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger, Decisional Dignity] 
21 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20.  
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this view, anti-abortion laws impair women's equality not only because they 
subject women to a prescriptive role but also because the particular role in 
question—motherhood — comes with high costs to women's personal, 
educational, economic, and political lives. Such impacts are often heightened, 
depending on the context, for women of color, migrant women, and women 
in lower socio-economic circumstances.22 The theory asserts that the 
cumulative ramifications of these associated with motherhood costs ensure 
that women — as a class — cannot gain the power and authority necessary 
to upend gendered inequalities.23 
Notably, the social and legal history of abortion law in Ireland reflects 
much of this theory in practice. A gendered ideology drove the 8th 
amendment with women's role as mothers at its apex.24 For most of the 20th 
century, establishing Ireland's status as a pious, patriarchal State required 
Irish women to adhere to strict rules about their sexuality and roles.25 Deeply 
entrenched in law and policy, the status quo rarely faced challenges. As such, 
when women secured modest gains on contraception access in the late 
1970s26 The backlash was swift. Led by anti-choice politicians, segments of 
the Catholic hierarchy, and prominent members of the medical 
establishment, conservative forces mobilized to insert the 8th amendment into 
the Irish Constitution as a way to reassert women's obligation to bear and 
rear children.27 To prevent what they saw as any further liberal 
encroachments on the “traditional order” that defined their aspirations for 
the nation, the 8th amendment and its recognition that the “unborn’s” life was 
equal to that of the “mother” placed a constitutional barrier in the way of 
women’s status as equal citizens. 
Notwithstanding the many parallels, the Irish abortion story departs from 
the abortion narratives offered by feminist theorists in some critical ways. Irish 
women who sought abortions for any reason other than their imminent death 
could not have one in Ireland. But they could legally travel abroad to have 
one. As such, Irish abortion restrictions did not, in the majority, subject 
women to the harms of forced motherhood (though this indeed happened in 
some cases) just described.28 Rather, the law communicated to all women that 
 
22 See, e.g., Risa Kaufman State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s Equality by Eliminating Reproductive-Based 
Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ 190 (2001). The dissertation examines the discriminatory intersectional 
impacts of restrictive abortion laws in Chapter 3. See infra Chapter 3, pp 164-166. 
23 Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 
EMORY L.J. 815, 823-24 (2007) [hereinafter Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments]. See also, Neil Siegel, The New 
Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights, 25 (1) YALE JOUR. OF LAW & THE HUMANITIES, 55 
(2013). 
24 See infra Chapter 3 pp 150. 
25 See generally, LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION: THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY 
IRELAND (2005); Siobhan Mullally, Gendered Citizenship: Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland 27(1) H RTS. Q., 78 
(2005). 
26 McGee v. Att’y Gen., [1974] IR 284 (Ir.) [hereinafter, McGee]. See also infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra Chapter 3 at p.150. 
28 See supra note 20-23 and accompanying text. 
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the nation did not respect their autonomy and that they needed to leave if 
they wished to assert it; in addition to rejecting women's autonomy, forcing 
women abroad inflicted burdens of stigma and shame on thousands of 
women. 29 Generating a climate of fear and recrimination, the law drove 
women to conceal their actions and be silent about their abortions and their 
defiance of Irish laws. Censoring a striking legacy of women's resistance to the 
gendered State, the 8th amendment — and the punishing stigma it 
engendered — redoubled its efforts to suppress women’s agency.30  
In this way, the efforts of the Irish abortion rights movement can be seen 
as a struggle for the recognition of women's equality. They sought to "remove 
the shackles of abortion restrictions."31 And say goodbye to an Ireland that 
brutally suppressed women. Repeal was less about whether abortions should 
be legally procurable in Ireland — with more than twelve Irish women having 
abortions every day, abortion was already very much an ingrained part of 
Irish reality — and more about delivering upon years of campaigning for a 
society of equals. The thousands who cried in Dublin Castle following the 
referendum results did so in delight, relief, and (dis)belief that such a society 
was in sight.32 
Using the story of abortion law in Ireland as a contextual framework for 
its arguments, this dissertation studies the law and practice of human rights 
on abortion. An in-depth study of how Irish pro-choice campaigners used (or 
did not use) international human rights over the lifetime of the 8th amendment 
(1983 - 2018) offers timely insights for scholars, advocates, and policymakers 
seeking to understand the reach and influence of international human rights 
standards on abortion.  This case study provides insights into the conditions 
under which the power of international human rights advocacy is amplified 
or stifled. 
Concluding that international human rights law’s equivocal recognition 
of abortion rights inhibited its utility as an emancipatory tool for abortion 
rights, this dissertation proceeds to its primary inquiry: an examination of the 
gendered limits of human rights law on abortion. Applying a feminist lens to 
current human rights law doctrine on abortion, the dissertation suggests that 
despite significant international law developments on abortion rights in the 
past 20 years, the relative invisibility of gender analysis is a critical limit on 
the law's transformative potential. The doctrine avoids scrutinizing the 
gender inequalities that animate abortion restrictions and provides an 
 
29 The dissertation develops this theory in Chapter 3. 
30 Id.  
31 Maeve Taylor et al., The Irish Journey: Removing the shackles of abortion restrictions in Ireland 62 BEST PRACT RES 
CLIN OBSTET GYNAECOL 36 (2020). 





incomplete account of the gendered effects of abortion restrictions. Moreover, 
in the cases where human rights law affirms women's abortion rights, this 
affirmation appears to depend on a woman's ability to fit the gendered mold 
of a powerless victim.  
To foreground this dissertation's case study, Chapter 1 chronologizes the 
legal and political developments that shaped Irish abortion law. Beginning 
with the colonial import from Britain in 1856, the chapter documents both 
pro and anti-choice efforts to define abortion in Irish law right up to the post-
repeal legal framework. Outlining the many political battles, the many 
constitutional referendums and a limited number of cases involving women 
who suffered under the 8th, and litigation and advocacy campaigns, the 
chapter describes the development of Irish abortion law, including its political 
and organizational dynamics. 
Chapter 2 delves into these dynamics, focusing on the role of international 
human rights law in the Irish abortion law reform movement. The chapter 
first places abortion within the context of international human rights law by 
analyzing the origins and doctrinal development of international law 
standards on abortion. Following this analysis, the chapter maps and critically 
positions the use of international human rights advocacy over the 35-year 
lifespan of the 8th amendment. Adopting a longer view of Repeal than the 
referendum campaign, this analysis does not try to explain how "the Yes vote 
was won." Nor does it set out to prove that international human rights law 
was dispositive in delivering the referendum result. The study establishes the 
points at which human rights advocacy affected the movement and its goals 
— both transformative and ambivalent. 
Chapter 3 contains the critique of international human rights law as 
gender-blind. The chapter first places abortion rights within feminist thought 
on the relationship between abortion rights and gender equality. To 
concretize and expand this line of feminist theory, the dissertation revisits the 
political and social history of abortion law in Ireland. Probing the roots of the 
8th amendment and its considerable impacts on the lives of Irish women, the 
chapter exposes the gender stereotypes that undergirded the Irish law and the 
inequalities engendered. The concrete and status-based harms to women's 
autonomy are identified as critical subordinating impacts, while Ireland's 
censorship of women's resistive agency is highlighted as a previously 
unexplored feminist critique of abortion regulation. Building on this analysis 
and feminist critiques of international law, the dissertation examines the 
distinct ways that human rights law misses the gendered dynamics of abortion 
rights. First, the critique describes the law's overly deferential approach to 
national authorities in abortion cases and shows how it routinely leaves 
harmful abortion restrictions unscathed. Second, acknowledging the inroads 
that the doctrine has made in identifying many of the egregious impacts of 
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abortion restrictions on women, the critique asserts that the harms recognized 
to date are overly narrow - leaving fundamental equality concerns 
unaddressed, human rights law appears blind to the gender subordination 
perpetuated by abortion restrictions. Third, the critique establishes that the 
law trades in narratives about women and abortion that appear to condition 
women’s recognition as rightsholders on their powerlessness.  Including a 
brief discussion of how a gendered approach could be incorporated into 
human rights law in practice, the chapter suggests that rather than being 
overly radical, linking the abortion right with gender equality may have 
strategic as well as theoretical benefits. 
The dissertation attempts to conclude by balancing the hopeful and 
critical lessons about human rights. Reminding the reader international 
human rights law helped propel Irish abortion law reform, the conclusion 
reiterates the empowering legitimizing, and mobilizing influences of human 
rights for reproductive rights movements. The dissertation suggests that this 
makes it all the more important for human rights law to remedy its gendered 
discords. Additionally, the author forewarns that a gendered human rights-
based approach to abortion may prove especially important amidst the 
ascendency of transnational anti-gender equality politics. As movements 
seeking to roll back protections for women and LGBT+ persons proliferate, 
international human rights law needs to confront rather than conceal the 


























To explore international human rights law and practice on abortion, this 
dissertation combines several scholarly approaches: doctrinal analysis, 
historical research, feminist legal methods, and an assessment of "law-in-
action."33  
A case study of the law, politics, and impacts of Ireland's abortion law 
concretizes the dissertation's analysis of international human rights and law 
and practice. To anchor the dissertation’s reliance on the Irish abortion story, 
Chapter 1 uses legal and historical research — drawing from secondary 
literature, parliamentary debates (dating back to the formation of the State), 
judicial decisions, newspapers, and discussions with historians — to provide 
the necessary contextual background on abortion law and politics in Ireland. 
Chapter 2 distills international human rights law standards on abortion 
from an in-depth analysis of international and regional human rights treaties 
and the jurisprudence emanating from the human rights monitoring 
mechanisms established under these treaties, namely regional courts and UN 
Treaty Monitoring Bodies.34 This "jurisprudence" consists of case law and 
interpretive guidance from UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies in the form of 
"General Comments" or "Recommendations," which provide detailed 
interpretation of specific treaty provisions and "concluding observations" on 
States' compliance with the Treaty in question. Included in the assessment of 
the development of the normative standards on abortion are relevant 
international consensus documents and certain reports from UN Special 
Procedures. When analyzing certain case-law and the claims of the parties,35  
The author also used insight from her experience working as a human rights 
attaché with the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs from 2014-2015. 
Similarly, in-person experience informed her assessment of the CEDAW 
Committee's application of human rights law standards.  Monitoring the 
CEDAW's review of Ireland in 2017 in Geneva and "off-the-record" 
discussions with CEDAW Committee members helped the author clarify (and 
later conceptualize) the Committee's approach to abortion.  
Chapter 2 of the dissertation goes beyond looking at the content of 
international norms to focus on how activists used the norms in different 
spaces and contributed to forming the law. By studying archival campaign 
materials, judicial opinions, submissions to UN Treaty monitoring bodies, 
 
33 Rebecca L. Sandefur, When Is Law in Action? 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 59 (2015) 
34 Treaty Monitoring Bodies are established under most UN human rights treaties to monitor State compliance 
with their treaty obligations.  
35  Mellet v. Ireland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (2016) [hereinafter Mellet v. Ireland] and Whelan v 
Ireland, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 (2017) [hereinafter Whelan v. Ireland] 
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over 42 interviews with advocates,36 newspapers and other media sources, the 
case study identifies who used human rights, when, where, and why. 
Providing a detailed qualitative and quantitative examination of the use of 
international human rights advocacy by pro-choice advocates during the 35-
year lifespan of the 8th amendment, this "Human Rights Law in Action" study 
identifies the relative impacts of human rights strategies in the Irish context, 
both radical and moderate. The author situates this analysis within 
international relations and international law debates about the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of human rights law, institutions, and movements.37 as well as 
social movement theories more broadly. The contextualized multi-
disciplinary study contributes to these bodies of literature, particularly 
theories that emphasize social movements and activists as the entrepreneurs 
of human rights change.  
Chapter 3's multilayered critique of human rights law on abortion relies 
on a number of feminist methods and insights. The chapter used feminist legal 
theory —primarily anti-stereotyping theory and anti-subordination theory —
to explain why abortion restrictions are fundamentally a matter of gender 
inequality. Similar theoretical approaches inform the chapter's critique of 
international human rights jurisprudence, which also draws on long-standing 
"feminist international law critiques."38 And while the dissertation devotes 
little attention to Catharine MacKinnon's insights on abortion rights, her 
methods — uncovering the gender of ostensibly neutral processes and 
demonstrating how that purported neutrality legitimates inequality39 — are 









36 The author interviewed individuals from leading non-governmental organizations, members of grassroots 
organizations, representatives of anti-choice organizations, lawyers involved in different cases, journalists, 
politicians who publicly advocated for abortion rights, government officials, and service providers, including 
those who helped women travel abroad or distributed the abortion pill. These interviews were in-person in the 
following locations: Dublin, Ireland, in June - July 2016 and June 2018; Belfast, Ireland in May 2016; Geneva, 
Switzerland in March 2017; and New York, USA in July 2018. Some advocates were interviewed twice, in June-
July 2016, and following the referendum result. 
37 See infra Chapter 2. 
38 See infra Chapter 3. 
39 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE [hereinafter CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 




CHAPTER 1: THE IRISH ABORTION STORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
TIMELINE 
 
As in many nations that Britain once colonized, criminal prohibition on 
abortion in Ireland dated back to the British Offences Against the Person Act 
1861. The Act codified a common law criminalization of abortion40 and 
made it a criminal offense — punishable by life imprisonment —for a woman 
to procure her "own miscarriage."41 Persons who assisted a woman seeking 
an abortion could also be convicted of a felony.42 Though Ireland became a 
“free state” in 1922, the 1861 British act was carried over and remained on 
Irish statute books.43 In 1983, the Irish people voted to enshrine in the 
Constitution a right to life for the fetus, which held equivalence with the right 
to life of the pregnant woman (the 8th amendment). In 2013, the Oireachtas 
(the Irish legislature) legislated on abortion for the first time, not to change 
the law, but to clarify that in cases where a pregnant woman's life was at risk, 
the criminality of abortion subsided.44 Five years later, in May 2018, the Irish 
people voted by referendum to remove the 8th amendment and replace it 
with a text permitting the Oireachtas to legislate for liberal abortion access in 
Ireland.45 In January 2019, a law to permit abortion access without restriction 
as to reason up to the 12th week of pregnancy came into force in Ireland.46 
This chapter charts the events that culminated in such a significant reform. 
 
40 At common law, abortion of the “quickened fetus” was considered a “heinous misdemeanor.” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, 129-130 (4th ed. 1771). This misdemeanor became a felony in 1803 under Lord 
Ellenborough's Act 1803. See also SPUC v. Open Door [1988] IR 593, 597 (H.Ct.) (Ir.).  
41 §58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provided that: "Every woman, being with child, who, with 
intent to procure her miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to 
procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or not be with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or 
cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other 
means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be 
kept in penal servitude for life."  
42 Under § 59, assisting with the procurement of abortion was also criminal. The move to criminalize abortion in 
the UK was in part due to the efforts of the (male-dominated) medical profession to control reproductive 
medicine. See generally COMPLAINTS AND DISORDERS: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF SICKNESS (Barbara Ehrenreich 
eds., 1974). 
43 Before 1922, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, which governed the territory by direct rule. In 1921, 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland partitioned the island into two self-
governing polities: Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Six counties in the north remained part of the United 
Kingdom while the other 26 counties on the island gained limited independence, becoming the Irish Free State. 
In 1949, the Free State became the Republic of Ireland.  
44 PLDPA supra note 3. This Act reaffirmed abortion as an illegal practice in Ireland and retained the 
punishment of a maximum of 14 years in imprisonment for procuring one in Ireland. The Act sets out specific 
incidents where termination was legal under the 'mother's life-at-risk' exemption. 
45 The Thirty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018 (Act No. C36/2018) (Ir.) stated that “provision 
may be made by law for the regulation of termination of pregnancy.” 




A. Law and Abortion in the Irish Free State 1922-1983 
As in all jurisdictions where abortion is restricted, women in Ireland with 
unwanted pregnancies tried to end them.47 In a State that also banned the 
import and sale of contraceptives until 1979, at which point it became legal 
only for married women,48 the number of unplanned pregnancies was likely 
very high. For many Irish women, this prohibitive regime around family 
planning meant a reproductive lifetime of becoming pregnant year on year, 
giving birth to a child after child once married.49 Others, however, challenged 
this fate, and while the data is limited, there exists a hushed history of illegal 
abortion, along with infanticide, birth concealment, and self-harm when 
pregnant.50 For those who aborted their pregnancies, most did so without 
ever coming into contact with authorities by relying on an underground 
network of ‘handywomen’—self-trained abortion providers— or taking pills 
and potions at home.51 Several abortion providers, however, faced criminal 
sanction; records from 1922 to 1968 indicate a small flow of prosecutions 
under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for those who assisted with 
or carried out abortions.52 One provider was even sentenced to death when 
a woman died after receiving an abortion from her.53 
Legal developments in mid-century Britain gradually helped provide a 
safer and legal alternative for women seeking to end their pregnancies. In 
1939,  Rex v. Bourne provided a defense  for assisting with or carrying out 
abortion under the Offences Against the Person Act, where the Act was done 
"in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."54 The 
Court distinguished between "unlawful abortion" as prohibited by sections 58 
 
47 Countries with stricter abortion laws have higher abortion rates than countries with liberal laws. The abortion 
rate is 37 per 1,000 women in countries that prohibit abortion altogether or allow it only to save a woman's life 
and 34 per 1,000 in countries that allow abortion without restriction as to the reason. See, Guttmacher Institute, 
Unintended Pregnancy, and Abortion Worldwide (2020) https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-
worldwide. 
48 Irish Statute Book: Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935 (Pub. Stat. No. 6/1935) § 17) 17(1) provided that “It 
shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose, offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to 
import into Saorstat Eireann for sale, any contraceptive." Historian Sandra McAvoy contends that this law was a 
response by the Free State to purported contraception access and suspected abortifacient use. See Sandra 
McAvoy, From Anti-Amendment Campaigns to Demanding Reproductive Justice: The Changing Landscape of Abortion Rights 
Activism in Ireland, 1983–2008 in JENNIFER SCHWEPPE, THE UNBORN CHILD, ARTICLE 40.3.3 AND ABORTION 
IN IRELAND 15-27. [hereinafter, Sandra McAvoy] 
49 CIARA MEEHAN, A JUST SOCIETY FOR IRELAND? 1964-1987, 167 (2013) (Kindle Reader) [hereinafter, CIARA 
MEEHAN]. 
50 See, e.g., Pauline Conroy, “Dúirt bean liom," 'A woman told me,' Punishing the productive and the reproductive in, THE 
ABORTION PAPERS, VOLUME 2 (Aideen Quility ed., 2015) 34, 40 (describing how the State’s prohibition on 
abortion and contraception led to women adopting other means of “fertility control” including Magdalene 
laundries for women pregnant with an illegitimate child, infanticide, birth concealment, and illegal abortion).  
51 See, e.g., Cara Delay, Pills, Potions, and Purgatives: Women and Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 WOMEN’S 
HIST. REV. (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09612025.2018.1493138. 
52 PAULINE JACKSON, THE DEADLY SOLUTION TO AN IRISH PROBLEM: BACKSTREET ABORTION (1983) 2 
(suggesting that there were 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between 1926 and 1974). 
53 Id. 
54 I939 1 KB 687, 694. 
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and 59 of the Act and the "lawful abortion" in the Bourne case where the 
defendant surgeon gave an abortion to a 14-year-old victim of rape.55 The 
Court noted that an abortion to end a pregnancy that would otherwise “make 
the woman a physical or mental wreck” could also be interpreted as life-
saving.56 
Despite involving the same abortion legislation that governed Ireland, 
Bourne was not a binding precedent in Ireland. As a separate legal system, the 
decision of the English Court had no direct influence on Irish law.57 Travel 
to the UK for abortion rose following Bourne, but border restrictions travel 
during WWII and the relatively narrow parameters of the criminal exemption 
limited abortion travel.58 However, the next shift in British abortion law had 
a dramatic impact on abortion travel. The Abortion Act of 1967, which 
became law on April 27, 1968, in parts of Britain59 provided that: 
 
(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offense under the law 
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the 
opinion, formed in good faith- 
 
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated; 
 
or (b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would 
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped.60 
 
Born from a combination of public health concerns about congenital 
disabilities caused by thalidomide.61, maternal deaths from unsafe abortion, 
 
55 Id. at 695. 
56 Id. at 696. 
57 See SPUC v Grogan (no. 5) [1998] 4 IR 343, 381-382, (where McNaughten J stated the prevailing legal view 
was that "the Bourne approach could not have been adopted in this country consistent with the Constitution 
prior to the 8th Amendment." See also Hamilton CJ in X v Att’y Gen., [1992] 1 IR. 
58See, e.g., Pauline Jackson, Trials and Tribulations, 18(1) CANADIAN J. OF IRISH STUD., WOMEN AND IRISH POL. 
112, 113-114 (1992) (arguing that Irish women traveled to mainland Britain to seek abortions before the 1967 
Act, but travel was expensive and complicated and during the Second World War it severely restricted. From 
1939 to 1946, journies to the UK required a police-issued travel permit which expanded the market for illegal 
abortion on Irish soil.  
59 The Act was not extended to Northern Ireland. 
60 Abortion Act 1967 §1, 87 HALS. STAT http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/section/1/enacted.   
61 Thalidomide was a medication widely prescribed for pregnant women in the United Kingdom to ease 
morning sickness but was later discovered to cause severe impairments in fetal development. See generally, Kate 
Gleeson, Persuading Parliament: Abortion Law Reform in the UK, 22(2) AUSTRALASIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 23, 24, 
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and a growing abortion rights movement,62 the Act dramatically expanded 
legal abortion access in Britain by expanding the exemptions to the 
criminalization of abortion under the Offences Against the Person Act. Under 
the Abortion Act, which remains in place today, a person is not guilty of a 
crime if the abortion is carried out on licensed premises by a registered 
medical practitioner63 (i) following a good faith opinion that the pregnancy 
could be injurious to the physical or mental health of the woman or her 
family, or (ii) up to twenty-four weeks in the case of a severely handicapped 
fetus.64 The legislation had no legal effect in Ireland (which was, by this point, 
a  Republic)65 but thousands of Irish women felt its impact for decades to 
come.66 Women with money to pay for travel and the procedure in the UK 
could now legally end unwanted pregnancies across the Irish Sea. The 
resulting “abortion trail” 67 — traveled by thousands of Irish women — lasted 
for over 50 years. 
 
B. Constitutional Amendment (1983) 
 
Britain was not alone in liberalizing its abortion law in this era (the late 
'60s and '70s); the United States legalized abortion in 1973, France in 1975, 
Sweden in 1974, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, the Netherlands in 1981. 
Ireland, however, moved in the opposite direction. In 1983, it became the 
first country in the world to enshrine in its Constitution a right to life for the 
"unborn."  Inserted via constitutional amendment, the right to life of the 
"unborn" held equivalence to the right to life of the pregnant woman, reading 
as follows: 
 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right.68 
 
A formidable civil society movement orchestrated the amendment's 
passage. Officially launched in April 1981, the Pro-Life Amendment 
 
30, 31 (2007). 
62 See, e.g., DAVID MARSH, ABORTION POLITICS (1981).  
63 There have been recent developments on this. See, e.g., BBC News, Judge Throws Out Challenge to Scots Abortion Pill 
Move, BBC (August 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-45196213.   
64 SALLY SHELDON, BEYOND CONTROL: MEDICAL POWER AND ABORTION CONTROL (1997). 
65 Ireland became a republic in 1937. See supra note 37. 
66 See, e.g., Brian Girvan, Social Change and Moral Politics: the Irish Constitutional Referendum 1983, 34 (1) POL. STUD.  
61 (1986). 
67 See ANN ROSSITER, IRELAND’S HIDDEN DIASPORA: THE ABORTION TRAIL AND THE MAKING OF A 
LONDON-IRISH UNDERGROUND, 1980-2000 (2009).  
68 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3. 
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Campaign (PLAC) comprised a myriad of Catholic and other pro-life groups; 
it had the support of the Irish Medical Association, the majority of elected 
politicians, and the Catholic Church hierarchy.69 PLAC’s official argument 
was that a “pro-life” constitutional amendment was necessary to prevent 
judicial development of a constitutional right to abortion as had happened in 
the United States in Roe v. Wade.70 This fear of judicial activism seemingly 
arose following the 1974 Irish case of McGee v AG.71 where the Court inferred 
a constitutional right to contraception for married couples from an 
unenumerated constitutional right to marital privacy.72 Without decisive legal 
action, the PLAC argued, the Irish Supreme Court could do what the US 
Supreme Court had done in Roe and extend the holding in McGee to infer a 
right to abortion.73 
In reality, the specter of an extension of the law to define a right to 
abortion following McGee seemed unlikely. The Irish Supreme Court had 
been explicit in McGee v AG, albeit obiter dicta, that the right to contraception 
did not extend to limiting family size by abortion.74 As to the argument that 
potential judicial activism in Ireland had to be blocked, it is not clear whom 
 
69  See generally TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 
1983 (1990) (describing the history and goals of PLAC); see also EMILY O' REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE 
RIGHT; Rosanna Cooney, Story of the 8th: How Right-Wing Catholic Groups Staged a Remarkable Political Coup, JOE.IE, 
https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-right-wing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-political-
coup-614595. See also, Fintan O’Toole, Why Ireland Became the Only Country in the World to Have a Constitutional Ban on 
Abortion, IR. TIMES, (August 26, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/why-ireland-became-the-only-
country-in-the-democratic-world-to-have-a-constitutional-ban-on-abortion-1.1907610. 
70 410 US 113 (1973).  
71 McGee, supra note 25. The importation of contraceptives had been illegal since 1935. Mrs. Mary McGee was 
twenty-seven years old when she gave birth to her third and fourth children, twin daughters in November of 
1970. Following the birth, McGee's doctor advised her that another pregnancy could endanger her life because 
her latest pregnancies had been "complicated by serious attacks of cerebral thrombosis." Mrs. McGee attempted 
to follow her doctor's orders by ordering contraceptive jelly from the United Kingdom to stop her from 
conceiving again. However, customs officials, citing the 1935 statute, seized McGee's contraceptives when they 
arrived in Ireland, which prompted her to challenge the restrictive law. On December 19, 1973, the Irish 
Supreme Court ruled that the McGee's right to privacy within their marriage trumped legal prohibitions on 
importing contraceptives. It was 1979 before a Health (Family Planning) Act enabled married couples to request 
contraceptives, including condoms, on prescription – though provision was made for doctors to refuse to provide 
this service on conscientious grounds. It was 1993 before condoms became freely available, without an age limit, 
from commercial outlets and vending machines. See Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in 
Ireland: the Making of a Dystopian Regime, in THE ABORTION PAPERS: VOLUME 2, 49 (Aideen Quility ed., 2015). 
[hereinafter, Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in Ireland]. 
72 [1974] IR 284-85; Constitution of Ireland art. 40.3.1, "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as 
practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state 
recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."  
73 William Binchy, Marital Privacy and Family Law: A Reply to Mr. O'Reilly, 66 IRISH STUD. (1977) 264, 333; William 
Binchy, The need for a Constitutional Amendment in ABORTION AND LAW: DOCTRINE AND LIFE, (AUSTIN FLANNERY. 
EDS. 1983) 116, 121 (William Binchy was the chief legal advisor of PLAC).  See also Ursula Barry, Abortion in the 
Republic of Ireland, 29 FEMINIST L. REV. 57, 58 (1988).  
74 In McGee, Justice Walsh stated that "any action on the part of either the husband and wife or of the State to 
limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offense against the 
common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question." McGee, supra note 
13. Nevertheless, the pro-life lobby claimed that “whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are 
encouraging they do not in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection for the 
unborn.” See, The Irish Association Lawyers for The Defence of the Unborn, Newsletter 2 (1983). 
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PLAC believed could mount a legal attack that would persuade the judiciary 
to liberalize access to abortion in deeply Catholic 1980s Ireland.75  There was 
no fervent national movement to legalize abortion at the time that needed to 
be defended against.76 Though, in February 1980, Ireland had its first-ever 
"Women's Right to Choose" public meeting in Trinity College Dublin,77 
students mostly attended it, and the informal organization was the only group 
in the country speaking out in favor of abortion rights.78 Additionally, its 
resources were predominantly spent establishing and maintaining the Irish 
Pregnancy Counselling Centre to provide counseling services to pregnant 
women and abortion referrals to British clinics when requested.79 The Well 
Woman Centre, another non-directive counseling center, was the only other 
organization concerned with abortion, and the Centre’s focus was on referrals 
to the UK rather than legal mobilization. By contrast, “pro-life” groups 
dominated Irish civil society. The most prominent group, the Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), originally an English organization 
formed to oppose Britain’s 1967 Abortion Act, held demonstrations up and 
down the country, visited classrooms without restriction to display supposed 
visuals of abortion procedures, and held hundreds of public meetings.80 
SPUC was so well organized and well-resourced that it ultimately provided 
PLAC with a ready-made network of campaigners in every parish.81 
Nor was the legislature a threat. No representative in the Oireachtas had 
ever suggested that they favor liberalizing abortion law in Ireland. The 
statutory prohibitions of the Offences against the Person Act had been 
reaffirmed in Irish law in 197982 and protection for the “unborn child” had 
repeatedly been recognized in legislation.83 Legally and politically, the 
 
75 A rich body of scholarship has examined the impact of the Catholic Church on Ireland in the 20th century 
and, in particular, on the State's suppression of women. See Caitriona Beaumont, Women, Citizenship and Catholicism 
in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948, 6 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 563 (1997); Yvonne Scannal, The Constitution and the Role 
of Women, 111, DE VALERA'S CONSTITUTION AND OURS: THOMAS DAVIS LECTURES (Brian Farrell ed., 1988); 
Maebh Harding, “Religion and Family law in Ireland,” 159, The Place of Religion in Family Law: A Comparative 
Search (Jane Mair, eds. 2011) 159; NO COUNTRY FOR WOMEN, (RTE 2018).   
76 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Irish women's movement of the 60s and 70s made gains on 
contraception access, rights for unmarried mothers, and women's property rights. However, abortion was not a 
priority for the many women's campaigns of this time. See, e.g., Pauline Conroy, “Dúirt bean liom… A woman told 
me… Punishing the productive and the reproductive” 34 in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2, 43 (Aideen 
Quility ed., 2015). 
77 Rosanna Cooney, Story of the 8th: how right-wing Catholic groups staged a remarkable political coup, JOE. IE, 
https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-right-wing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-political-
coup-614595; EMILY O’ REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT, 56. See generally Sandra McEvoy, supra note 65 
at 21-22. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 CIARA MEEHAN, supra note  49. EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT, 54. 
81 Ciara Meehan, id. 
82 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 (Act No. 20/1979), §10.  
83 Civil Liability Act 1961, (Act No. 41/1961), §58, (outlining clearly that “for the avoidance of doubt it is hereby 
declared that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child for his protection in like manner as if the 
child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive.”) See also Brenda Daly, Braxton Hick's or the Birth of a 
New Era – Tracing the Development of Ireland's Abortion Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence 18 
EUR. J. OF HEALTH L. 375, 376 (2011). 
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“unborn” was safe in Ireland. 
Some members of the PLAC movement entertained legal possibilities 
other than a referendum to prevent abortion access, including criminalizing 
women who had abortions abroad, physically preventing women from 
leaving the country to have abortions, or prosecuting abortion referral 
agencies.84 Such proposals were deemed unworkable or unpalatable; PLAC's 
legal adviser conceded that prosecuting women for traveling to England for 
abortions or attempts to physically stop women from traveling could provoke 
harsh criticism that Irish politicians would likely not be able to withstand.85 
Notwithstanding the implausibility of PLAC’s assessment of the need for 
a constitutional amendment to prevent the liberalization of abortion law in 
Ireland, the group managed to secure a commitment from the leaders of 
Ireland’s two main political parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – for a 
constitutional referendum on abortion. Contemporaneous commentators 
describe the 1983 referendum campaign as an enraged and divisive battle.86 
but securing the initial political agreement to hold a referendum was 
surprisingly easy for the PLAC. Instability characterized Irish electoral 
politics in the early 1980s – there were three general elections in the 14 
months between June 1981 and November 1982 – and the respective party 
leaders were eager to appease an influential conservative alliance like 
PLAC.87 Additionally, the party leaders did not want to risk being labeled 
"baby killers" during a chronic election cycle.88 Writing at the time, a former 
Government minister turned political commentator described the decisions 
of the two-party leaders as "nothing to do with the right to life of the unborn, 
except the right of politicians to political life."89 Both political parties 
embraced the PLAC's demand for a constitutional amendment, but the 
wording of the amendment itself became a matter of political football between 
the two political parties.90 Each respective draft legal text was grounded in 
attempts to satisfy the PLAC lobby, engage different religious leaders, and 
consolidate political support.91 In November 1982, the outgoing Fianna Fáil 
Government published a draft version of the amendment: 
 
84 See, e.g., EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHTS, 61 (1997); John Quinlan, The Right to Life of the 
Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution 1984 BYU L. Rev. 371 (1984).  
85 William Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine, A Legal Perspective in ETHICAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE 
MEDICINE 27(Maurice Reidy ed., 1982). 
86 See, e.g., PAULINE CONROY, THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2 (Aideen Quilty ed., 2015) 
(describing “a vile and venomous atmosphere of denunciation and hatred”). 
87 See, e.g., 339 No. 10 Dáil Deb. Prionsias de Rossa, (Feb. 9, 1985) (Ir.) 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1983-02-09/3/. 
88 See, e.g., CIARA MEEHAN, Supra note  49 quoting journalist Gene Kerrigan who commented that “FitzGerald 
knew that if he didn’t agree to pressure from the Knights of Columbanus-sponsored campaign, he would be in 
danger of being daubed a baby murderer while trying to fight an election.” 
89 EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHTS, 79 (1997) (quoting Conor Cruise O’Brien).  
90 For a detailed account of this, see TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE 
ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 1983 (1990), Chps VI and VII. 




The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right. 
 
No sooner had the incoming Fine Gael Government leader and 
Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, approved the outgoing government's draft than 
he began to consider alternative versions to satisfy others within his party.92 
His Attorney General conveyed grave concerns about the indeterminacy of 
the wording, contending that the amendment could legally prevent doctors 
from intervening when a woman's life was at risk or require the Oireachtas 
(parliament) to legislate for abortion.93 Others raised the fact that the 
amendment provided no definitions for phrases such as the “unborn,”94 “due 
regard” or “as far as practicable.” Nor had the drafters provided guidance on 
how law, policy, or practice could reconcile the equivalence between the right 
to life of the unborn and the right to life of the "mother" in case of a conflict 
between the two.95 
To address the legal uncertainty, the Taoiseach proposed a new text; 
"[n]othing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate, or to deprive of 
force or affect any provision of a law on the ground that it prohibits 
abortion."96 However, the pro-life lobby and their parliamentary allies 
rejected this version. The anti-abortion lobby considered it insufficient to 
insert a clause into the Constitution prohibiting the legislature from legalizing 
abortion; they sought to affirmatively assert fetal rights and looked to the State 
to 'vindicate' those rights.97 No country had ever included fetal rights in its 
Constitution, but this radical aspect of PLAC's proposal did not reduce its 
influence over the process. The government abandoned their text and 
proposed PLAC's favored draft to the Oireachtas as follows: 
 
Protestant churches were among these groups and opposed the amendment, believing that it enforced Catholic 
morals in the State's laws. The Church opposed abortion but felt that the Constitution was not an appropriate 
place for its regulation. TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE ABORTION 
REFERENDUM OF 1983, 158 (1990). 
92 Id. 141. 
93 Statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Ir. Times, 340 Dáil Deb. 
(February 16, 1983) col.473; See also, John A. Quinlan, The Right to Life of the Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth 
Amendment to the Irish Constitution, 1984 BYU L. REV. 371, 389 (1984) [hereinafter, John A. Quinlan, The Right to 
Life]. 
94 Tom Hesketh reveals that even PLAC was worried about the ambiguity of the draft amendment at an earlier 
stage. The Irish version of the amendment (which takes precedence over the English version as per Article 
25.5.4. of the Constitution) calmed their fears because this version was less ambiguous about the unborn, and 
they were satisfied that it could not be interpreted as meaning 'an unborn viable child' but rather the unborn 
fetus from conception. TOM HESKETH,163. 
95 See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter Sutherland, February 8, 1982, 2012/90/667, DEP’T OF TAOISEACH, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES OF IR. 
96 341 Dáil Deb. 2225-30 (1983. 




The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right.98 
 
A majority of the Oireachtas voted in its favor and set a date to put the 
amendment to a public vote. 
Individual public representatives actively campaigned with PLAC, but on 
the whole, political parties did not feature strongly in the public referendum 
campaign that followed.99 The campaign was fought chiefly between PLAC 
and an emergent Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC). The AAC, established 
in mid-1982, was a loose coalition of (i) pro-choice groups including feminists, 
trade unions, and some liberal politicians; and (ii) a small cohort of more 
conservative politicians, a small number of lawyers and medics, and most 
non-Catholic religious leaders in the country.100 The liberal faction of the 
AAC ceded to the more conservative voices in the group such that the AAC 
coalition did not lead an openly “pro-choice” campaign. A woman’s right to 
abortion, even in limited circumstances, was rarely mentioned.101 A Workers' 
Party leaflet, which called for a "No" vote in the referendum, did not mention 
abortion or women.102 For what they considered to be strategic reasons, the 
AAC did not advocate for women’s rights and focused on attacking the 
legitimacy of holding a constitutional referendum on abortion, characterizing 
the amendment as "ill-considered, unnecessary, sectarian."103 and "a 
rubbishly academic exercise."104 The AAC also argued that the referendum 
was a waste of public money, that improving supports for unmarried mothers 
and their children was a more worthwhile use of resources, and that the 
amendment campaign represented a retreat from Ireland's emerging 
openness as a member of the EU.105 
Several members of the AAC opposed abortion rights but were concerned 
about what they perceived as the “sectarian” nature of the amendment. In a 
context where one of the reasons why Protestants in the North of Ireland 
opposed a united Ireland was the feat that "Home Rule would mean Rome 
 
98 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3. 
99 TOM HESKETH, su67 (noting that the TD Oliver Flanagan, Tom O'Donnell, Michael Joe Cosgrave, and Alice 
Glenn campaigned actively in favor of the amendment with PLAC). 
100 TOM HESKETH, 81; See also, Story of the 8th JOE. IE,  https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-right-
wing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-political-coup-614595. 
101 Maev Kennedy, Women 'shut out' from debate,' THE IR. TIMES, September 5, p.11. 
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Rule," some AAC members worried that a constitutional provision reflecting 
distinct Catholic teaching would validate Protestant hesitancy about ever 
rejoining the South.106 In particular, they argued that using the Constitution 
— with its relative permanency and legal supremacy — to protect the ‘right 
to life of the unborn’ would communicate to Ireland’s minority Protestant 
community that living in Ireland meant living under the thumb of the 
Catholic Church. By contrast, they suggested, if abortion was legislatively, 
rather than constitutionally, prohibited, Northern Protestants might feel secure 
that minority positions on social issues could at least be considered and 
debated, rather summarily subsumed by Catholic fundamentalism.107 
Some, albeit very few local grassroots AAC groups, were headed by 
openly pro-choice activists, particularly in the urban centers of Dublin and 
Cork. The AAC, however, generally tamed the more emancipatory claims 
about women’s abortion rights.108 Notably, the activists who foregrounded 
pro-choice arguments were sometimes accused of “playing into the hands of 
PLAC” for voicing their support of abortion rights.109 At times, the AAC 
echoed the concerns about the ambiguous language of the amendment and 
the potentially life-threatening legal and medical confusion it could produce, 
but the office of the Attorney General was entirely alone in publicly 
prioritizing questions about what it would mean for a “mother” to have an 
equal right to life to that of the “unborn” she carries,110 or what state defense 
of the “unborn’s” right to life “as far as practicable”  would look like.111 Would 
the right to life of the unborn be subject to exceptions? Would constitutional 
recognition of the “unborn’s” right to life prevent women from going abroad 
to have abortions? This latter question was posed by civil servants in the 
attorney general's office on several occasions but not the AAC; presumably, 
the AAC did not want to seem to be approving of abortion by travel.  
 The reticence of the AAC to foreground the legal and practical impacts 
of the 8th on pregnant women was matched by the fervor with which the 
PLAC positioned “the unborn” as the subject of the referendum. Similar to 
American anti-abortion discourse at the time, the fetus was presented as a 
 
106 TOM HESKETH, supra note _ at 93. 
107 See, e.g., TOM HESKETH, 57, 70-71. In the 1980s, the Fine Gael government sought to reassure Protestant 
Unionists in Northern Ireland that the republic was not the Catholic theocracy they feared. See also CIARA 
MEEHAN, supra note 74 at pp 160-164. 
108 Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10, 35. 
109 See also Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10, at 26. (Describing how some activists, primarily working-class feminists, 
broke away from AAC to form the “Women’s Right to Choose Campaign” to make arguments about women’s 
rights).  
110 It was not until 2009 that the meaning of 'unborn' was judicially determined as being the "embryo or fetus in 
the womb from implantation" Roche v. Roche [2009] IESC 82. In 2013, §2 of the PLDPA provided that, for its 
purposes, "unborn" is a reference to human life during the period of time commencing after implantation in the 
womb of a woman and ending on the complete emergence of the life from the body of the woman'. PLDPA, 
supra note 3. 
111 See e.g., John Quinlan, 397-398. See also, 339 Dáil Deb. (February 9, 1983) col. 1357.   
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vulnerable and innocent citizen that needed protection.112 The Catholic Press 
asserted that the amendment was “profoundly positive” given that “that 
innocent human life has an intrinsic value.113 The Society for the Protection 
of the Unborn (SPUC) circulated a flyer asking people to make their votes 
count for “those with no voice and no vote.”114 Evoking the post-colonial 
sensibilities of Irish people, another of their pamphlets presented the 
amendment as a means of defending the unborn from "the abortion mills of 
England that grind Irish babies into the blood that cries out to heaven for 
vengeance."115 Women, when featured in the PLAC campaign, were 
presented as one of the threats from which the unborn needed the 
amendment’s protection. The Catholic Bishop of Clonfert, Joseph Cassidy, 
claimed that the most dangerous place for an Irish baby to be was in its 
mother’s womb.116 
Following a campaign dominated by pro-amendment forces, just 54.6% 
of the electorate went to the polls on September 7, 1983— one of the lowest 
referendum turnouts in Irish history. 68% voted in favor of the “pro-life” 
clause, and 32% voted against it.117 And though the anti-abortion lobby 
claimed that the 8th proclaimed the nation’s morals definitively, the precise 
legal meaning of the 8th remained decidedly unclear. The Offences Against 
the Person Act and its near-absolute prohibition on abortion remained on the 
books, but there was no regulation to implement the 8th amendment. 
Critically, there was no guidance for women, healthcare professionals, or state 
officials on how to execute the 8th’s declared equivalence between the right to 
life of “the unborn” and the right to life of “the mother.” Over the next 40 
years, this nebulous unknown of the 8th amendment manifested painfully in 
the country. 
 
C. Legal Campaign After 1983 
 
The 1983 abortion amendment quickly became the most litigated 
amendment of the Irish Constitution. Though the legal cases and the political 
battles surrounding such cases are complicated chronologically, the primary 
theme is recurrent; anti-abortion groups sought sweeping enforcement of the 
amendment via the Irish courts, requiring pro-choice groups to defend 
against even more restrictions on abortion access. 
 
112 See e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION: THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).  
113 As quoted in TOM HESKETH, supra note xx at 49. 
114 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children pamphlet, "Value Your Voice— Value Your Vote." 
115 See, e.g., Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy, The Substantive Issue and the Rhetoric of the Abortion Debate in Ireland, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 141, 147 (Anne Wagner et al. eds., 2005). 
116 See, e.g., NELL MCCAFFERTY, A WOMAN TO BLAME: THE KERRY BABIES CASE 10 (2010). 
117 DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, CMTY. AND LOC. GOV’T REFERENDUM RESULTS 1937-2015, 38. See generally, Sandra 




1. SPUC v. Open Door (1986) 
 
Following the anti-choice victory, most Irish pro-choice groups 
disbanded. Activists switched from advocacy to the provision of non-directive 
counseling to women who sought abortion services abroad.118 The Woman's 
Right to Choose group became the Women's Information Network (WIN). It 
formed clinics in Dublin, which mainly provided information about the 
identity, location, and contact details of British providers, but in certain 
circumstances, the Irish clinics also made abortion appointments for 
women.119 
The anti-abortion lobby responded to the clinics’ attempts to help women 
go abroad by initiating legal proceedings against two clinics.120 Claiming a 
breach of the 8th amendment, the Irish Attorney General (a different one to 
the AG who had warned about the risks to women's lives inherent in the 
amendment) took the case on behalf of the Society for Protection of the 
Unborn Child ("SPUC") and sought an injunction to prohibit the named 
clinics from providing women with information about abortion services 
abroad. In Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and 
the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd,121 the Attorney General argued that, by 
providing information and logistical support for abortions abroad, the clinics 
were “assisting in the destruction of unborn life,” in violation of the 8th 
amendment.122 He added that the counseling activities amounted to “a 
conspiracy to corrupt public morals” under common law and were therefore 
criminal.123 
The clinics defended their activities, claiming that under European 
Community law (as it was then known)124 individuals in Ireland had a right 
to travel to another Member state for commercial services, and therefore the 
clinics were entitled to provide information about these services. An 
injunction, they argued, would also violate their constitutional right to 
freedom of expression.125 
 
118 Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10. 
119 SPUC [1988] IR 593 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
120 Soc'y for Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1988] IR 593 (H. 
Ct.) (Ir.); SPUC v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1989] IR 618 (SC) (Ir.) (affirming the High Court's ruling). 
121 The action, instituted by SPUC, was converted into action by the Attorney General with SPUC as a relator 
on September 24, 1986, thus allowing the Attorney General to prosecute the case. Id. 602-03. 
122 SPUC, [1988] IR 593 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), at 600. 
123 Id. 
124 Before the 1992 Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ 1993, C224/I [Maastricht Treaty], what 
is now known as the European Union (EU) was known as the European Community. European Community law 
takes precedence over all national law, including constitutional law. The European Court of Justice ensures that 
European Community law is enforced. 
125 Article 40.6.1 (i) of the Constitution includes, subject to public order and morality, “the right of the citizens to 
express freely their convictions and opinions.” 
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The High Court did not find that the clinics were engaged in "criminal 
conspiracy," but it issued an injunction against the clinics, finding that their 
activities unlawful under the 8th.126 The clinics’ activities, the Chief Justice 
stated, were within the Irish State, and thus questions of European 
Community law did not arise.127 
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision,128 on the basis that 
the right to freedom of expression was secondary to the unborn fetus's right 
to life.129 In doing so, the Supreme Court suggested that the State's duty to 
protect the right to life of the unborn went beyond an abortion ban; it placed 
an affirmative duty on the State to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. One 
such proactive measure was to prevent the distribution of information in 
Ireland about the availability of abortions in other countries. 
Soon after its defeat in the Irish Supreme Court, one of the clinics, Open 
Door Counselling, filed an action in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The ECtHR case languished until 1992, a delay common for 
ECtHR cases at the time. Awaiting a hearing, the pregnancy centers 
complied, for the most part, with the injunction. In a pre-google world, the 
injunction meant that clinics were prohibited from giving pregnant women 
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of abortion clinics abroad.130 
Fearful of litigation, many clinics shut their doors altogether.131 Social 
workers and other professionals were warned that they could be subject to 
legal action if they provided any form of abortion counseling.132 Bookshops, 
libraries, magazines, and newsagents practiced self-censorship and removed 
material that carried information about British abortion clinics.133 
 
2. S.P.U.C. v. Coogan & SPUC v. Stephen Grogan  
In response to the curtailing of clinic activity, Students’ Unions Ireland 
attempted to fill the information gap, publishing the phone numbers and 
addresses of English abortion clinics in their student handbooks. The SPUC 
 
126 Id. 614. 
127 Open Door, [1988] I.R. 618 (Jr. S.C.) at 625. 
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129 Id.  
130 An underground helpline run by the Women’s Information Network (WIN) was established and linked up 
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and practical help. Other underground groups in Ireland also provided information through informal networks. 
See e.g., Ivana Bacik, Abortion and the Law in Ireland in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2, 104,108 
(Aideen Quility ed., 2015);  see also, ANN ROSSITER, IRELAND’S HIDDEN DIASPORA: THE ‘ABORTION TRAIL’ 
AND THE MAKING OF A LONDON-IRISH UNDERGROUND, 1980-2000 93-103 (2009). 
131 In response, Ruth Riddick, the director of Open Door Counselling, decided to close her counseling center 
"for fear of her clients suffering legal repercussions in a climate of cuddly fetus propaganda and moral hysteria.” 
See, e.g., Lesley White, A Woman With a Cause Fights Off Old Ireland, SUNDAY TIMES, November 1, 1992. 
132 See, e.g., Anna Eggert & Bill Rolston, Ireland, in ABORTION IN THE NEW EUROPE 157, 166-68 (Anna Eggert 
& Bill Rolston eds., 1994). 
133 LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION, 11. The pregnancy advisory sections of imported publications as 
Cosmopolitan and Elle were blacked out, and British telephone directories were withdrawn from Irish libraries 
because they listed the numbers of termination clinics in Britain. SCHWEPPE, THE UNBORN CHILD, 29. 
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responded quickly. In SPUC v. Coogan134SPUC sought an injunction against 
the students to prevent the printing, publishing, or distributing of the Welfare 
Guide UCD (University College Dublin). The High Court refused this 
application due to lack of standing, but on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the importance of the societal right SPUC was trying to protect and 
recognized that the organization had sufficient standing to sue.135 SPUC used 
this standing to return to the High Court and add two more student unions 
to the proposed injunction in SPUC v. Grogan.136 
SPUC contended that publishing information about abortion clinics was 
essentially the same as the abortion counseling the Irish Courts had already 
prohibited; and that imparting such information violated the right to life of 
the unborn child.137 They repeated the argument that the right to life of the 
unborn was primary and that the students’ calls for the Court to uphold their 
right to freedom of expression could not trump the right to life.138 The 
defendants argued that, under European Community law, the free supply of 
services within the community meant that they were entitled to publish and 
distribute information about abortion services abroad and that pregnant 
women had a right to receive information about the same.139 The students 
also argued that the information they were providing was readily available 
elsewhere, such as British telephone books, and therefore an injunction was 
an ineffective means of ‘vindicating the right to life of the unborn. Turning to 
women’s rights, the students argued that, owing to the potential for 
complications in pregnancy, a woman’s right to bodily integrity required the 
accessibility of basic information about terminating a pregnancy.140 In 
response, SPUC maintained that the provision of abortion could not be 
regarded as being a 'service' because it involved the destruction of the life of 
a human being (the "unborn child"). They argued that women's rights to 
bodily integrity could not take precedence over the right to life of the 
unborn.141 
Before deciding on whether to grant injunctive relief, the sole woman 
judge on the High Court, Justice Carroll, referred two questions to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg for a 'preliminary ruling' as 
follows.142: (1) whether abortion was a “service” within the meaning of the 
 
134 S.P.U.C. v. Coogan, [1989] ILRM 526 (H.Ct.), rev'd, [1990] ILRM 70 (S.C.). 
135 S.P.U.C. v. Coogan, [1989] ILRM 526 1990 [ILRM] 70 (S.C.). 
136 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.), rev'd, [1989] IR 760 (SC), aff'd, remanded, [1992] ILRM 
461 (Case C-159/90, EJC), aff'd slip op. (H. Ct. August 7, 1992).  
137 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.). 
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139 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.) 692-93. 
140 Alan Murdoch, Students Defend Right to Abortion Information, THE INDEPENDENT, August 7, 1992, at 6. 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), formerly Article 117 of the EEC Treaty Establishing 
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Treaty of Rome Article 60143 and; (2) whether Article 59’s prohibition on 
restricting the freedom to supply services meant that the student groups had 
a right to distribute information about abortion services in other Member 
states.144 SPUC appealed to the Supreme Court, which found in their favor 
and issued an injunction against the students.145 The Supreme Court’s 
decision asserted that there could not be any right in European Community 
Law that would allow travel for services that placed the right to life of the 
“unborn” at risk.146 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had no power to stop 
Justice Carroll’s referral to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling. 
The students, despite the injunction and threat of prosecution for 
contempt of court, continued to distribute information.147 
In October 1991, the European Court of Justice agreed with the 
applicants that abortion, as a medical activity provided for remuneration, is 
a “service” under Article 60 of the Treaty of Rome and noted that Article 59 
of the Treaty of Rome prohibits restrictions on the receipt of services.148 
Nevertheless, the students were ultimately unsuccessful. The Court held that 
an injunction against the students did not amount to restricting the freedom 
to supply services under European Community Law because the students had 
no direct links with the service providers.149   
The case, SPUC v. Grogan, returned to the Irish High Court. This time 
around, the High Court instituted a permanent injunction preventing the 
students from disseminating information about international abortion 
services.150 Moreover, the Court passed case papers to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for possible criminal contempt proceedings against students who 
had breached the earlier temporary injunction.151 The students promised to 
continue providing the information about pregnancy advisory services in the 
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UK, stating that they were prepared to risk jail.152 
Though the ECJ had upheld the ban on the students' provision of 
abortion information, the outcome of the case provoked concern amongst 
members of the anti-abortion lobby. The Irish Family Planning Association 
(IFPA) established a direct commercial link with the British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service (BPAS) – an abortion provider in the UK – whereby the 
IFPA referred abortion-seeking women for BPAS's services. Because the 
IFPA was now providing 'customers' to a European service provider, Ireland 
could not prohibit the IFPA's abortion counseling. Now deeply suspicious of 
European law, the anti-abortion lobby grew concerned about the impending 
Maastricht Treaty to create the European Union (EU). The goal of the Treaty 
was the creation of an economic, monetary, and political union among 
Member States of the EU, but anti-abortion campaigners were adamant that 
the 8th amendment needed to be legally insulated from any changes in the 
interplay between Irish law and European Union law. Anti-abortion groups 
mobilized quietly and successfully to convince the government to negotiate a 
protocol to the Treaty that would protect the 8th amendment from any future 
impact of European Union law.153 Protocol 17 read: 
 
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts 
modifying or supplementing those Treaties shall affect the application 
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.154 
 
3.  The Attorney General v. X and Others 
Despite another apparent victory for the Irish anti-abortion lobby, an 
event in February 1992 posed the biggest threat yet to their persistent legal 
and political campaign to maintain the State's abortion ban. In what became 
known as the X case155 the public erupted upon hearing that the State 
attempted to stop a fourteen-year-old girl, who had been raped by her best 
friend's father, from traveling with her parents to London for an abortion. 
Before setting out on their journey, the teenager's parents asked the Gardaí 
(police) if they should preserve a tissue sample to assist with the alleged rapist's 
prosecution. The Gardaí, unsure whether a DNA test would be admissible as 
evidence in Court, referred this question to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, who in turn alerted the Attorney General. The Attorney 
General, assuming the role as the protector of the right to life of the unborn 
 
152 Interview with Prof. Ivava Bacik, July 2016, who was one of the students against whom the injunction was 
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155 Att’y Gen. v. X and Others, [1992] 1 IR 1 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) [hereinafter, Att’y Gen. v. X]. 
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as per the 8th, then sought – and was granted – an injunction from the High 
Court to stop the pregnant girl and her parents from traveling abroad for nine 
months.156 
Known as "Miss X," the girl and her family returned to Ireland upon 
hearing of the injunction. But her case had already sparked mass public 
outcry.157 At a march organized by the Dublin Abortion Information 
Campaign (“DAIC”), 10,000 people chanted for “a woman’s right to 
choose.” 158 It was only a decade before that a majority of the electorate voted 
for an outright abortion ban, but for many, compelling a fourteen-year-old to 
maintain a pregnancy conceived through rape was too much to stomach.159 
The Irish Independent (a newspaper known for supporting the government) 
included an editorial that described the State as having "created a prison" in 
which X and her family had to suffer "for being the entirely innocent victims 
of sexual violence of the worst kind."160 Jon O'Brien of the Irish Family 
Planning Association told international media that “the state appears more 
concerned with protecting the procreative rights of rapists than with 
protecting the rights of their victims.”161 News outlets around the world 
commented on Ireland’s tyrannical approach to a teenager in distress.162 So 
intense was the criticism that the government pleaded with X's parents, who 
at this point did not want any further trauma or attention, to appeal the case 
to the Irish Supreme Court.163 Eventually, the family agreed to appeal, and 
the State footed the bill. 
 
156 The Court rejected the defendant’s four arguments opposing the injunction. Firstly, the High Court dismissed 
the jurisdictional argument advanced, that because the Oireachtas had not regulated how the right to life of the 
unborn and the right to life of the mother referred to in the 8th amendment could be reconciled, the Court could 
make no order in a case in which an issue of reconciliation arose. Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that 
because of the possibility of suicide, the Court would not be affording due regard to the right to life of the girl if it 
upheld the order. The Court reasoned that the risk that X might take her own life if not allowed to travel for an 
abortion was less and different in order of magnitude than the otherwise certain death of the unborn if the order 
was not made. Thirdly, the Court determined that the defendants' contentions that the girl's right to liberty was 
being unlawfully infringed were unfounded since the Court had the power to restrain the abuse of a 
constitutional right when exercised to commit a wrong. And finally, the Court rejected the defendant's argument 
that, as a matter of European Community law, the defendants had a prima facie right to travel to another Member 
State to receive a medical service. A.G. v X, at 11-16. On the EU question, the Court contended that Ireland's 
derogation from EC law on the freedom to travel for services (Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty) would be 
permissible under EC law in this case on grounds that the divergence was based on Ireland's deeply held 
convictions on moral issues. Id at 16. The High Court also asserted that the European Convention of Human 
Rights did not bear on the issue. 
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Within ten days, the Supreme Court reversed the injunction. On appeal, 
X's legal team argued that a 14-year-old girl, pregnant as a result of rape, 
faced a real and substantial risk to her life due to the threat of suicide and that 
termination of her pregnancy was legal under the 8th amendment. The 
Supreme Court agreed. In attempting a reconciliation of the rights of the 
"mother" and "the unborn," the four majority judges agreed that if the 
termination was necessary to keep a woman alive, abortion was permissible 
under the 8th amendment. In the words of Finlay CJ: 
 
the proper test to be applied is that if it is established as a matter of 
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct 
from the health of the mother, which can only be avoided by the 
termination of her pregnancy, that such termination is permissible, 
having regard to the true interpretation of Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution. 164 
 
A majority of the Court accepted evidence provided by a clinical 
psychologist that the girl was suicidal, and they determined that this 
amounted to a "real and substantial" threat to her life that could only be 
alleviated by ending her pregnancy.165 However, the Court did not provide 
any further guidance on other circumstances that might satisfy the test. 
Rather, the judges made clear that they felt less than comfortable to be in the 
“abortion umpiring business.”166 The amendment, “born of public disquiet, 
historically divisive of our people,” was, the Supreme Court said, “bare of 
legislative direction.”167 Their ire was evident in the reprimand delivered to 
the Irish legislature by one of the judges (McCarthy J): 
 
the failure by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no 
longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable. What are pregnant women 
to do? What are the parents of a pregnant girl underage to do? What 
are doctors to do?168 
 
By the time the Irish Supreme Court issued its opinion to lift the High Court 
injunction that February, X had miscarried.169 
Though pro-choice groups welcomed the Supreme Court’s move to lift 
the injunction, some also criticized the limits of the decision. The feeling was 
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that the Court’s interpretation of the 8th was too narrow and still prioritized 
the "unborn." Feminist commentators and activists noted that the State's 
obligation to protect fetal life under the 8th amendment extended only “as far 
as practicable,” but the Supreme Court in X interpreted this to mean that if 
a fetus’ life was at risk, any burden short of mortality could be imposed upon 
pregnant women.170 Endangering a woman’s health or imposing economic 
or emotional suffering did not make state interventions impracticable.171 As 
one journalist emphasized  in the days following the decision, the ruling 
changed little for Irish women; “this week, at least 100 women will travel to 
England for abortions.”172 
Anti-abortion campaigners were also unhappy with the Court’s decision 
in X.173 Arguing that permitting abortion in situations when a woman was at 
risk of suicide subverted the intent of the 1983 referendum, they lobbied the 
government to hold another referendum to overturn the decision. The 
solution in such cases, anti-choice activists claimed, would be to "mind" 
pregnant women who were suicidal,174 so that the pregnancy could be carried 
to term. Within a couple of months, anti-choice lobbying bore success, and 
the government committed to run an abortion referendum to eliminate 
suicide risk as a legal basis for a life-saving abortion. 
 
4. Open Door Counselling Limited v. Ireland 
Before the Government managed to put another abortion referendum to 
the people, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) took up the 
question of whether the Irish Supreme Court’s 1988 injunction against the 
provision of abortion-relation information by pregnancy counselling centers 
was in keeping with the European Convention on Human Rights. Two years 
prior, having exhausted their domestic remedies, the clinics had lodged an 
appeal before the ECHR supervisory bodies, arguing that the Irish ban 
unduly limited their freedom of expression. At that time, cases brought for 
alleged violations of the ECHR were first examined by the European 
Commission on Human Rights,175 which declared the case admissible and 
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made a preliminary decision that the law violated Article 10 of the 
Convention, protecting freedom of speech.176 The State appealed the 
Commission’s decision to the European Court of Human Rights, which 
heard the case two years later in September 1992. 
In Open Door Counselling Limited and Dublin Well-Woman Centre Limited v. 
Ireland, the counseling centers, now joined by applicants Bonnie Maher and 
Ann Downes (who worked as counselors for Dublin Well Woman) along with 
two individual women, Mrs. X and Ms. Maeve Geraghty, who joined as 
women of child-bearing age, argued that the Supreme Court’s injunction 
prohibiting the clinics from distributing information about abortion clinics 
abroad was contrary to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (the right to freedom of expression);177 the clinics and counsellors could 
not impart information, and Mrs. X and Ms. Geraghty could not receive 
information.178 They added that the injunction discriminated against the 
applicants on grounds of political or other opinion under Article 14 of the 
Convention since those who sought to counsel against abortion were 
permitted to express their views without restriction.179 Finally, the clinics 
raised the fundamental issue, namely, abortion’s illegality in Ireland which 
they claimed violated the European Convention; women, they argued, have 
a right to abortion under article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the 
“right to respect for . . . private and family life.”180 
The State successfully argued that Ireland’s prohibition on abortion 
information fell within the scope of permissible restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression in the European Convention; the restriction was 
“prescribed by law” and was “necessary in a democratic society” under one 
of the grounds specified in Article 10 namely, "the protection of public 
morals." The Court accepted that Ireland had a legitimate aim in adopting 
the injunction because the protection of the "unborn child" was predicated 
on the Irish community's "profound moral values concerning the nature of 
life," as reflected in the 1983 referendum. The Court also acknowledged that, 
in general, the Convention affords Member States a wide margin of discretion 
on questions involving the protection of morals within their respective 
communities.181 
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the applicants that the injunction 
against the clinics was “overbroad and disproportionate” and therefore fell 
afoul of the Convention’s protections for freedom of expression.182 The Court 
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held that the injunction was disproportionate to Ireland's legitimate aim of 
protecting the unborn because it appeared to be largely ineffective—it did not 
prevent the large numbers of Irish women from continuing to obtain 
abortions in Britain.183 In the Court’s view, the injunction might delay many 
women—possibly risking the health of such women by causing them to have 
later abortions—but it did not stop the abortion trail. Noting that the clinics 
served many women who faced both educational and socio-economic 
barriers to accessing information, the Court commented that the injunction 
was likely to have adverse effects on women who were already 
disadvantaged.184 The injunction was doing little to implement the 8th 
amendment; rather, it was making it more difficult for women to have the 
safest type of abortion (first trimester) and reinforced the socio-economic 
vulnerabilities of women who did not have access to information elsewhere. 
The Court avoided considering the compatibility of Ireland's 
constitutional ban on abortion with the Convention, but for the advocates, it 
was a win. 185  Moreover, for the first time in the litany of abortion cases since 
the 1983 referendum, a judicial decision took seriously the impact of the 
information ban on women. 
 
D. The 1992 Referendum 
 
In November 1992, just one month after the Open Door ruling, the 
Government presented three abortion-related constitutional amendments to the 
Irish people. First, the 12th Amendment of the Constitution Bill responded 
to anti-choice calls to subvert the X-case decision by excluding the risk of 
suicide as a legal ground for a life-saving abortion. The 12th amendment read: 
 
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such 
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of 
the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving 
rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-
destruction. 
 
Second, the uproar over the confinement of X suggested to the 
Government that the public likely would vote against restrictions on the right 
of women to travel abroad for abortions. Accordingly, the Government 
proposed the 13th Amendment, which specified that the 8th amendment 
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would not limit "freedom to travel between the State and another state."186 
Finally, the proposed 14th Amendment reaffirmed the right to freedom of 
information: "This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make 
available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, 
information relating to services lawfully available in another state." 
In part, because they were no longer a united front, anti-choice activists 
were unable to match the intensity and ferocity of their 1983 campaign in 
their 1992 referenda campaign. Some anti-choice groups wanted to 
campaign for a ‘No’ vote in all three referenda. The Pro-Life Campaign, for 
example, was unhappy with the text of the 12th Amendment and its 
recognition that abortion could be legally permitted to save a woman’s life. A 
life-saving abortion was a misnomer to their minds. Rather than just giving 
the Irish people the opportunity to remove the threat of suicide as a ground 
for legal abortion, the Pro-Life Campaign wanted the amendment to ban 
abortion even where there was a “real and substantive risk to the life of the 
woman” (the X-case test).187 Of the same mind, Youth Defense circulated 
leaflets that claimed: “the government is asking us to legalize the killing of 
little babies.”188 By contrast, others, including the majority of Ireland’s 
Catholic bishops, were agreeable to allowing a ‘Yes’ vote on the travel and 
information amendments; they calculated that efforts to constrain these 
freedoms could end up leading to more liberal concessions on abortion 
restrictions down the road.189 The Catholic hierarchy understood that 
women “going to England” or “getting the boat” – the euphemisms used for 
abortion travel – provided a safety valve that allowed the country to ostensibly 
maintain an image of Ireland as a “pro-life” nation. 
Pro-choice groups also struggled to form a united coalition in the run-up 
to the 1992 referendum. Following X, one group, the Dublin Abortion 
Information Campaign (D.A.I.C.), adopted an explicitly pro-choice position, 
but broader efforts to establish a "Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign" 
("R.E.A.C.") led to less defiant messaging. R.E.A.C. campaigned for fewer 
restrictions on accessing information about abortion, legislation on X (i.e., 
legislation specifying the right to an abortion in the case of suicide), and the 
right to travel, rather than more liberal pro-choice policies.190 As in the 1983 
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campaign, pro-choice arguments were tame, but this time around, the anti-
amendment campaign openly discussed the impacts of the proposed 
amendment on women. One of their key arguments, for example, was that 
the distinction between the mother's life and the mother's health was 
unclear.191 Highlighting that a woman whose health might be threatened by 
illness but whose life might not be immediately threatened would not be 
allowed an abortion, pro-choice activists interrogated the entirely of the 12th 
amendment, not just the attempt to exclude suicidal risks.192 In another 
difference from 1983, the medics and the women’s groups were on the same 
side; several doctors who agreed with R.E.A.C.'s argument about the 
unworkability of the life and health distinction – and also opposed the 
information restrictions – formed a Doctors for Information group. But 
shared referendum goals aside, Doctors for Information would not appear 
publicly with pro-choice women's groups.193 
By a ratio of approximately two to one, the public voted against the 12th 
Amendment and its proposition to exclusion of suicide risk from the life-
threatening risks that could permit an abortion. The information and travel 
amendments passed by a similar margin.194  Thus, as of 1992, the Irish 
Constitution contained a three-part provision relating to abortion: a 
statement on the constitutionally protected right to life of “the unborn” to be 
protected and vindicated as far as practicable and with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the pregnant woman; a statement that the unborn’s right 
to life did not limit women’s freedom to travel abroad; and a statement that 
women’s freedom of information was not legally restricted by the 8th. 
Though prior to the results 1992 referendum, the Minister of Health, 
John O'Connell, had committed the Government to legislate on X if the 
suicide proposition was defeated,195 no such action was taken. Three years 
later, in 1995, the Government passed the Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Act,196 to give 
effect to the information amendment. Most of the Act, however, concerned 
prohibitions on the dissemination of information about abortion services 
rather than affirmatively protect the rights to information and expression.197 
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The Act made it unlawful, for example, for anyone to give information that 
would "encourage or advocate an abortion in individual circumstances."198 
This prohibition came with the threat of summary conviction, but nothing in 
the Act defined what “encourage” and “advocate” meant. 
In practice, the Information Act had a chilling effect on healthcare 
providers and women. At the most basic level, women were unaware of their 
right to information and consequently were fearful to ask direct questions or 
to reveal medical information to their medical carers.199 Doctors, nurses, 
midwives, sonographers, and other healthcare workers consistently reported 
that law restrained the type of care they could offer their patients; they felt 
unable to inform their patients on options for ending pregnancy, including 
options abroad, in case this could be construed as "advocating" Abortion 
under the Act.200 While, in fact, the wording of the Act allowed for the 
provision of 'truthful and objective' information, the chilling effect of this law 
was such that many misread it as prohibiting the provision of even basic 
information.  
Despite the escalating restrictions on abortion access, Irish women 
continued to terminate their pregnancies, covertly and abroad, the country's 
"hidden diaspora."201 But just as the law’s imprecision impeded the right to 
information on abortion, the absence of clarifying legislation inhibited the 
freedom to travel for an abortion. A case in point was a 1997 High Court 
decision involving a 13-year-old in state care. Known as “C,” the girl, who 
became pregnant following rape, expressed to her carers that she would end 
her life if forced to give birth.202 The public health board, which was 
responsible for her care, obtained a court order to enable the board to take 
her abroad for an abortion. Upon hearing about the intended abortion, the 
anti-abortion organization Youth Defence encouraged the girl’s father to 
challenge his daughter’s wishes and to contest the health board’s petition in 
the High Court.203 In what was known as "the C case," the High Court 
determined that the health board was permitted to take C to England for an 
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abortion because, as in the X Case, the girl was suicidal and therefore “a real 
and substantial risk to her life” existed if the pregnancy were to continue.204 
Although the case did not directly implicate the travel amendment,  Justice 
Geoghegan, writing for the court, addressed it by claiming that the 13th  
amendment had not, in fact, recognized a substantive right to travel for an 
abortion.205 “I do not think [the amendment] was ever intended to give some 
new substantial right,” he contended. Rather, “it was intended to prevent 
injunctions against travel or having an abortion abroad.”206 On Justice 
Geoghan’s reading, the state could only authorize travel for an abortion if the 
requirements set out in Attorney General v. X were satisfied, i.e., where a "real 
and substantial risk" to a woman's life existed.207 But this contradicted the 
popular understanding of the travel amendment. The Department of Justice, 
for example, had legally permitted asylum seekers to travel for abortions and 
then to return to Ireland without any assessment of risk to life. C’s case 
questioned the legality of this practice and the abortion travel of thousands of 
others. 
 
E. The 2002 Referendum & Women on Waves 
In 2002, the government proposed yet another constitutional amendment 
on abortion: the 25th Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of Human 
Life in Pregnancy) Bill, No.48 (2001). Presented as measures to deal with 
"crisis pregnancy,"208 the amendment had four main parts: (1) to ensure that 
life was protected from the moment of implantation (as opposed to 
conception), (2) to require the Oireachtas to pass within 180 days of the 
referendum its proposed Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002 
(which among other provisions clarified that traveling abroad for an abortion 
was not a criminal offense)209 (3) to grant the proposed Act constitutional 
protection so that, in the future, it could only be amended by referendum of 
the People, and (4) to permit abortion when it was necessary to prevent loss 
of the pregnant woman’s life except when the threat to her life was a risk of 
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suicide (i.e., to undo this element of the X Case). Penalties for procuring an 
abortion also increased under the amendment. 
This time, the Fianna Fáil Government had been persuaded to hold a 
referendum by four anti-choice independent Teachtaí Dálí (TDs) whose 
support Fianna Fáil needed to create a coalition government.210 The TDs in 
question had been particularly aggravated the previous year when, at the 
invitation of Irish pro-choice groups, Dutch organization Women on Waves 
sailed a floating medical facility to Dublin and Cork to provide abortions. The 
ship was originally intended to provide abortion in international waters to 
ensure that neither woman nor provider would be criminalized. However, 
given that the ship had not fulfilled certain requirements in the Netherlands, 
the Dutch Justice Minister threatened to prosecute the medical professionals 
on the ship if surgical or medical abortions were performed.211 Instead, the 
Women on Waves team distributed contraceptives, did pregnancy tests, and 
provided counseling and service information to hundreds of people. News 
agencies from around the world covered the visit, and even at home, Irish 
press coverage was primarily positive.212 And possibly concerning for anti-
abortion groups, Women on Waves Ireland, the activists who had invited the 
ship publicly stated that the visit was designed “catalyze efforts to liberalize 
abortion laws in Ireland.”213 In response, the independent TDs, Fianna Fáil, 
and the anti-abortion groups decided that another referendum to strengthen 
the 8th amendment was the way to crush this rising wave of pro-choice 
activism before it gained more energy. 
The government's campaign for the amendment faltered in part because 
the government seemed to want to have it both ways. On the one hand, it 
appeared to be seeking a greater degree of protection for "the unborn" by 
asking the public to vote for a constitutional prohibition on abortion in cases 
of suicide. On the other hand, in proposing an amendment to ensure that 
women could leave the jurisdiction to obtain abortions, arguably the state was 
diluting the legal duty is owed to "the unborn." 
Faced with these competing concerns, anti-abortion forces split. 214 The 
Catholic Church and the Pro-Life Campaign lobbied for a ‘‘Yes’’ vote in 
agreement with the government’s proposal to tighten Irish abortion laws.215  
Other organizations, such as Youth Defence and Mother and Child, called 
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for a “No” vote because the proposal defined abortion as "the intentional 
destruction . . . of human life after implantation in the womb of a woman,", 
i.e., the fetus's right to life applied only following implantation.216 This latter 
view mirrored a recent Polish law and was proposed to avoid outlawing 
contraceptives such as Plan B and IUDs.217 Amongst pro-choice groups, the 
Alliance for a No Vote umbrella campaign218 focused their messaging on 
objecting to the elimination of the suicide exception,219 and arguing that the 
referendum was fraught with ambiguities.220 The Irish Family Planning 
Association attacked the abortion regime in its whole; it's chair Tony O'Brien 
condemned the government for lacking ''the political courage to publish an 
amendment to the Constitution which would allow the 6500 women traveling 
to the U.K. each year to have their abortions at home." 
When the public voted in March 2002, the referendum was defeated by 
50.4% to 49%; just 10,000 votes retained access to legal abortion by women 
at risk of suicide.221 Reports from this time suggest that the vote was 
influenced by bad weather that appeared to discourage people from visiting 
polling stations in rural areas – the communities that the anti-abortion lobby 
had pinned their hopes on.222 
 
F. The European Court of Human Rights: D & ABC 
 
Despite continuing calls from the Supreme Court that the 8th 
amendment needed clarification,223 the Irish government maintained its 
policy of legislative inaction on the 8th. Catharine Forde, former chairperson 
of the Irish Family Planning Association, commented that "politicians were 
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terrified of being called murderers (…) they were paralyzed with fear, so they 
did nothing."224 With no legal framework to assist medics (or pregnant 
women) to determine what cases fell within the X-case conditions for legal 
abortion, medical professionals reported that they were often unable or 
unwilling to provide care to pregnant women, including life-saving care. The 
Irish Medical Council Guidelines (an ethical guide to doctors practicing in 
the country) explicitly excluded the threat of suicide as a ground for 
terminating a pregnancy.225 
Ultimately, the law’s ambiguity meant that pregnant women often needed 
to turn to the courts to confirm their right to access an abortion in life-
threatening circumstances. Few choose this route; it is estimated that 
approximately 2,000 pregnant women traveled from Ireland to the UK or 
mainland Europe for abortions every year until 2018.226 
Quite brazenly, the Irish Government relied on the absence of domestic 
legislation clarifying the 8th amendment when challenged about the law at the 
European Court of Human Rights. In D. v Ireland, the applicant argued that 
Ireland's ban on abortion in the case of fatal fetal abnormalities violated 
articles 3 (freedom from torture), 8 (right to private life) 13, 14, and 20 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.227 Upon learning that one of the 
twins she was carrying had died in the womb and that the other had Edward’s 
syndrome, the woman, known as D, had traveled to the UK for an abortion. 
Despite her fatal fetal abnormality diagnosis, her doctors told her that she 
could not end her pregnancy under Irish law. For its part, the Government 
lawyers argued that it was an “open question” as to whether D would have 
been legally entitled to an abortion in Ireland should she have gone through 
the Irish courts system; there was no legislation on the 8th, and therefore it 
was 'impossible to foresee' if an abortion in her circumstances would be 
criminalized.228 The state's lawyers claimed that there was at least a tenable 
argument that a fetus suffering from a fatal abnormality was not “an unborn” 
for the purposes of the 8th or that even if it was an unborn, its right to life was 
not actually engaged as it had no prospect of life outside the womb.229 The 
European Court of Human Rights sided with the government and held that 
D's case was inadmissible because D did not go through the Irish courts to 
determine whether her situation fell within the 8th. 
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Ireland also accessed abortion services in other European countries such as the Netherlands and Spain.).  
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The state had successfully defended itself in D v. Ireland by claiming that 
Ireland likely did not ban abortion in cases of fatal fetal abnormality. Far from 
a settled question, a year later, news broke that state actors were trying to stop 
a pregnant 17-year-old girl from leaving the country to abort a pregnancy 
with a fetal abnormality.230 "Miss D," who was in the care of the state, 
expressed her intention to travel to the UK for an abortion to her social 
worker, who in turn informed the Health Service Executive (HSE), the body 
responsible for her care. The HSE first attempted to rely upon the X-case 
exception for the teenager's case by claiming that she posed a risk to herself, 
but Miss D refused to say that she was suicidal. The HSE then wrote to the 
Gardaí to request that they arrest Miss D if she attempted to leave the 
country. The HSE also asked that the Passport Office refuse to issue her with 
a passport. 231 
Miss D was forced to turn to the courts. Finding that were no legal rules 
to prevent a 17-year-old girl in the care of the Health Service Executive from 
traveling abroad for an abortion, the High Court in D (A Minor) v. District Judge 
Brennan, the Health Services Executive, Ireland, and the Attorney General, upheld her 
right to travel. 232  
Miss D’s case was one of many that exemplified the particularly 
challenging burdens that the 8th amendment forced upon women who were 
already disadvantaged in their access to resources and power. Women in 
myriad circumstances, such as migrants, asylum seekers and the 
undocumented, women in lower socio-economic cases, and women with 
disabilities, struggled to travel abroad for abortions. A woman's health and 
age could also limit her mobility. As a Dublin city center family planning 
clinic, the Irish Family Planning Association had a front-row view of the 
harms of Ireland's restrictive and ambiguous abortion laws. This prompted 
the organization to support three women to challenge Ireland's legal regime 
on abortion at the European Court of Human Rights.233 
In December 2009, the Grand Chamber of 17 Judges of the European 
Court of Human Rights sat for an oral hearing of A, B, and C v. Ireland.234 The 
three women argued that Ireland's criminalization of abortion had forced 
them to travel to England for abortions which had jeopardized their health 
and wellbeing, in violation of the right to private life under Article 8; the right 
to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under Article 3 and 
the right to be free from discrimination per Article 14 of the European 
 
230 See, e.g., Irish police cannot stop girl leaving for abortion, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2007) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/04/ireland. 
231 See, e.g., RTE, Miss D Can Travel for Abortion, RTE (May 9, 2007),  
https://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0509/88757-abortion/. 
232 D (A Minor) v. District J. Brennan, the Health Serv. Exec., Ir. & the Att’y Gen. [2007] unreported judgment 
of the H. Ct. (Ir.). 
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Convention of Human Rights.235 While the first two applicants had sought 
abortions for socio-economic reasons, the third applicant had become 
pregnant after three years of chemotherapeutic treatment for a rare form of 
cancer, and the pregnancy threatened a recurrence of the cancer.  Unable to 
obtain advice from Irish doctors on whether she was entitled to an abortion 
in Ireland, and she had an abortion in England.  
As in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Ireland argued that the 
country’s abortion law represented the “profound moral choice of the Irish 
people as to the nature of unborn life” and added that “for almost 60 years 
the Court had recognized the diversity of traditions and values of the 
contracting states” including the right of each contracting state to determine 
that fetal life is entitled to the right to life.236 
The litigants maintained that the will of the Irish people had changed 
since the 1983 referendum; the Irish electorate had voted against so-called 
'pro-life' amendments in all referenda since 1983, and opinion polls suggested 
an appetite for reform. Accordingly, the state's asserted "legitimate aim" for 
interfering with their human rights was no longer, they claimed, a valid one. 
The women also underscored the ineffectiveness of Ireland's restrictions in 
achieving that goal, given that the abortion rate for women in Ireland was 
similar to states where abortion was legal.237 
The Court separated the claims of A and B, the ‘wellbeing’ abortions from 
C, the potentially life-saving abortion. In C’s case, the Court held 
unanimously that Ireland had violated her right to private life under Article 
8.238 The Court accepted C’s argument that the risk to her life should have 
qualified her for a legal abortion per the X-case doctrine; but, because there 
was no legislation clarifying that medical professionals would not be 
criminalized for aborting a fetus to save a woman's life, it was rare for doctors 
to actually carry out such life-saving abortions. Echoing the Irish Supreme 
Court's condemnation of the government for failing to clarify the meaning of 
the 8th amendment, the Court concluded that: 
 
[t]he uncertainty generated by the lack of legislative implementation of 
Article 40.3.3 (the 8th amendment) and more particularly by the lack 
of effective and accessible procedures to establish a right to an 
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237 ABC, supra note 12 at 170. 
238 ABC, supra note 12 at 253. 
 
 47 
between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on 
grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its 
practical implementation.239 
 
In addressing the first two applicants, the Court agreed that Ireland’s 
system of forcing women abroad to have abortions interfered with the 
women’s right to respect for private life. But a majority of 11 judges to 6 
declined to hold that the 8th amendment violated the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). The majority reasoned that because women had 
the option of lawfully travelling to another state for an abortion, the state had 
"struck a fair balance" between protecting the public's interest in securing the 
right to life of the unborn and the conflicting rights of the women.240 In 
particular, given “the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised 
by the question of abortion,” Ireland enjoyed a “broad margin of 
appreciation” in regulating the field of abortion law.241 Without discussion on 
the merits, the Court dismissed the applicants' claims that their rights to non-
discrimination and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
were abridged. 
Because it left the 8th amendment intact, A, B & C could be characterized 
as an anti-abortion victory. However, given the violation of applicant C's right 
to private life, to comply with the decision, the state was required to finally 
pass legislation to implement the Supreme Court's X-case conclusion that 
abortion was permissible in Ireland if necessary to save the life of the pregnant 
women. A year after the decision, on November 2011, the Irish government 
established an Expert Group to “elucidate” the implications of the ABC case 
and to recommend a series of options on how to implement the judgment.242 
A year later, in November 2012, the Expert Group reported to 
government with four options to clarify the criteria under which abortions 
could be carried out in order to save a woman's life;243 to clarify by means of 
(i) non-statutory guidelines by the Minister for Health (ii) statutory regulations 
by the Minister by Health244 (iii) primary legislation or (iv) legislation and 
statutory guidelines. Before the Government or Oireachtas had the chance to 
debate these options, a story broke that significantly altered the context for 
deliberation. A pregnant woman named Savita Halappanavar died while in 
 
239 Id. 264, 269. 
240 Id. 241. 
241 Id. 242. 
242 GOV’T OF IR., ACTION PLAN A, B, & C V. IR. APPLICATION NO 25579/2005, GRAND CHAMBER JUDGMENT, 
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243 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND CHILD., REP. OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON THE JUDGMENT IN A, B AND C V. IR., 
(2012), http://www.dohc.ie/publications/Judgement_ABC.html [hereinafter, Expert Group Report]. 
244 In Ireland, statutory regulations are "an order, regulation, rule, scheme or bye-law made in exercise of a 
power conferred by statute." They are similar to regulations of various government agencies in the U.S. 
Statutory Instruments Act 1947. 
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Galway University Hospital in circumstances where an abortion may have 
saved her life.  
Savita Halappanavar, a dentist of Indian origin who had been living in 
Ireland for three years, was 17 weeks pregnant when she presented with signs 
of an impending miscarriage to hospital staff in Galway. Her doctors told her 
that her pregnancy would not survive, but they wouldn't terminate the 
pregnancy 'due to their assessment of the legal context.'245 As Savita and her 
husband pressed her medical team as to why she couldn’t have an abortion 
when miscarriage was inevitable, a midwife explained that Ireland was “a 
Catholic country”; until the fetal heartbeat stopped, doctors would not be 
able to intervene.246 Instead, the medical team's approach was to "await 
events." Savita's prolonged miscarriage caused her to develop sepsis. The 
infection became fatal and forced her to have a heart attack, from which she 
died at the age of 31.247 
Until this point in time, Ireland’s proximity to the UK meant that the 
country had largely escaped the deathly impacts of unsafe self-induced or the 
so-called “backstreet” procedures that cost many lives in countries with 
restrictive abortion laws.248 Savita's death, however, was a vividly publicized 
catastrophe. There was an outpouring of discontent and outage in Ireland 
and beyond. 249 “Ireland Murders Pregnant Indian Dentist’” ran a headline from 
the India Times, just one of a multitude of international headlines that 
followed her death.250 Communities held candle-lit vigils across the country 
with signs reading "Never Again" and "Savita had a heartbeat too." In a way 
never seen before, public sentiment contested the status quo on abortion, and 
calls for change were no longer fringe. 
 
245  HEALTH SERV. EXEC., FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT 50278 FROM TIME OF PATIENT'S 
SELF-REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL ON OCTOBER 21, 2012, TO THE PATIENT'S DEATH ON OCTOBER 28, 2012, 21, 
22-53, (2013) (Patient history is derived from the official investigation and final report carried out by the Irish 
Health Service Executive and commissioned by the hospital.) [hereinafter HSE Report 2013]. 
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cancer treatment and an abortion in Ireland. Although her doctors had advised her to terminate the pregnancy 
because of the risk to her health, her treating hospital in Cork refused to authorize an abortion on the basis that 
her life was not under 'immediate threat.' In order to receive her cancer treatment, Michelle Harte began making 
arrangements for travel to the UK for an abortion. However, her abortion was delayed owing to her need to 
obtain a passport, and her cancer returned during this period. Michelle Harte subsequently died from the 
returned cancer. See, e.g., Ir. Council for Civ. Liberties, Case in Focus: Michelle Harte, www.iccl.ie/her-
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Within a month of her story breaking, the government announced plans 
to follow the recommendation of the Expert Group on ABC by introducing 
a combination of legislation and guidelines to clarify how medical 
professionals could determine if an abortion would be legal when a woman’s 
life was at risk, thereby implementing the X-case ruling.251 Anti-abortion 
groups, now most forcefully represented by the Pro-Life Campaign, Iona 
Institute, and the Life Institute, argued that such legislation would "blur the 
distinction between life-saving medical interventions in pregnancy and 
induced abortion" and that the inclusion of suicidal ideation would become a 
"gateway" for widespread abortion availability in Ireland.252 Youth Defense 
unveiled campaign posters with a forlorn woman above the caption: 
"Abortion tears her life apart – there is always a better solution." They were 
closely followed by the Pro-life Campaign's billboards; "Did you know that 
79% of women want Fine Gael to keep its pro-life commitments?" one read, 
featuring a woman holding a baby.  
Similarly, in the Dáil, anti-choice TDs mounted a significant campaign 
against the legislation, particularly the proposed Act's legalization of abortion 
in situations where a woman's life was at risk owing to a suicide threat. Brian 
Walsh TD claimed that the suicide provision would "defile the Statute Book 
with the absurd premise that the suicidality of one human being can be abated 
by the destruction and killing of another," while others argued that it would 
"open the floodgates to widespread abortion" (Eamon O'Cuiv) and 
"normalize suicidal ideation" (Lucinda Creighton).253 
Meanwhile, the public’s attitude suggested a willingness for reform 
broader than implementing X. Polling in February 2013 revealed that 78% 
of respondents supported access to abortion in the case of rape and incest. 254   
A number of pro-choice TDs took advantage of the fact that the 
government had actually committed to passing abortion legislation to 
advocate for legislation beyond X and ABC. Invoking the Irish government’s 
own argument before the European Court of Human Rights in D. v Ireland – 
that the right to life of “the unborn” may not be engaged when fetal 
abnormality is incompatible with life – a small group of mostly independent 
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TDs contended that the legislation should permit access to abortion in the 
context of fatal fetal anomalies.255 Three women who had traveled to the UK 
for abortions in cases of fatal fetal abnormality, including D herself, addressed 
the Dáil to support the legislative plan of the pro-choice TDs.256 Notably, this 
was the first time that women who had had abortions spoke about their 
experience openly before the Dáil.257  
Following the second set of legislative hearings, the Dáil passed the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (“PLDPA”) to implement the 1992 
judgment in the X case, as required by A, B and C v. Ireland, to clarify that 
abortion would be legal where there was a real and substantial risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman).258 Marking a break with the years when anti-
abortion groups had dictated the legislative agenda on abortion, the 
legislature did not exclude suicide risk as grounds for abortion. But pro-choice 
TDs had not succeeded in determining the scope of the legislation either – 
the Act did not permit abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomaly.259 The Act also 
fell short in solving the legal difficulties raised by Savita’s case; doctors could 
still not intervene and end a pregnancy until a pregnant woman’s life, as 
opposed to her health, was patently at risk. Abortion in any situation other 
than when necessary to protect a woman’s life remained a crime with a 
penalty of imprisonment for up to fourteen years. 
 
G. From the PLDPA to the Road to Repeal 
 
Though the PLDPA was a victory for pro-choice campaigners in the sense 
that the state had finally legislated for X (21 years later), their concerns were 
far from abated. The new law did not improve access to abortion; legal 
abortions in the years that followed averaged typically less than fifty per 
year.260 Only 26 "terminations" were carried out in Irish hospitals under the 
Act the year following its adoption. Three were carried out based on the risk 
to the life of the woman by suicide, 14 due to the risk from physical illness, 
and nine based on an emergency situation from physical illness. Under the 
Act, medical professionals still owed a duty to do everything practicable to 
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preserve fetal life, whatever the consequences for a pregnant woman.261 
Commenting on the new act, Dr. Rhona Mahony, Master of Ireland’s 
National Maternity Hospital, explained that: 
 
the new law has not changed much of the practice. When women get 
sick, we can’t intervene until her life is at risk, and then we have to 
hope we save her in time.262 
 
And though the Act did little to alleviate the burden of travel for abortion 
seekers, the annual number of women living in Ireland and accessing abortion 
services outside the country began to fall.263 The primary reason for this was 
the increasing use of medical abortions (or the 'abortion pill') in Ireland. 
Taking – but not obtaining – the pills was illegal. As such, the pills could be 
prescribed through telemedicine —usually, via international non-profit 
groups, Women on Web and Women Help Women— and taken at home. 
Such home use of abortion pills was not, however, a panacea for all women 
in need of an abortion. In addition to its illegality, its accessibility was limited 
for women who lacked information, privacy, and residency status. Young 
women and migrant women faced particular challenges. The non-profits 
usually mailed the pills to safe addresses in Northern Ireland, where customs 
were less likely to seize the delivery. Just as going to England was not usually 
an option for migrant women, crossing the border to Northern Ireland was 
not always possible.  
The case of ‘Ms. Y' vividly captured the reality that some women in 
Ireland had no options to end unwanted pregnancies. A young migrant 
woman, Ms. Y, discovered that she was pregnant while going through the 
asylum process in Ireland; she had been raped in her country of origin. 264  
Distraught, she repeatedly told the different state agencies and health care 
workers who were managing her asylum application and her care that she 
needed to have an abortion; she would otherwise commit suicide.265 Despite 
the state’s new legislative guarantee in the PLDPA that abortion was legal 
when a woman’s life was at risk, including the risk of suicide, Ms. Y. was 
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denied access to lawful abortion care and was ultimately forced to give birth 
cesarean.266  
The same year as Ms. Y’s ordeal, the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) assessed Ireland's compliance with the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee condemned the new Act 
and asserted that its review process effectively gave power to doctors, 
obstetricians, and psychiatrists to prevent women from terminating their 
pregnancies, even when termination should be lawful.267 The Committee 
recommended that the state rectify its failure to provide women with access 
to abortion in circumstances in which pregnancy was a result of rape, when 
a woman is carrying a fetus with fatal abnormalities, and where a woman's 
health was in danger.268 The comments by Nigel Rodley, then Chair of the 
Committee, attracted particular attention: 
 
Life without quality of life is not something many of us have to choose 
between, and to suggest that, regardless of the health consequences of 
a pregnancy, a person may be doomed to continue it at the risk of 
criminal penalty is difficult to understand . . . Even more so regarding 
rape when the person doesn't even bear any responsibility and is by 
the law clearly treated as a vessel and nothing more. 269 
 
The litany of tragic cases involving the 8th amendment continued. In 
December of the same year (2014), a team of doctors placed a woman, who 
had been declared irrecoverably brain dead, on life support—against her 
family’s wishes—in an effort to enable her fetus to be born alive.270 The 
woman’s medical team believed that the 8th amendment required them to 
protect “the unborn” in this way;271 to have somatic care withdrawn, and the 
woman's father was forced to sue the Irish Health Service.272 
International criticism of Ireland's abortion law also intensified. In July 
2015, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) recommended that Ireland revise its legislation on abortion, 
including the Constitution and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
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2013, in line with international human rights standards.273 The Committee 
members also remarked on the discriminatory impacts of the law on women 
who could not afford to go abroad for an abortion or who could not access 
the necessary information.274 Their condemnation was followed by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 2016, which expresses a 
number of concerns regarding the impact of Ireland's abortion laws on girls' 
human rights.275 Pro-choice activism proliferated, and its base grew stronger 
and more vocal about the need for access to abortion in Ireland. The 
campaigning at the UN level was supplemented with myriad forms of 
advocacy nationally and locally. Some activists used art and street protest 
were used to bring visibility to the injustice of Ireland's abortion laws. ROSA 
(for Reproductive rights, against Oppression, Sexism, and Austerity) publicly 
smuggled abortion pills across the border and around the island by train, bus, 
and drone, raising awareness and recruiting members along the way. The 
Abortion Rights Campaign carried out an initiative called 'Chats for Choice' 
that utilized Facebook Live, a web streaming facility, to counteract 
misinformation about abortion in a live chat show format. The X-file Project 
offered a platform for more people to come forward and share their name 
and portrait in the telling of their abortion stories.276 Pro-choice groups online 
and offline promoted first-person abortion story-sharing to "bust stigma" and 
normalize abortion.277 Irish women began speaking publicly in 
unprecedented numbers and with unprecedented candor about their 
abortion histories. 
By February 2016, polling from Amnesty Ireland suggested majority pro-
choice sentiment throughout the country.278 In the general election that same 
month, most political parties took a position on the future of the 8th 
amendment in their manifestos. Fine Gael (the majority party in government) 
committed to establishing a 'Citizens' Assembly' to consider the matter of the 
8th amendment, and the Social Democrats proposed repealing the 8th 
amendment and then having a "people's convention" to consider the 
legislation that would follow. Sinn Fein, Labour (the minority Government 
party), the Green Party, the Anti-Austerity Alliance, and People Before Profit 
all proposed repeal of the 8th amendment followed by legislation to make 
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abortion available, although there was little consistency across the parties 
regarding different levels of availability.279 Fianna Fáil, the main opposition 
party, made no mention of abortion in its manifesto. 
In May 2016, in the 'Programme for a Partnership Government, the new 
government committed to establishing, within six months, a Citizens' 
Assembly to examine the possibility of repealing the 8th amendment.280 In 
the meantime, Ireland’s abortion law was condemned once again by the 
Human Rights Committee.  In a ground-breaking international human rights 
law case, Amanda Mellet v Ireland281 the Human Rights Committee held that by 
denying Ms. Mellet an abortion in Ireland to end a pregnancy with a fatal 
fetal anomaly, Ireland had subjected her to cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment.282 The Committee also found that Ireland had violated Ms. 
Mellet’s right to privacy by interfering with her decision as to how best to 
cope with her non-viable pregnancy.283   
The Taoiseach at the time, Enda Kenny, responded that the Human 
Rights Committee ruling was not binding on the state and rather than reform 
the law to comply, he proceeded with his plan for the assembly. In July 2016, 
the government-appointed Judge Mary Laffoy to lead 99 members of the 
public, randomly selected on the basis of being representative of the Irish 
electorate in terms of gender, age, and regional spread, to examine the 
possibility of repealing the 8th amendment. Justice Laffoy's stated priority was 
to "facilitate an evidence-based approach to discussion and policymaking." 
Beginning its work in the autumn of 2016, assembly members received oral 
and written evidence from a number of experts and advocates over the course 
of 9 months. The evidence covered the legal regulation of abortion in Ireland 
and abroad, the intricacies of Irish constitutional law, the relationship 
between domestic law and international human rights law, the experience of 
medical practitioners in the UK treating women from Ireland who access 
abortion in England, ethicists, and pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates.284  
The citizen members themselves insisted on several interventions to help 
them decide: they asked to be addressed by people with direct experience of 
the 8th amendment, i.e., women who had, and who had not, accessed 
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abortion.285 They also insisted on the rewording of some propositions that 
had been put to the group, most importantly that in addition to voting to 
recommend that abortion be legal in situations of rape and serious risk to 
health, they should have the option to vote for grounds of risk to the woman’s 
health more generally and of socio-economics reasons and women’s 
autonomy.286 In their final report, on June 29, 2017, the majority of the 
Assembly members recommended that abortion be available without 
restriction as to reason up to 12 weeks (48%, with 44% thinking it should be 
available without restriction up to 22 weeks), up to 22 weeks where there was 
a risk to a woman's health (including to mental health), on socio-economic 
grounds up to 22 weeks, where the fetus was diagnosed with a non-fatal 
anomaly (up to 22 weeks), in cases of rape (up to 22 weeks), where there was 
a serious risk to the pregnant person's health (without time limit), or where 
the fetus was diagnosed with a fetal anomaly (without time limit). 287 
The assembly’s recommendations went far beyond what most people 
expected;288 up until this point, public discourse had mostly focused on 
exceptions, such as providing abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomalies or 
situations of rape or incest, and most Irish people had assumed that the 
assembly would favor this limited solution.289  
The assembly's recommendations did not necessarily commit the 
government or parliament to anything.290 The government responded by 
establishing the ‘Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution' comprised of representatives from various political parties from 
both houses of the Oireachtas (Dáil and Seanad), to consider the assembly's 
recommendations. Over a period of three months, the Committee was again 
addressed by experts, some the same as those who had given testimony to the 
assembly. This time, however, there was a greater emphasis on international 
policy and practice on abortion, including best practices on reproductive 
 
285 The assembly addressed this by recording testimony from people who had and who had not accessed abortion 
during the time of the 8th amendment and playing those to the citizen members. This occurred in the third 
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290 See generally, David Kennedy, Abortion, the Irish Constitution, and constitutional change, 5 REV. DE INVESTIGAÇÕES 
CONSTITUCIONAIS 3, (2018). 
 
 56 
health and Ireland's obligations under international human rights law. The 
World Health Organization, the Guttmacher Institute, BPAS, the Centre for 
Reproductive Rights, the Irish Human Rights Commission, and a range of 
other Irish medical, medico-legal, and constitutional law experts addressed 
the 21 politicians.291 
The Committee debated whether a limited right to access abortion (e.g., 
on grounds of rape or risk to life) could be inserted into the Constitution to 
replace the 8th, but in the end, the Committee voted for 'repeal simpliciter.'292 
Like the Citizen’s Assembly, the parliamentary committee recommended that 
the 8th amendment be repealed from the Constitution and abortion made 
lawful without restriction as to reason up to a gestational limit of 12 weeks.293 
Several committee members commented that, over the course of their 
involvement in the Joint Committee, they had changed their minds to favor 
access to abortion for any reason in the first 12 weeks rather than an 
exception-based regime.294 
 
H. Referendum to repeal the 8th amendment 
 
Upon receipt of the Joint Committee’s recommendations, the Cabinet 
(government ministers) agreed at the end of January 2018 to hold a 
referendum on the 8th Amendment in May 2018. Their proposal was to 
remove the 8th and replace it with a text empowering the Oireachtas to pass 
abortion law. In March, the government also shared a 'general scheme' 
(Heads of a Bill) for post-repeal legislation.295 It presented a trimester 
framework for dealing with abortion; in the first 12 weeks, abortion would be 
available on request, following a three-day waiting period. Beyond the first 
trimester of pregnancy, abortion would be available where two medical 
practitioners certified that there was a risk to the life or of serious harm to the 
health of the pregnant woman. There was no distinction made between 
mental and physical health. Abortion would not be permitted beyond the 
 
291 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment (2018), https://webarchive.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/eighthamendmentoftheconst
itution/Report-of-the-Joint-Committee-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-web-version.pdf (The full list of witnesses is 
included as Appendix 2 to the Committee’s Report);  See also, Christine Zampas, Opening Statement to the Oireachtas 
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point of viability, which was set at the 24th week of pregnancy.296 Abortion 
outside the terms of the legislation would remain a criminal offense, although 
pregnant women would be exempt from prosecution.297 
Though for the five years prior to the referendum, it had fallen to 
Independent TDs and other small left political parties to advance pro-choice 
arguments in the Dáil, by March, all of the political party leaders had 
announced their support for the repeal movement. Micheál Martin (leader of 
the opposition Fianna Fáil party) announced on January 19, 2018, that he 
would campaign to repeal the 8th amendment, even though up until that 
point, he had been on record as being against abortion access.298 His u-turn 
may have been a catalyst for other political figures to come out in support of 
the repeal movement. Hours after his announcement, Taoiseach Leo 
Varadkar also announced his support for repeal. In a significant change of 
position, Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney (and deputy leader of 
the government) made a similar announcement. However, key figures in all 
three main parties – Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and Sinn Féin – took different 
sides in the debate. Some 26 Teachtaí Dála voted against allowing any 
referendum on the 8th amendment, most of which were from the Fianna Fáil 
party. Nonetheless, the vote to allow an amendment passed with a majority 
of 97 to 26 and a referendum was announced for May 25, 2018.299 
Immediately from the time of the referendum’s announcement, opinion 
polling showed a consistent lead for the ‘Yes’ side.300 In March, the main 
campaign movement for a Yes vote, "Together for Yes," launched. It 
represented a coalition of three large pro-choice organizations, namely the 
Coalition to Repeal the 8th amendment, the Abortion Rights Campaign, and 
the National Women's Council. Professional and cultural organizations 
formed support groups, such as Nurses Together for Yes, Psychologists 
Together for Yes, Farmers for Yes. Crucially, Together for Yes mobilized 
hundreds of grassroots networks to conduct a mass canvassing operation. In 
every constituency in the country, local Together for Yes groups, comprised 
of men and women of all ages (but primarily young people), canvassed door 
to door. Every canvassing group logged responses on a specially designed 
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software package that fed data from doorsteps all over the country to the 
campaign headquarters in Dublin.301  
Notably, the Together for Yes messaging over the three months of the 
referendum campaign focused on “Care, Compassion and Change” rather 
than on a woman’s right to choose or women’s freedom. Emphasizing the 
need to repeal the 8th in order to provide compassionate care to women who 
were pregnant because of rape, or women who make hard decisions to end 
pregnancies because their child won’t survive to term,  Together for Yes 
aimed at appeasing the alleged anti-choice instincts of a 'middle Ireland' or 
Ireland's 'middle ground.'302 The campaign also argued that repeal was 
necessary to alleviate the legal and medical risks for women and girls who 
sourced abortion pills online and self-administered abortion without medical 
supervision. Voices from the medical community were front and center, as 
well as women—with husbands who had experienced pregnancies with fetal 
anomalies. Some commented that voices heard at its public demonstrations 
almost always had recognizably middle-class accents.303  
The Catholic Church urged Irish Catholics to become “missionaries for 
the cause of life” in the run-up to the referendum. The No campaign, led by 
a coalition known as Save the 8th, however, did not invoke religion. Its 
messaging focused, instead, on portraying the proposed legislation as being 
‘too extreme’ and likely to result in a large number of abortions occurring in 
Ireland.304 It frequently invoked claims about ‘vulnerable’ cases, such as 
children with disabilities, and the likelihood that abortion would be used to 
reduce the number of children born with particular needs. Factions of the 
campaign framed abortion as murder, using the hashtag ‘#repealkills’ on 
social media. 
On May 25, 2018, polling stations opened from 8 am – 10 pm. Until this 
day, no Irish citizen under the age of 53 had ever had the option of liberalizing 
Ireland’s abortion law. Media reported that thousands had flown home from 
abroad to vote for repeal.305 Analysts predicted a narrow victory for Yes. 
“Feminist Christmas”306 began when the Irish Times reported the first 
exit poll at 10 pm on the night of the vote. The exit poll indicated that the 
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repeal vote had won by a landslide, a margin of 68% to 32%.307 In an almost 
exact reverse of the 1983 referendum, in the actual confirmed result, repeal 
succeeded with a vote of 66.4% percent.308 The Yes vote was carried in 39 
out of 40 constituencies, and there was a majority vote for repeal in almost 
every demographic. Savita Halappanavar's father, Andanappa Yalagi, spoke 
of the referendum result as providing justice, at last, for his daughter.309 
Following the declaration of results in Dublin Castle, the Taoiseach, Leo 
Varadkar, described the outcome as "the culmination of a quiet revolution 
that has been taking place in Ireland over the last couple of decades."310 In 
response, Irish abortion rights activists noted that it was Varadkar's 
Government and his political party who had attempted to mute their 
demands for so many years. 
The Thirty Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Act 2018 formally 
removed the 8th amendment from the Irish Constitution and replaced it with 
a new Article 40.3.3, which states that "provision may be made by law for the 
regulation of termination of pregnancy"). With the power to enact legislation 
on abortion, the Oireachtas repealed the Protection of Life During Pregnancy 
Act and introduced the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 
2018 (HRTPA), which came into effect in January 2019. Mirroring the 
legislative proposals offered before the referendum vote, the act recognizes 
four grounds within which abortion is legally available in Ireland. Abortions 
are now legally available, without cost, upon request until 12 weeks of 
pregnancy, subject to two conditions: (i) confirmation from a medical 
practitioner that the pregnancy has not reached more than 12 weeks and (ii) 
following a waiting period of 3 days after the certification that the pregnancy 
is under 12 weeks. Abortions at any point beyond 12 weeks are only allowed 
in cases where there is a risk to the life or of "serious harm" to the health of 
the pregnant woman as certified by two medical practitioners, in 
circumstances where the fetus has not reached viability;311 in emergency cases 
- where a medical practitioner is of a reasonable opinion that there is “an 
immediate risk” to the life or of serious harm to the health of a pregnant 
woman and that a termination must be carried out immediately to avert that 
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https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-times-exit-poll-projects-ireland-has-voted-by-landslide-to-
repeal-eighth-1.3508861. 
308 See, e.g., Elections Ireland, Referendum of May 25, 2018, 36th Amendment: Regulation of Termination of 
Pregnancy (Repeal of 8th Amendment), 
https://electionsireland.org/results/referendum/refresult.cfm?ref=201836R (last visited September 1, 2018).  
309 Megan Specia How Savita Halappanavar’s death spurred Ireland’s abortion 
rights campaign NEW YORK TIMES (May 27, 2018) https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/05/27/world/europe/savita-halappanavar-Ireland-abortion.html. 
310 RTE News, Result is culmination of quiet revolution, says Varadkar (May 26, 2018) https://www.rte.ie/news/eighth-
amendment/2018/0526/966132-reaction/. 
311 Section 8, HRTPA states that: “viability” means the point in a pregnancy at which, in the reasonable opinion 




risk;312 and in cases of fatal fetal abnormality. Doctors who provide abortions 
outside these terms continue to risk arrest, prosecution, and up to 14 years in 
prison—just as they did before the referendum.313  The Act mandates an 
inquiry into the operation of the law after three years. 
This chapter focused on key moments in the development of Ireland’s 
abortion regime, including its ultimate demise. Amidst, rather than beyond, 
such legal and political contestation were the experiences of women who 
lived, and sometimes died, under Ireland’s restrictive laws. The next two 
chapters of this dissertation study, in much greater depth, women’s 
experiences of the law in terms of both their pain at the hands of the 8th and 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
REFORM OF IRISH ABORTION LAW 
 
Over the decades, Irish pro-choice groups employed numerous strategies 
in their struggles for change. Activists battled a stalwart anti-choice lobby and 
unmoving political elites with everything from street protests, legal 
challenges, social media campaigns, lobbying, artistic activism, abortion 
stigma busting, to service provision (both funding and providing abortions). 
Many of these strategies were infused with and augmented by international 
human rights-based advocacy. In contrast to the treatment of abortion as a 
crime under the 8th, international and regional human rights law recognizes 
that the denial of abortion, in a range of circumstances, violates fundamental 
human rights.314  Consequently, non-governmental organizations, grassroots 
activists, and victims embraced international human rights.  As Chapter 1 
outlined, Irish advocates took complaints to the UN Human Rights 
Committee.315 and the European Court of Human Rights,316 engaged in 
‘shadow reporting’317 and in-person advocacy before UN Treaty Monitoring 
Bodies (TMBs) and UN Special Procedures, emphasized human rights when 
campaigning domestically and organized in human rights coalitions. This 
chapter charts these efforts and analyzes their impact. 
In turning to the international human rights framework to advance their 
cause, Irish advocates emulated reproductive rights movements across the 
globe. In all regions of the world, abortion rights activists invoke international 
human rights in their efforts to overturn domestic restrictions on abortion, 
and at the international level, advocates seek to consolidate and expand 
recognition for sexual and reproductive rights. These efforts have delivered 
 
314 See infra, pp 66-96. 
315 See Mellet v Ireland, supra note xx and Whelan v Ireland, supra note xx.. 
316 See A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 12. 
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human rights. Irish pro-choice groups submitted shadow reports to the Committee Against Torture Committee, 
the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and to the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health in 
preparation for his report A/66/254 (2011) on the interaction between criminal laws and other legal restrictions 
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many successes in different countries,318 and in international fora,319 but they 
have not been universally effective, nor are the gains secure. Over the past 5-
10 years, a coordinated global pushback against reproductive rights (and the 
rights of sexual orientation and gender identity minorities) has gained 
significant momentum.320 Waged by alliances of conservative political actors 
and religious fundamentalists — often presenting as human rights groups — 
these actors use litigation and advocacy at national and international levels to 
oppose a range of reproductive rights: access to abortion, contraception and 
fertility treatments, and the provision of evidence-based, comprehensive 
sexuality education.321 At the multilateral level, blocs of States have mirrored 
and augmented their practices to dilute international protections for 
reproductive rights, sexuality rights, and self-determination.322 And 
increasingly, campaigns that misleadingly — and incorrectly under 
international law — assert a human right for healthcare professionals (and 
even institutions) to ‘conscientiously object’ to providing both abortion and 
contraception are gaining traction.323 Amidst such virulent pushback to the 
 
318 Courts in countries of Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America increasingly reference human rights standards 
in their review of national abortion laws. See Rachel Rebouche, Abortion Rights as Human Rights, 25(6) SOCIAL & 
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advancement of reproductive rights, it is compelling to consider the role of 
international human rights in upending one of the most restrictive abortion 
regimes in the world.   
This study also presents insights relevant for social movement scholars 
and international relations theorists concerned with the legitimacy and utility 
of the international human rights framework in domestic politics. Many 
scholars (and activists) cast doubt on the utility and legitimacy of international 
human rights to advance social change.324 The polemics are applied to 
human rights movements beyond abortion rights; human rights, whether 
conceived as discourse, law, or values, face incessant claims of irrelevance and 
predictions of demise. Within this milieu of critiques, scholars query whether 
international human rights, as a "universalist discourse," is the best 
foundation on which to build local political leverage for reform.325 Others 
argue that conceptions of human rights can miss the technical and practical 
work of implementing social and legal reform.326 Scholars suggest a tendency 
of human rights advocacy to ignore the underlying cause of rights violations 
and to distract attention from broader, structural causes of injustice and 
oppression.327 The array of international legal rules and institutions are 
condemned for their limited enforcement machinery.328 and their “lack of 
democratic accountability.”329 Some skeptics go further and contend that the 
growth of legal and political international human rights movements was a 
companion to the rise of global inequality, which paved the road to populism 
and further rights abuses.330  
While Chapter 1 of this dissertation briefly documented Irish pro-choice 
international human rights advocacy and litigation, this chapter digs deeper 
into the practices of domestic advocates and the influence of international 
human rights on the abortion rights movement. By examining how pro-
choice "civil society331 (a term used in both human rights literature and in 
 
324 See, e.g., Laura Nader, The Americanization of International Law, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE LAW: EXPANDING 
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NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275, 296 (2002); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International 
Law Over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 11, 12 (2009). 
325 See also, Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights, and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender Violence Through Global Law, 
44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 54, 55–57 (2006); Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing 
Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 343, 344 (2003). 
326 Rachel Rebouche, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and Human Rights 7 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 579 (2017). 
327 See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, Rights 23 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS–CIVIL LIB. L. Rev 393, 400 (1988). 
328 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? I YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); ALICE 
EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2011). 
329 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; David Kennedy, The international human rights 
movement: Part of the problem 15 HARV. HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 101 (2004). 
330 See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018). 
331, "civil society is a term used in both literature and in practice to describe actors that are distinguishable from 
government or profit-seeking agents or individuals. See, Richard Price, Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in 
World Politics 55(4) WORLD POLITICS, 579 (2003). 
 
 64 
practice to describe actors that are distinguishable from government or profit-
seeking agents) used human rights advocacy at different points in their reform 
efforts in Ireland, this identifies four interlocking roles played by international 
human rights law and advocacy: 1) a formative role; 2) a formal legal role; 3) 
a structural role, and 4) a framing role. However, within this account, the 
constraints of international human rights law for abortion rights reform 
emerge. International human rights legal standards on abortion access did 
not mirror the movement's ultimate vision of unrestricted access to abortion 
for women in Ireland; as the movement moved from the margins to the 
center, international human rights law ran out as a resource.332 
Part I of this chapter sets out the current international legal standards on 
abortion rights and discusses how these standards developed within the 
United Nations and regional human rights systems. The trajectory of 
international human rights law on abortion includes several instances where 
human rights bodies considered the compatibility of Irish abortion law with 
international standards. Accordingly, there is some repetition from Chapter 
1, and these cases are also outlined in Part II of this chapter.  
Part II documents and analyzes how Irish pro-choice activists used 
international human rights-based strategies to create legal, political, and 
cultural opportunities for reform. Though there are elements of chronology 
in the analysis, the study cannot be told in an exact chronological account.  
This chapter concludes that at key moments, human rights-based 
strategies were critical to mobilize and gain leverage and legitimacy but 
cautions that the formal doctrine of international human rights law on 
abortion risks ambivalence for emancipatory movements for abortion rights.  
 
A. The Trajectory of International Human Rights Law on Abortion 
The texts of most human rights treaties and related international 
agreements are silent on abortion. However, since the 1990s, women's rights 
activists have used international human rights mechanisms to advance 
protection for abortion rights. Similar to arguing that abortion rights are 
implicit in provisions of domestic constitutions (as done in the US in Roe v. 
Wade333), human rights advocates who campaign for abortion rights urge 
human rights bodies334 to infer protection for abortion from other textually 
explicit rights. As a result, even though there is no stand-alone woman’s right 
 
332 For a contrasting view on the relevance on substantive content, see Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, 
Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 103–04 (1996) (suggesting that women’s rights 
advocates focus on the adequacy of rights rather than implementation of rights). 
333 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). The US Supreme Court recognized that the right to privacy is “broad enough 
to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”. 




to abortion in international human rights law, a number of human rights 
bodies—those charged with interpreting treaty provisions—have asserted 
national abortion restrictions to violate the right to life, right to health, right 
to privacy, right to liberty and security of the person, right to equality before 
the law and right to non-discrimination, and right to be free from torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Additionally, various human rights bodies have reached decisions that use 
human rights norms to pressure states to implement their own national 
exceptions to abortion bans. For example, some human rights bodies have 
contended that when States permit abortion in certain circumstances, the 
state is obliged to adopt legislation and/or guidelines to make clear when 
abortion is legal and when it is not.335 Others have said that states must ensure 
that legal abortion services are effective, timely, and practically accessible,336 
and that states should provide quality post-abortion care irrespective of 
whether individuals have undergone a legal or illegal abortion.337 Most have 
recommended that abortion should be decriminalized338 and the CEDAW 
Committee has described the denial of abortion, in certain instances, as a 
form of gender-based violence.339 All told, a set of norms is emerging from 
the international human rights framework that recognizes that the denial of 
abortion in certain circumstances is a violation of the universal human rights 
of women and girls.  
Notwithstanding these inroads, the scope of the developing norms 
concerning abortion is limited. In particular, these norms are limited by the 
willingness to recognize an affirmative right to an abortion only for 
“exceptional” cases.  Unless a woman’s pregnancy is the result of sexual 
assault (rape or incest), threatens her life or her health, or is not capable of 
surviving to term, human rights bodies have not recognized access to abortion 
as a human right.340 Chapter 3 analyzes this limited scope from a critical 
 
335 See infra xx 
336 The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized this in numerous cases. See detailed discussion of the 
relevant decisions infra at  xx 
337 General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), May 2, 2016, E/C.12/GC/22.  
338 See, e.g., CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating 
General Recommendation No. 19, July 14, 2017, CEDAW/C/GC/35 at ¶ 18; CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of 
Ireland, July 8, 2015, E/C.12/IRL/CO/3 at ¶ 30.  
339 In 2017, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) said that “without being able to 
effectively exercise their sexual and reproductive rights, women cannot realize their right to live free from 
violence and discrimination.” See, IACHR Urges All States to Adopt Comprehensive, Immediate Measures to Respect and 
Protect Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights October 23, 2017, https://mailchi.mp/dist/iachr-urges-all-states-to-
adopt-comprehensive-immediate-measures-to-respect-and-protect-womens-sexual-and-reproductive-
rights?e=07a43d57e2. The CEDAW Committee has also described criminalization of abortion and denial or 
delay of access to legal abortion as “forms of gender-based violence that, depending on the circumstances, may 
amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 on 
gender-based violence against women (2017), ¶18. 




Examining treaty provisions, decisions of human rights bodies,341 general 
comments and concluding observations by human rights bodies, international 
consensus statements, and the outputs of the UN special procedures, this 
section outlines how the United Nations, European, Inter-American, and 
African human rights accountability mechanisms have interpreted human 
rights treaties to support abortion access.342 From this examination will 
emerge a picture of both the successes of international human rights theories 
in resisting abortion restrictions and the limitation of those theories.  
 
1. The right to life 
The right to life provides one source of protection under international 
human rights law for women seeking abortion access. The right to life is 
protected by international human rights treaties and customary international 
law. Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) provides that "every human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life." Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that 
"every child has the inherent right to life." Similar provisions can be found in 
Art. 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ('ECHR'), Art. 4 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, which recognizes that everyone is entitled to respect for his 
or her life and safety.343  
 Unsafe abortions currently account for approximately 10-14% of the 
maternal mortality rate globally. Abortion is not inherently dangerous344—in 
most countries, it is safer than childbirth—but legal restrictions result in 
millions of women either seeking abortions “underground” from untrained 
persons or self-inducing using methods that risk their lives. The grievous 
 
341 Similar to a court being petitioned, Treaty Monitoring Bodies can receive “communications” from individuals 
against states that have provided their consent for this procedure. The body then forwards its ‘views’ to the state 
party and the individual concerned. While these views are not directly binding on states, they “exhibit some 
important characteristics of a judicial decision” because “they are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the 
impartiality and independence of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the 
Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions. See, e.g., General Comment 33, Obligations of States 
parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 25, 2009, 
CCPR/C/GC/33 at ¶ 13.  
342 The UN special procedures are independent human rights experts appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council 
to monitor human rights around the world, report on violations, and recommend strategies for governments and 
other stakeholders to improve human rights conditions. They conduct thematic studies and convene expert 
consultations, contribute to the development of international human rights standards, engage in advocacy, and 
provide advice for technical cooperation.  
343 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
344 See, e.g., Susheela Singh et al., Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE, 2018 https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-worldwide-2017.  
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methods women use to end unwanted pregnancies include placing foreign 
objects or herbal preparations in the vagina or cervix, ingesting substances, 
or inflicting direct trauma on their bodies. Complications include 
hemorrhage, sepsis, peritonitis, and trauma, many of which result in these 
women losing their lives.345 Meanwhile, the scale of post-abortion 
complications is substantial, with an estimated 7 million women and girls 
worldwide admitted to hospital every year owing to complications related to 
unsafe abortion.346  
The advent of the ‘abortion pill’—a common and cheap stomach-ulcer 
drug, misoprostol, mostly used in combination with another drug, 
mifepristone, to end a pregnancy in the first trimester—means that abortion-
related deaths are far less common than they were a few decades ago. Still, 
every year, somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000 women die as a 
consequence of unsafe abortions (97% in developing countries).347 Because so 
many of these deaths could be prevented by access to legal abortion—where 
abortion is legally restricted, the median ratio for unsafe abortion mortality is 
34 deaths per 100,000 live births, compared with one or less per 100,000 live 
births in countries that allow abortion on request348—human rights law 
recognizes that restrictive abortion laws can violate the right to life.  
The most recent international human rights law authority recognizing that 
abortion restrictions violate the right to life is the Human Rights Committee’s 
2018 General Comment on the right to life — an influential interpretative 
instrument that aims to clarify the normative scope of the treaty provision on 
the rights to life. 349 The Human Rights Committee articulated that while 
States can regulate abortion, restrictive abortion laws violate the right to life 
when they expose women to a risk of death from unsafe abortion,350 and 
recommended that States “provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion 
where the life and health of the pregnant woman or girl are at risk, or where 
carrying a pregnancy to term would cause the pregnant woman or girl 
substantial pain or suffering, most notably where the pregnancy is the result 
 
345 David A. Grimes et al., Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable Pandemic, 368 LANCET 1908, 1911 (November 6, 2006), 
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(06)69481-6.pdf. 
346 Id. 
347 World Health Organization (WHO), Safe abortion: Technical & policy guidance for health systems, World Health 
Organization (2015) 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/173586/WHO_RHR_15.04_eng.pdf;jsessionid=64E5FCC0
E3763E34CA2B0CF9C2395646?sequence=1. Furthermore, it is estimated that 220,000 children lose their 
mothers every year due to unsafe abortions. Researchers suggest that these children are at a greater risk of death 
in comparison with children who have two parents as a result of receiving less education, health care, and social 
care. See David Grimes et al, supra note 322; See also, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
“Unsafe abortion is still killing tens of thousands of women around the world – UN rights experts warn’” (September 28, 2016) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20600&LangID=E. 
348 See, e.g., Singh S et al., Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, Guttmacher Institute, 2018, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-worldwide-2017 . 
349 HRC General Comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018) ¶ 8 




of rape or incest or is not viable.”351 Prior to this guidance, the Human Rights 
Committee had long expressed particular concern for restrictive abortion 
laws and the risk to women’s lives when reviewing State compliance with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).352  
Other UN Treaty Bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), have also underscored the link between the denial of 
abortion and maternal mortality and addressed the denial of abortion as a 
violation of women’s right to life.353 The CESCR Committee called on States 
to amend restrictive abortion laws and to increase access to legal abortion in 
order to decrease maternal deaths.354 To guarantee women’s right to life “in 
practice,” the CESCR Committee urged States to ensure that life-saving 
abortion services are accessible by adopting, for example, guidelines on legal 
abortion and guaranteeing that conscientious objection laws are not an 
obstacle to abortion.355  
As of the year 2020, nearly all UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies recognize 
access to abortion as part of the right to life when denial poses a risk to the 
woman’s life. As a result, States are obliged to ensure that women do not put 
 
351 Id. Notably, drafting General Comment No. 36 was an unusually protracted process—it took almost 4 years. 
The first draft was circulated in 2015 and included references to “the rights of unborn children, including to their 
right to life.” In response, a coalition of women’s rights organizations lobbied the Committee to delete from the 
draft any express references to "the rights of the unborn children" or any other turn of phrase that may have 
implied that the right to life under the ICCPR applied before birth. Interview with Christina Zampas, Human 
Rights Lawyer, Geneva, March 3, 2017. See, also, Livio Zilli, The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36 on 
the Right to Life and the Right to Abortion, March 6, 2019 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/06/the-un-human-rights-committees-general-comment-36-on-the-right-to-life-
and-the-right-to-abortion/ . 
352 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the HRC regarding El Salvador, August 22, 2003, CCPR/CO/78/SLV 
at ¶14; HRC, Concluding observations on Ecuador, CCPR/C/ECU/CO/6 (2016), ¶15; Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/CO/5 (2016), ¶ 12. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Killings has articulated that the death of a woman, where it can be medically 
linked to a deliberate denial of access to life-saving medical care because of an absolute ban on abortion, would 
not only constitute a violation of the right to life and an arbitrary deprivation of life. Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions on a gender-sensitive approach to arbitrary 
killings, (2017), ¶ 95. 
353 CESCR, General Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health (2016), ¶ 10; Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 20 on the implementation of the rights of the child during 
adolescence, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/20 (2016), ¶¶ 13 and 60; CEDAW Committee, “Statement of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on sexual and reproductive health and rights: 
Beyond 2014 ICPD review,” 57th Session (2014) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/SRHR26Feb201. 
354 See, e.g., Concluding observations of the CESCR on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (2012), ¶.29; 
Concluding observations of the CESCR on the Republic of Korea, UN Doc. E/C.12/KOR/CO/4 (2017); 
Concluding observations of the CESCR on the Philippines, UN Doc. E/C.12/PHL/CO/5-6 (2016); 
Concluding observations of the CESCR on Kenya, UN Doc. E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (2016); and Concluding 
observations of the CESCR on Pakistan, UN Doc. E/C.12/PAK/CO/1 (2017). 
355 See, e.g., CESCR concluding observations on Spain, UN Doc. E/C.12/ESP/CO/6 (2018); Concluding 
observations of the CESCR on Mexico, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/5-6 (2017); Concluding observations of 
the CESCR on Moldova, UN Doc. E/C.12/MDA/CO/3 (2017); Concluding observations of the CESCR on 
Uruguay, UN Doc. E/C.12/URY/CO/5 (2107); Concluding observations of the CESCR on Poland, UN Doc. 




their lives at risk by procuring life-threatening abortions.356 Regionally, 
human rights experts have taken the same approach: the Organization of 
American States Rapporteur on the Rights of Women confirmed that women 
in the Central and South American region face “significant obstacles in 
exercising their sexual and reproductive rights” and are forced to “continue 
pregnancies that put their lives at risk” due to restrictive abortion 
legislation.357 The World Health Organization (WHO) has also outlined that 
legal, regulatory, and administrative barriers to abortion access contribute to 
unsafe abortion because they "deter women from seeking care and cause 
delays in access to services."358 
An inevitable legal issue related to the right to life approach to abortion is 
whether or not a fetus or “the unborn” has a right to life. Certain States 
recognize a prenatal right to life and justify prohibitions on abortion and 
certain types of contraception on this basis.359 In international human rights 
law, however, the invocation of claims to the right to life of the fetus has been 
largely ineffective. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”360 and the 
travaux preparatoires indicate that the word “born” was used intentionally to 
confirm that the rights in the Declaration are “inherent from the moment of 
birth,” thereby excluding a prenatal application of the rights protected in the 
Declaration.361 Similarly, the travaux preparatoires of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms that the right to life contained 
in Article 6 does not apply prior to birth.362 The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child defines a “child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen 
years.”363 Its preamble acknowledges the child’s need for special safeguards 
and care, including appropriate legal protection “before as well as after 
birth.”364 However, at the time of drafting, state delegations that included this 
 
356 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, October 30, 2018, CCPR/C/GC/36 at ¶ 8 [hereinafter HRC, 
General Comment No. 36]; CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men 
and Women), March 29, 2000, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 at ¶ 10.  
357 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, On International Women’s Day, IACHR Urges States to Guarantee 
Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights (March 6, 2015), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2015/024.asp.  
358 World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, at 94. 
359 In 2012, Honduras’ Supreme Court upheld the country’s ban on emergency contraception based on the belief 
that it can harm a fertilized embryo – which is a misunderstanding of emergency contraception’s mechanism of 
action. See, Decision of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 2012 (Hond.) [Dictamen de la CSJ, 1 de feb. de 2012 
(Hond.)]. 
360 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res.217a (III), Article 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (1948).  
361 U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 99th mtg., ¶ 110-124, U.N. Doc. A/PV/99 (1948). 
362 U.N. GAOR Annex, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 113 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.654 (1957); U.N. GAOR, 12th 
Session, Agenda Item 33, at 199(q), U.N. Doc. A/3764 (1957). The proposed and rejected text read, "the right to 
life is inherent in the human person from the moment of conception." For a contrasting view, see P.J. Flood, Does 
International Law Protect the Unborn Child?” 7(2) NATIONAL CATHOLIC BIOETHICS QUARTERLY, 73 (2007). 
363 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Article 1. 
364 The phrase "before as well as after birth" was added as a result of a proposal by the Holy See, Ireland, Malta, 
and the Philippines. E/CN.4/L.1542, Commission of Human Rights, 36th session, 1980, ⁋ 6. 
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language stated that it would not preclude the possibility of abortion because 
it was legal in many states under certain circumstances.365 
Regional human rights instruments and their respective courts’ 
jurisprudence support similar conclusions on the level of protection the right 
to life affords to the fetus. The Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam 
(CRCI)366—a binding convention which has not entered into force but was 
adopted in 2005 by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) Council 
of Foreign Ministers—is the most specific in terms of its protection for 
prenatal life. Article 7(a) reads, "as of the moment of birth, every child has 
rights due from the parents, society and the state to be accorded proper 
nursing, education, and material, hygienic and moral care. Both the fetus and 
the mother must be protected and accorded special care."  
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) protects 
“the right to life, in general, from the moment of conception.”367 However, 
in the Baby Boy case,368 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) drew on the preparatory works to the ACHR to assert that the 
drafters of the Convention did not intend for the phrase “in general, from the 
moment of conception” to mean that abortion should be outlawed under the 
Convention.369 Accordingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
determined that embryos do not constitute persons under the convention and 
are not afforded an absolute right to life.370 
In the 2004 case of Vo v. France371, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights avoided clarifying whether fetuses enjoy the right to 
life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case 
 
365 Id. 
366 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, OICDoc.OIC/IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.Final. [hereinafter 
CRCI]. 
367 American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970) (OAS Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65 
(1970)) [hereinafter American Convention) Negotiated at San Jose, Costa Rica in 1969, with the active 
participation of the United States, the American Convention is an international agreement that operates within 
the framework of the Organization of American States. Although the Convention was signed by President Jimmy 
Carter in 1978, it has yet to attain the two-thirds vote in the Senate the is required for ratification. 
368 Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9, rev. 1, ¶ 1 (1981) (White, Potter v United States, 
commonly known as the Baby Boy Case). The case was essentially a challenge to Roe v Wade and Doe v Bolton. 
Following Roe, the State of Massachusetts reversed a manslaughter conviction against a doctor who had 
performed an abortion. This was challenged as a violation of the right to life under the Convention. For more, 
see Dinah Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System: The Case of Baby Boy, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 
309 (1979). 
369 Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, ¶ 30 ("In the light of this history, it is clear that the... addition of the phrase 
'in general, from the moment of conception' does not mean that the drafters of the Convention intended to 
modify the concept of the right to life that prevailed in Bogota, when they approved the American Declaration."). 
Nonetheless, in practice, the ACHR has been used nationally and locally in attempts to limit access to abortion. 
For example, conservatives in Argentina, while arguing against abortion in cases of rape or as the only possible 
means of preventing danger to the life or health of a woman, contended that the provision had become 
"prospectively unconstitutional" in light of the ACHR. See Paolo Bergallo, The Struggle Against Informal Rules on 
Abortion in Argentina, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 147 
(eds. Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, and Bernard M. Dickens). 
370 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., series C, No. 257, ¶ 264, 273 (November 28, 2012). 
371 Vo v France, 40 EHRR 12 (2005) at ¶ 80. 
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arose from a situation where, due to a mix-up at a French hospital, a doctor 
punctured the applicant's amniotic sack during a medical procedure that was 
meant for a different 'Mrs. Vo'. As a result, the applicant had to have a 
therapeutic abortion. The doctor responsible faced malpractice charges. 
Unsatisfied with this outcome, the applicant, supported in her application by 
anti-abortion doctors, complained to the European Court of Human Rights 
that France should have prosecuted the doctor for "unintentional homicide" 
rather than malpractice and that the state's failure to do so infringed upon the 
right to life of her fetus under Article 2 of the Convention. However, the 
Court held that there was no violation of Article 2. The majority concluded 
that "the unborn child is not regarded as a person directly protected by Article 
2 of the Convention" and that if "the unborn" do have a right to life, it is 
limited by the mother's rights and interests.372 
International law does not establish that protecting prenatal life is 
illegitimate, but it is clear that the state's duty to protect the woman's right to 
life has primacy over any fetal right to life.373 In 2011, the CEDAW 
Committee affirmed this in the case of L.C. v. Peru.374 In that case, a public 
hospital refused to provide surgery to a child, in part because she was 
pregnant, and the hospital wished to prevent harm to the fetus.375 The 
CEDAW Committee confirmed that protecting the fetus over the health of 
the mother was a human rights violation.376 Similarly, in 2007, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights issued precautionary measures377 
to Nicaragua, requiring the state to provide medical care to a pregnant girl 
who had been denied cancer treatment because her doctors were concerned 
that the treatment could provoke an abortion.378  
 
2.  The right to health 
There are numerous formulations of the right to health in international 
human rights treaties. Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) enshrines the seminal 
international human rights law articulation of the right to health. It 
“recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
 
372 Id. ¶ 80 and 82. This was also indicated in A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 10. 
373 For a contrary view, see generally, Thomas Finegan, International Human Rights Law and the "Unborn": Texts and 
Travaux Preparatory, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 121 (2016). 
374 LC v. Peru, CEDAW Committee Communication No. 22/2009, UN Document CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 
(2011) [hereinafter LC v. Peru]. 
375 Id. ¶ 2.1–2.4, ¶ 30-31. 
376 Id. 
377 Article 25 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure establishes the mechanism for precautionary measures. In 
serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that 
a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of the 
proceedings in connection with a pending petition or case. 
378 MC 43-10 – “Amelia”, Nicaragua (February 26, 2010). 
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standard of physical and mental health.379 Article 24 of the CRC provides 
that States must "recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health." Article 12(1) of CEDAW obliges states 
to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family 
planning."380 Article 25 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Art. 5(e)(iv) of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also articulate the right to 
health. 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol),381 a binding multilateral 
treaty at the African regional level that came into force in 2005 is a rarity 
amongst human right treaties in expressly enjoining States to ensure the 
access to abortion in order to protect women's health. Under Article 14(2)(c) 
of the Protocol, the right to health, States Parties are called upon to take all 
appropriate measures to 
protect the reproductive rights of women by authorizing medical 
abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where continued 
pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or 
the life of the mother or the fetus. 
 
In clarifying States’ obligations under Article 14(2)(c) of the Maputo 
Protocol, the African Commission calls on States, in General Comment 2,382 
to adopt a purposive interpretation of grounds for abortion similar to the 
WHO Technical Guidance on abortion.383 Drawing on this guidance means 
that where “mental health” is relied upon as grounds for abortion, it is not 
necessary for States to establish psychiatric evidence first.384 The WHO’s 
definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” is also adopted, 
potentially enabling a broad interpretation of grounds for abortion, to include 
 
379 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (entered into force January 3, 1976) art 
12(1). This followed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949, which affirms that 'everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself [or herself ] and of his [or her] 
family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social services. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, UN Doc A/810 (December 10, 1948) art 25(1). 
380 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 
December 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force September 3, 1981) art 12(1). 
381 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (September 
13, 2000). 
382 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. General Comment No 2 on Article 14 (1) (a), (b), (c) and 
(f) and Article 14 (2) (a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the African Commission on November 28, 2014. 
383 Id. ¶ 10. 
384 Id. ¶ 38. 
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socio-economic reasons.385 The General Comment calls on States to remove 
restrictions that are not necessary for providing safe abortion services, such as 
the requirements of multiple signatures, approval by committees before an 
abortion can be performed, or restricting the performance of abortion to only 
medical practitioners.386 
More generally, the right to health in international law includes a 
prohibition on discrimination in the access to healthcare. Article 2 of the 
ICESCR provides that Covenant rights should be exercised "without 
discrimination of any kind," including on grounds of sex, race, and 
socioeconomic status. Article 3 requires States to "ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights 
…. [in the Covenant]." The right to health—along with other economic, 
social, and cultural rights—must be progressively realized according to 
available resources, but the right to non-discrimination is of immediate effect 
in human rights law and cannot be restricted.387 The CEDAW Committee 
has clarified that discrimination in access to health can occur not only when 
there is a difference in treatment between men and women but also indirectly 
when services used only by women, including reproductive healthcare, are 
neglected.388 The World Health Organization advises that countries 
permitting abortion on health grounds should interpret “health” to mean 
“complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity.”389  
The negative health effects of abortion restrictions are evident in any 
country or region with restrictive laws or other barriers on the access to 
abortion. As outlined in the previous section, criminal bans and cumbersome 
regulations on abortion access—particularly in the Global South—lead 
women to obtain abortion procedures in unsafe circumstances. Every year, 
close to five million women suffer from temporary or permanent disability as 
a consequence of unsafe abortion.390 Though laws restricting access rarely 
lead to lower rates of abortion,391 research in the US has shown that 
regulations seeking to prevent women from accessing abortion have been 
 
385 Id. ¶ 7, ¶ 38. 
386 Id. ¶ 58. 
387 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, “The nature of State Parties’ 
obligations” (Art. 2, ¶ 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, 1990, ¶ 9. 
388 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General Recommendation 
No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), ¶15, 31 (U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. 1) (April 
20, 1999), 
389 World Health Organization, Constitution of the World Health Organization, at 1 (45th ed. 1949). 




391 Gilda Sedgh, et al, Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide From 1995 to 2008, THE LANCET 379, No. 




marginally effective in some States,392 and that carrying an unwanted 
pregnancy to term can threaten a woman’s health.393 On the other hand, 
thousands of women circumvent local restrictions by traveling to regions that 
offer safe and legal access; Irish women traveled to the UK, Polish women go 
to Germany, and women and girls from States such as Georgia, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Texas, Ohio or Missouri in the USA travel as far as New York. 
As the phenomenon of abortion travel has gained more attention, studies 
have reported that travel can have negative mental health impacts on 
women394 and creates long-term social inequities that may influence health 
outcomes.395 Additionally, criminal abortion restrictions that are unclear 
have been shown to have chilling effects on healthcare providers, to the point 
that providers may refuse to provide abortions even when it is legal.396 
Criminal provisions on abortion also present barriers to other reproductive 
health services, including during pregnancy and childbirth; hospitals have 
denied women abortions even when their lives are threatened by the 
pregnancy, including in the context of miscarriage.397 In Nicaragua398  and 
the Dominican Republic399  for example, state and non-state actors have 
denied cancer treatment to women because of the potential harm that the 
treatment could do to the fetus. In a number of countries that criminalize 
abortion, women who have miscarried their pregnancies have delayed 
seeking medical treatment out of fear — usually well-founded— that they will 
be legally punished for purposefully inducing.400  
Conceptualizing access to reproductive healthcare as part of the right to 
health is a relatively recent development in international human rights law.401 
In the early 1990s, UN agreements reflecting States’ political commitments 
(as opposed to express legal obligations) on international development 
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introduced ‘reproductive rights’ to the human rights lexicon.402 Academics, 
policymakers, and advocates consider three such political commitments — 
the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD), its resulting Cairo Program of Action,403 and the 1995 Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing404 — as representing a “paradigm shift” in 
this regard.405 Prior international population growth and development 
policies addressed women’s reproductive needs as an issue of population 
growth; access to contraception was embraced by governments on the 
grounds that it could reduce the birth rate. By contrast, in these new 
population commitments, participating governments endorsed “reproductive 
health” as a right.406 The ICPD report described reproductive rights as: 
 
the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and 
responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children and to 
have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the 
highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.407 
 
The momentum for recognizing women's reproductive rights, however, did 
not extend to abortion rights at this juncture. Notably, the Holy See led a 
group of Latin American States, Malta, and some OIC countries in a 
successful campaign to exclude abortion access from the concept of 
'reproductive rights' and from classification as a health service or method of 
fertility regulation.408 This bloc of UN Members framed abortion as a threat 
to national values, both religious and cultural, and successfully inserted 
guarantees within the ICPD declaring that “in no case should abortion be 
promoted as a method of family planning” and that legal or policy changes 
on abortion access could only be determined nationally.409 In turn, the only 
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consensus that States reached on providing abortion access was "the Cairo 
compromise," an affirmation that where abortion is legal, it should be safe, 
and where illegal, women should have access to quality post-abortion care.410 
The following year, the Beijing Platform asked States to “consider reviewing 
laws containing punitive measures against women who have undergone 
illegal abortions”411 but went no further. While the ICPD introduced public 
health aspects of unsafe abortion to the UN agenda for the first time, abortion 
could not yet be treated as a legitimate reproductive health service. Rather, it 
was something to be prevented. 412  
In the years that followed, the CEDAW and CRC Committees became 
vocal about the negative health consequences of abortion restrictions for 
women and girls,413 but the Committees hesitated to require that States 
liberalize their domestic abortion law to comply with human rights 
obligations. In 1999, the CEDAW Committee issued General 
Recommendation No. 24 on Women and Health in which it echoed the 
ICPD’s endorsement of reproductive health rights to clarify that “access to 
health care, including reproductive health, is a basic right under the 
Convention.”414 The Committee did not, however, assert that abortion denial 
or its criminalization violated the right to reproductive health. It recognized 
the link between maternal mortality and unsafe abortion but only asked States 
to amend legislation criminalizing abortion “when possible.”415 Furthermore, 
the country-specific sections within the report from the same session 
expressed concerns about high levels of abortion in Greece, indicating that 
the Committee did not consider abortion as part of the reproductive health 
services they promoted.416 In 2000, the CESCR Committee's General 
Comment No. 14. articulated that "sexual and reproductive health services, 
including access to family planning, pre-and post-natal care, [and] emergency 
obstetric services," must be provided as part of the right to health,417 but like 
CEDAW, the CESCR Committee did not expressly recognize legal access to 
 
410 Beijing Platform supra note 898 at ¶ 8.25. See also, Marge Berber, The Cairo “Compromise” on Abortion and its 
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abortion as part of the right to health. 
The CEDAW Committee received its first communication involving 
abortion denial in the case of L.C. v. Peru.418 A 13-year old girl was raped by 
her uncle, and when she discovered that she was pregnant, she threw herself 
from the roof of a building.419 She survived and was taken to hospital, where 
her doctors recommended immediate realignment of her spine to prevent 
permanent paralysis.420 The surgeon in the hospital refused to perform the 
surgery because of LC’s pregnancy and what he considered to be risks to the 
fetus.421 LC was subsequently diagnosed with serious depression, but her 
medical team refused to provide anti-depressives on the grounds of her 
pregnancy.422 LC and her mother then requested an abortion for LC, which 
she was entitled to under Peruvian law owing to the risk to her health,423 and 
they tried to reschedule LC’s surgery.424 The hospital refused to provide an 
abortion and did not perform the surgery until LC miscarried three months 
later.425 The delay dramatically diminished the success of the intervention, 
and LC became paralyzed from the neck down.426 
LC complained to the CEDAW Committee that the state’s failure to 
provide for a therapeutic abortion violated her right to non-discrimination in 
access to healthcare under Article 12.427 Emphasizing that LC was a minor 
and a victim of sexual abuse, the CEDAW Committee agreed that Peru had 
violated her right to health under Article 12 by not ensuring she received the 
healthcare that her medical condition required—both the surgery and the 
abortion.428 Crucially, LC was entitled to this healthcare under national law. 
As such, the precedent is limited because LC’s circumstances fell within the 
state’s own legal limits for abortion access.  
Following a global study on reproductive and sexual rights, in 2011, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, pushed the 
norm further and articulated that the criminalization of abortion could 
violate the right to health.429 And for the first time, a UN expert 
recommended that all States decriminalize abortion to protect the right to 
health.430 Almost concurrently, in 2011, the CEDAW Committee became 
less tentative in its criticisms of national abortion laws and their impact on 
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women's right to health.431 The heightened burdens that criminal abortion 
laws impose on marginalized women and girls, such as women with poor 
socio-economic resources, asylum seekers, and migrant women, was a key 
theme of this criticism.432 
By 2016, the CESCR Committee included access to abortion as part of 
the right to reproductive health for the first time in the Committee’s corpus.433 
General Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health outlines 
that “States must reform laws that impede the exercise of the right to sexual 
and reproductive health including laws criminalizing abortion.”434 The 
Committee also delineated that respect for the right to health requires States 
to prevent unsafe abortions, including to “liberalize restrictive abortion laws; 
to guarantee women and girls access to safe abortion services and to quality 
post-abortion care.”435 Additionally, the CESCR Committee recognized the 
pernicious nature of the intersectional discrimination that impacts women 
living in poverty, people with disabilities, migrants, adolescents, and people 
living with HIV/AIDS when such persons seek reproductive healthcare.436 
The CEDAW Committee’s 2015 Statement of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women on sexual and reproductive health and rights: Beyond 
2014 ICPD sums up its interpretation of abortion as a human rights issue:  
 
Unsafe abortion is a leading cause of maternal mortality and 
morbidity. As such, States parties should legalize abortion at least in 
cases of rape, incest, threats to the life and/or health of the mother, 
or severe fetal impairment, as well as provide women with access to 
quality post-abortion care, especially in cases of complications 
resulting from unsafe abortions. States parties should also remove 
punitive measures for women who undergo abortion. States parties 
should further organize health services so that the exercise of 
conscientious objection does not impede their effective access to 
reproductive health care services, including abortion and post-
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The CEDAW Committee applied such standards in its ‘Country Inquiry’ of 
Northern Ireland.438 Though abortion has been permitted in England, Wales, 
and Scotland since 1958, until recently, Northern Ireland criminalized 
abortion in all cases other than when the life of the woman was threatened or 
where the fetus would not survive to term. Invoking the right to health as 
recognized in Article 12, the CEDAW Committee recommended that 
Northern Ireland decriminalize abortion in all situations and legalize 
abortion at least in cases of incest, rape, fetal impairment and when there is a 
threat to the life or health of the woman.439  
 In recent years, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
similarly urged States to “decriminalize abortion in all circumstances” to 
safeguard a girl’s right to health.440 Additionally, in August 2018, the CRPD 
Committee issued a ‘joint statement’ with CEDAW asserting that “access to 
safe and legal abortion, as well as related services and information, are 
essential aspects of women’s reproductive health.”441 
At the regional human rights level, through the mechanism of 
‘precautionary measures,’442 the Inter-American Court and Commission 
have recognized that abortion access (though not by name, instead preferring 
to describe it as medical treatment) can be necessary to protect a women’s 
right to health, as recognized in Article 10 of the Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. El Salvador’s near-total ban on abortion led to the measures issued in 
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B v. El Salvador443 by the Inter-American Court. A 22-year old mother who 
was pregnant with an anencephalic fetus sought an abortion when her 
physician told her that carrying her pregnancy to term would exacerbate her 
lupus and cause life-threatening obstetric complications.444 Though B's 
request for an abortion was within the permitted exceptions to El Salvador's 
abortion ban, state authorities intervened to prevent her from getting an 
abortion. In response to B's petition for the Inter-American Court to 
intervene, the Court ordered El Salvador to ensure that "appropriate medical 
procedures" were carried out to preserve B's life, health, and personal 
integrity.445 In doing so, the Court addressed the case solely as a question of 
providing medical treatment for B and avoided any assessment of the 
compatibility of El Salvador’s abortion ban with the Convention. By contrast, 
the Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights in the Inter-American system has 
expressly named therapeutic abortion as a necessary health service for 
women, the denial of which constitutes a violation of human rights.446  
By invoking the right to health to call for the decriminalization of 
abortion, international and regional human rights bodies have taken 
important steps beyond the UN political commitments made in the 1990s. By 
contrast, global health and international development policies on 
reproductive health remain ambivalent on abortion rights. These policies and 
practices remain bound by the ICPD and its abortion compromise: where 
abortion is legal, it should be safe, and where illegal, women should have 
access to quality post-abortion care.447 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, for example, includes the target of “universal access to sexual 
and reproductive health and reproductive rights,” but the target is limited to 
ensuring sexual and reproductive rights as recognized in the ICPD, the 
Beijing Platform for Action and the ‘outcome documents’ of their review 
conferences.448 The most recent review of Beijing Platform in 2019 
committed to striving for "access to safe abortion to the full extent of the law, 
measures for preventing and avoiding unsafe abortions, and for the provision 
of post-abortion care."449 – thereby remaining bound by the 1994 
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compromise on abortion. Similarly, in the WHO’s 2016-2030 “Global 
Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health”—an evidence-
based strategy “designed to ensure that every woman and child realizes their 
right to health”—the interventions on abortion are limited to providing post-
abortion care and safe abortion where it is already legal.450  
 
3. The right to decide freely on the number and spacing of children 
As mentioned, other than the Maputo Protocol, no regional or 
international human rights treaty explicitly addresses abortion. The 
CEDAW, where one may expect to find a provision on abortion, does not, 
but it includes several provisions on family planning; these include Articles 
10(h), 12(1), and 14(2). Relatedly, Article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW calls on States 
to ensure that men and women have "the same rights to decide freely and 
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children, and to have access 
to the information, education, and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights."451 However, the family planning provisions have never been 
interpreted to support access to abortion, and Article 16(1)(e) only once.452 
Similarly, Article 23(1) of the Convention on the Rights of all Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) recognizes "[t]he rights of persons with disabilities to 
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children."453 
but this provision has not been interpreted to support abortion rights. 
4. The right to privacy 
In the landmark 1973 US Supreme Court case, Roe v. Wade,454 the right 
to abortion was recognized as a fundamental right included within the 
guarantee of personal privacy.455 The decision had a global impact; it inspired 
movements for and against the liberalization of abortion laws across the 
world. This Supreme Court's judicial reasoning, which considered abortion a 
matter of privacy rights, also reverberated in jurisdictions around the globe. 
The European Court of Human Rights was one such importer. Strasbourg 
jurisprudence treats Article 8, the right to private and family life, as the main 
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provision pertinent to claims for access to abortion under the Convention. 
Article 8 guarantees "respect for private and family life" and provides that this 
right may not be interfered with "except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary . . . in the interests of . . . the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."  Decisions related 
to the right to private life at the European Court of Human Rights have 
recognized that the right incurs both negative and positive obligations; the 
state may need to refrain from interfering in private life, or it may have to act 
by taking measures to safeguard access. Additionally, the Court has also 
asserted that privacy includes, among other things, the right to personal 
identity or personal autonomy, a right to establish and develop relationships 
with others, a right to moral and physical integrity, and the "right to become 
or not become a parent."456 Though such interests appear to support a 
woman’s right to abortion, in contrast to American jurisprudence, the 
European Court does not consider the right to privacy to protect a woman’s 
right to abortion. 
The first case to address abortion rights in the European Convention on 
Human Rights was Bru ̈ggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany457 in 
1977. Two applicants claimed that Germany's criminalization of abortion in 
the first trimester, other than in exceptional cases, violated their right to 
respect for private life, and in the case of Scheuten, a single mother with two 
children, her right to respect for family life.458 In claiming a violation of 
private life, the applicants argued that the German law demanded that they 
either forego sexual intercourse or use contraceptive methods that may be 
unreliable, unhealthy, or unavailable459 and that the law could force women 
“to carry out pregnancy against [their] will.”460 The applicants also invoked 
Articles 9, 11, 14, 17, and 18 of the Convention, but all of those claims were 
dismissed without interrogation by the Commission.461  
The Commission asserted that legislation "regulating the termination of 
pregnancy" engaged privacy interests under Article 8(1) and described the 
right to private life as encompassing rights to sexual autonomy.462 and the 
right to physical and psychological integrity.463 However, according to the 
(now defunct) Commission, a woman’s private life becomes “shared” with the 
fetus whenever she is pregnant.464 Consequently, the Commission held that 
 
456 Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007-IV); Tysiac v Poland supra note ¶ 107. 
457 Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75, (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 244 /3 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. 244, (1981) [hereinafter Bruggemann v. Germany]. 
458 Id. ¶ 50. 
459 Id.  
460 Id. 
461 Id. ¶ 51. 
462 Id. ¶¶ 61–63. 
463 Id.  
464 Id. ¶ 59. 
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the German law did not interfere with the applicants’ private life.465 The 
Commission also emphasized that all member states of the Convention, in 
one way or another, set up their own legal rules in this area.466 The 
commission alleged that parties to the Convention did not intend to bind 
themselves in favor of any particular position on abortion rights.467  
The case of Tysiac v. Poland was the first abortion access human rights 
challenge at the European Court of Human Rights.  Alicja Tysiac had sought 
an abortion in Poland upon being told that her pregnancy constituted a risk 
to her eyesight (she had severe myopia).468 Because Poland’s abortion ban 
includes exceptions for abortions where there is a risk to a woman’s life or 
health, where the pregnancy is a result of a crime, or where the pregnancy 
cannot survive to term,469 Tysiac's abortion was legal. However, her doctors 
would not perform the abortion for her; they claimed that if she delivered by 
cesarean, the risk could be averted. Unable to get an abortion, Tysiac 
delivered her pregnancy by cesarean. A few months later, her eyesight 
deteriorated to the point that she could no longer care for her children.470 She 
initiated a criminal case against her doctors, but the Polish courts dismissed 
the case. She then turned to the European Court of Human Rights.  
Tysiac argued that Poland violated her right to private life both 
substantively—by failing to provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion—
and procedurally—by failing to provide a comprehensive legal framework 
that could guarantee her legal right to a therapeutic abortion.471  
The European Court of Human Rights focused its assessment on Alicja 
Tysiac’s procedural claim.472 The Court held that the right to private life 
required Poland to ensure proper procedures to allow women to exercise their 
domestic abortion rights. Emphasizing that it was not creating “abortion 
rights,” the Court outlined that "once the legislature decides to allow 
abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit 
real possibilities to obtain it,"473 — a responsibility that extended to protecting 
 
465 Id. at ¶ 66. There was, however, a dissent. Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett disagreed with the Commission's conclusion 
regarding Article 8 and argued that the intervention of the German law in sexual morality had not been justified 
by the state. He opined that regulation of abortion invades article 8(1) rights not only during pregnancy but 
before conception since it will influence a woman's decision regarding its commencement and termination. Mr. 
T. Opshal, with Mr. C. Norgaard and Mr. L. Kellberg, concurring, issued a separate opinion in which they 
argued that the state had intervened in the applicants' private life but that this was not an interference because the 
intervention was justified. 
466 Id.  
467 Id. 
468 Tysiac v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5410/03 (2007) [hereinafter, Tysiac v. Poland]. 
469 Law on Family Planning (protection of the human fetus and conditions permitting pregnancy termination) 
Statute Book 93.17.78 (1993 Act). 
470 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 468 at ¶15. 
471 Id. at ¶¶ 67, 75-76. 
472 See Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in ABORTION LAW IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman & 
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014). 
473 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 468 at ¶ 105-6. 
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against medical obstructiveness. There the Court ended its review, avoiding 
discussion of the claims that Poland’s abortion law, in and of itself, interfered 
with Alicja Tysiac’s human rights.474  
In RR v. Poland,475 a public hospital delayed genetic testing for the 
applicant after ultrasounds indicated a severe impairment in the fetus—
grounds for termination of pregnancy in Poland—until the legal time limit 
for abortion expired.476 In finding a violation of RR’s right to private life, the 
Court articulated that “effective access to relevant information on the 
mother’s and fetus’ health, where legislation allows for abortion in certain 
situations, is directly relevant for the exercise of personal autonomy.”477 
Drawing on its holding in Tysiac, the Court concluded that, where domestic 
law allows for abortion in cases of fetal malformation, the state has a positive 
obligation under Article 8 to ensure that there is “an adequate legal and 
procedural framework to guarantee that relevant, full and reliable 
information on the fetus’ health is available to pregnant women.”478 
In P & S v. Poland,479 a 14-year-old girl (P) became pregnant after she was 
raped by a classmate.480 P's situation fell within one of Poland's exceptions to 
its abortion ban, i.e., rape, and her mother (S) approached several hospitals 
seeking a referral for an abortion. Still, a series of medical personnel invoked 
"conscientious objection" and would not refer P to another provider.481 The 
hospitals then pressured P to sign a statement that she did not want an 
abortion, and state authorities removed P from the custody of her mother, 
falsely claiming that P was being pressured by her mother. 482 The hospitals 
also released P’s information to the press and Catholic anti-abortion 
groups.483  
P ultimately obtained an abortion, but the European Court held Poland 
responsible for the delay and obstruction. Relying on the right to private life, 
the Court reiterated that when abortion access is permitted, the state is 
obligated to put in place a “procedural framework enabling a pregnant 
woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abortion.”484 The 
 
474 Id. ¶ 116. 
475 R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012) [hereinafter, R.R. v. Poland]. 
476 Section 4(a) of the Polish 1993 Family Planning Act provides: "An abortion can be carried out only by a 
physician where 1) pregnancy endangers the mother's life or health; 2) prenatal tests or other medical findings 
indicate a high risk that the fetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-
threatening ailment; 3) there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act." 
Under any circumstances, it is only possible to obtain an abortion before the 23rdweek of pregnancy (when the 
baby would be able to survive outside the mother’s body).  
477 R.R. v. Poland, supra note 475 at ¶177. 
478 Id. at ¶ 200. 
479 P & S v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) [hereinafter, P & S. v. Poland]. 
480 Id. at ¶¶ 11–15. 
481 Id.  
482 Id. at ¶¶19, 26, 28, 32. 
483 Id. at ¶41. 
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Court specified that exceptions to the criminalization of abortion must be 
transparent, and the regulatory framework must include appropriate appeals 
processes to satisfy the right to private life:485 
 
once the state, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory 
regulations allowing abortion in some situations, . . .the legal 
framework devised for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent 
manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be 
taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations 
deriving from the Convention.486 
 
The Court followed a similar approach in the 2010 case of A, B & C v. 
Ireland (already discussed in this dissertation in chapter 1) concerning three 
women who went to the UK for abortions owing to Ireland’s almost total ban 
on abortion.487 The first applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic with four 
children in the care of the state.488 She had suffered from post-natal 
depression after each of her four prior pregnancies, which had exacerbated 
her alcoholism. She felt that a fifth child could impede her progress in 
becoming sober and reuniting with her family and so decided to get an 
abortion.489 She borrowed money at a high interest rate to pay for travel and 
a private clinic in the UK, and she traveled in secret.490 The second applicant, 
B, was young and single and felt that she could not care for a child on her 
own. She also traveled to the UK in secret.491 The third applicant, C, who 
was in remission from cancer, tried to find out from her doctors whether her 
pregnancy would impact her health and whether the radiation from her 
recent cancer tests might have harmed the fetus.492 Neither her doctor nor 
other healthcare workers were forthcoming. Having researched the risks 
herself, she decided to travel to the UK for an abortion. Upon return to 
Ireland, she suffered prolonged bleeding and infection as consequences of 
incomplete abortion.493  
All three applicants submitted that Ireland's abortion prohibition violated 
their human rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment), 8 (right to respect for private life), and 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) of the European Convention. Applicant C also claimed that 
 
485 Id.  
486 R.R. v. Poland, supra note 475 at ¶ 187; P & S v. Poland, supra note 479 at ¶ 99; See also, Tysiac v. Poland, supra 
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487 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12. 
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492 Id. ¶¶ 24-26. 
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her right to life under Article 2 (right to life) had been violated, arguing that 
abortion was not available in practice in Ireland even in a life-threatening 
situation (the one possible legal exception to the ban) because there was no 
legislation or guidelines to clarify that a woman had a right to a life-saving 
abortion).494 In relation to the right to private life, all three applicants argued 
that Ireland failed to respect their physical integrity, and the stigma, delay, 
and stress they had suffered by being forced to travel secretly to England for 
abortions infringed upon their right to private life.495 C also claimed that the 
state’s lack of a statutory or regulatory basis for a life-saving abortion violated 
her right to private life.496  
The Irish government contested all of their claims and argued that even 
if Article 8 was engaged, Ireland’s abortion ban was a justified interference 
with the right to private life because it pursued two legitimate aims: a) the law 
advanced the protection of the rights of ‘others,’497 and b) it was based on 
public morals and the need to protect the right to life of the fetus.498 
In relation to all three applicants, the Grand Chamber asserted that 
Ireland’s prohibition on abortion impacted their private lives.499 The 
Chamber did not engage C’s right to life claims but found in her favor on 
privacy grounds, reiterating its previous position that, where abortion is 
legally permitted, the state has a positive obligation to ensure that it is 
accessible.500 But with respect to applicants A and B, the Court’s majority 
held that the state’s interference with their private lives was justifiable; the 
Court accepted Ireland’s claim that the normative premise of abortion 
restrictions in Ireland was “the profound moral views” of the Irish people on 
the protection of prenatal life, i.e. the second proffered legitimate aim.501 The 
Chamber also assessed whether the prohibition on abortion was 
proportionate to the state’s aim by considering whether Ireland had: 
struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second 
applicants’ right to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, 
on the other, the profound moral values of the Irish people as to the 
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In determining whether this balance was met, the Court afforded the Irish 
government a wide “margin of appreciation”503 and the claims of A and B 
were dismissed.504  
At the UN level, the right to privacy in abortion jurisprudence at the 
Human Rights Committee produces similarly tentative support for abortion 
access. Many cases replicate the European Court’s approach, i.e., the 
Committee will find States in violation of the right to privacy if their abortion 
regulation is not implemented in practice. KL v. Peru505 challenged Peru’s 
failure to implement a woman’s right to a therapeutic abortion. When she 
was three months pregnant, KL, then aged 17, attended a public hospital in 
Lima for an ultrasound, which revealed that she was carrying a fetus with a 
fatal anomaly where the fetus lacks most or all of a forebrain. Her gynecologist 
told KL that her life was in danger if the pregnancy continued.506 KL opted 
to have a therapeutic abortion, which is legal in Peru, but the hospital's 
director refused. As a result, KL gave birth to an anencephalic newborn and 
suffered from severe depression when the newborn died four days after she 
gave birth.507  
KL complained to the HRC that is interfering with her decision to legally 
terminate her pregnancy and subjecting her to an "extended funeral" for her 
child; the state acted on the basis of prejudicial social attitudes towards 
women to violate her rights under Articles 3 (non-discrimination between 
men and women), 6 (life), 7 (torture and ill-treatment), 24 (the right of every 
child to receive from her family, society and the state the protection required 
by her status as a minor) and 26 (equal protection of the law) of the ICCPR. 
508 In terms of the violation of her right to privacy, KL argued that by 
interfering with her decision to have an abortion—a decision that impacted 
her bodily integrity and her life more broadly—the state violated her right to 
privacy.509  
The Committee found in favor of KL, but on a different basis. Rather 
than engaging her argument that the state interfered with a woman's right to 
make autonomous decisions about reproduction or parenthood, the 
Committee held that the "state interfered arbitrarily in her private life by 
denying her the opportunity to secure medical intervention."510  
LMR v. Argentina511 involved a girl who was pregnant as a result of rape. 
Argentina permits abortion for victims of rape, but the hospital that LMR 
 
503 K.L. v. Peru, CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003, Communication No. 1153/2003 [hereinafter K.L. v. Peru] 
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506 Id. ¶¶ 2.1—2.2.  
507 Id. ¶¶ 2.3 & 2.6. 
508 Id. ¶¶ 3.4-3.7. 
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510 Id. ¶ 6.4. 
511 LMR v. Argentina, UN Doc. CCPR/C/101/D 1608/2007, (UN Human Rights Committee Apr 28, 2011). 
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attended initiated legal proceedings to prevent her from getting an 
abortion.512 Following a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Buenos Aires 
determined that LMR could get an abortion, but the hospital again refused 
to perform the abortion on grounds of “institutional conscience.”513 With the 
help of local women’s organizations, LMR obtained an illegal abortion on 
the “black market.”514 LMR suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder in 
the aftermath.515  
LMR’s mother complained to the HRC that the hospital’s refusal to 
terminate the pregnancy violated her human rights,516 including her right to 
be free from arbitrary interference in her private life.517 She emphasized that 
the state arbitrarily interfered in her private life by making a decision 
concerning her life and reproductive health on her behalf.518 In response, the 
Committee held that Argentina’s unlawful interference—through the 
judiciary—in an issue that should have been resolved "between the patient 
and her physician" violated LMR's right to privacy.519  
In Mellet v. Ireland520 and Whelan v. Ireland,521 the applicants’ argued that 
Ireland’s abortion ban in cases of non-viable pregnancies impeded their 
physical and psychological integrity and arbitrarily interfered in their 
decision-making.522 In response, the HRC concluded that by interfering with 
their decision not to continue a non-viable pregnancy and causing mental 
anguish, Ireland interfered with their right to privacy.523 In contrast to the 
European Court of Human Rights, the HRC held that: “the balance that the 
state party has chosen to strike between protection of the fetus and the rights 
of the woman cannot be justified.”524 
There are no abortion-related decisions involving the right to privacy 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, in 2007, the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights brokered a friendly settlement 
in Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. México. 525 Paulina, 13, was pregnant as 
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a result of rape. At the hospital she attended, Paulina’s medical team 
purposely delayed her abortion.526 A Catholic priest and anti-abortion 
hospital director began visiting Paulina as she waited, providing both Paulina 
and her mother misleading information about the health risks of abortion. 
Worried, Paulina canceled the abortion. Her petition to the Commission 
alleged that the state had enabled public officials to violate her rights to 
dignity and privacy, physical and psychological integrity, liberty, and 
informed consent in its failure to issue guidelines for access to abortion for 
women who have been raped.527 
Paulina's case never reached the admissibility stage at the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights; Paulina and the State of Mexico reached a 
"friendly settlement agreement," in which the Mexican government conceded 
generally to the human rights violations and agreed to a number of 
reparations.528 Similar to cases in the European Court of Human Rights, the 
judicial approach distilled the issues to focus on procedure, namely the 
absence of regulations to clarify the exceptions to Mexico’s abortion ban. 
There was no examination of the abortion ban itself or the broader socio-
political context that gave rise to a situation where individuals could impose 
their religious beliefs about abortion on a woman.529 
5. The right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
(CIDT) is a norm of universal applications in international law530 and is one 
of the most prolific norms contained in international and regional human 
rights treaties.531 There is no single definition of torture under international 
law, but international human rights bodies tend to agree upon four elements 
that, if combined, constitute torture.  
 
526 Id.  ¶¶ 9–13. 
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I. an act (or omission) that inflicts severe pain or suffering 
II. which is intentional 
III. for a specific purpose or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, and 
IV. inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.532  
In distinguishing torture from CIDT, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Ill-Treatment asserts that the concept of "powerless[ness]" is "the 
decisive criteria" for distinguishing torture from cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment.533 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights 
defines torture as inhuman treatment that is both deliberate and “caus[es] 
very serious and cruel suffering.” The Court considers inhuman or degrading 
treatment to be conduct that, while still serious, falls below that threshold.534 
The form of torture and CIDT traditionally accepted as prohibited under 
international human rights law required that the perpetrator be "a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity," e.g., official detention 
settings, during interrogations, or armed conflict.535 This right would protect 
“the male prisoner of conscience.”536 Torture and ill-treatment inflicted upon 
women by either state or non-state actors wasn't part of the picture.537 
However, over the past thirty years, feminist activists transformed 
understandings of torture and CIDT in international law such that pain and 
suffering endured by women are also understood as a violation of the right to 
be free from torture and ill-treatment.538 Rape now has been found to 
constitute torture in some circumstances539 and categories of gender-based 
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non-state torture such as female genital cutting, widow and acid burning, and 
the torture of “trafficked” women are emerging.540  
At national, regional, and international levels, civil society organizations 
extensively document the ways in which state denial of abortion rights can 
generate suffering at the hands of the state that constitutes torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.541 In response to such monitoring, 
documentation, and advocacy, the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee Against Torture (CAT),542 and the European Court of Human 
Rights have articulated that denial of access to abortion can lead to physical 
or mental suffering amounting to ill-treatment. Alyson Zuerick identifies two 
broad situations where this occurs.543 The first involves cases where actors, 
such as medical professionals, hospital boards, or police, frustrate or obstruct 
a woman’s attempts to obtain an abortion that she is legally entitled to.544 The 
second and more recent branch of this abortion denial-as-ill-treatment 
jurisprudence involves cases where human rights bodies find that a State's 
abortion regulations themselves cause the ill-treatment.545  
Beginning in the late 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee, through 
its General Comments and Concluding Observations to States, expressed its 
concern restrictive abortion laws could run afoul of their obligations to 
prevent torture or CIDT, particularly when the pregnancy was the result of 
rape or the woman’s life was threatened.546 Over the next decade, the 
Committee substantiated its reasoning on abortion denial as ill-treatment in 
individual decisions.  
The above-discussed case KL v. Peru,547 in 2005, was the first in a series of 
cases where the HRC found that denying or obstructing a woman’s access to 
an abortion amounted to CIDT. The Committee recognized that the mental 
suffering that KL experienced, both during her pregnancy and after giving 
birth, was a foreseeable result of the hospital compelling her to continue with 
the pregnancy even though KL’s child would die very soon after birth.548 This 
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was compounded because her medical team provided no psychological or 
medical support despite KL’s “special vulnerability as a minor girl.”549 The 
Committee held that this suffering amounted to CIDT for which Peru was 
liable.550  
In LMR v. Argentina,551 LMR’s mother claimed that forcing her daughter 
to continue with her pregnancy constituted cruel and degrading treatment 
and, consequently, was a violation of her personal well-being.552 LMR also 
claimed that she felt humiliated by the barrage of attention she had received, 
in particular the pressure from people to continue the pregnancy and give the 
baby up for adoption.553 In addressing the author’s claim, the Committee 
held that Argentina’s failure “to guarantee LMR’s right to a termination of 
pregnancy [as provided under domestic law] . . . caused LMR physical and 
mental suffering” amounting to a violation of Article 7.554 The Committee 
also expressed heightened concern at what they perceived to be the 
vulnerability of the complainant, that LMR's suffering was "aggravated by 
her status as a young woman with a disability."555  
In 2014, in its Concluding Observations to Ireland, the HRC, citing 
Article 7 of the Convention, expressed its concern that Ireland continued to 
prohibit abortion in most circumstances and highlighted the “severe mental 
suffering caused by the denial of abortion services to women seeking abortions 
due to rape, incest, fatal fetal abnormality or serious risks to health.”556 The 
Committee concluded by recommending that Ireland undertake significant 
reforms, namely that it “[r]evise its legislation on abortion, including its 
Constitution, to provide for additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, 
serious risks to the health of the mother, or fatal fetal abnormality” to comply 
with its obligations under the ICCPR.557 When this law was subject to the 
Committee’s scrutiny in two landmark cases just two years later, the 
Committee unambiguously held that criminal abortion law in and of itself, i.e., 
not just obstruction of the law, violated the right to be free from cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the cases of Mellet and Whelan shared a similar 
factual background. During their pregnancies, both Amanda Mellet and 
Siobhán Whelan received diagnoses of fatal fetal impairments (congenital 
heart defects in the case of Mellet and holoprosencephaly in the case of 
 
549 Id. ¶ 6.5. 
550 Id. ¶ 6.5. 
551 LMR v. Argentina, supra note 511, ¶ 7.2. 
552 Id.  ¶ 3.8. 
553 Id. 
554 Id.  ¶ 9.2. 
555 Id.   




Whelan).558 At the time, Ireland only permitted abortion in situations where 
there was a risk to the life of the woman, which meant that the women had 
to leave Ireland, at their own expense, in order to end their non-viable 
pregnancies. In Mellet’s situation, she had to return to Ireland twelve hours 
after her abortion — still weak and bleeding — because she could not afford 
to stay overnight in the UK.559 Upon return, neither woman received post-
abortion or bereavement care in the public health care system. In addition, 
the women described deep feelings of shame and stigma associated with the 
criminalization of abortion.560 Both women had to leave the remains of their 
child in the UK to be received later via delivery by courier.561 
In their separate cases, Amanda Mellet and Siobhan Whelan claimed that 
Ireland subjected them to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by i) 
denying them reproductive health care and bereavement support; (ii) forcing 
them to continue carrying a dying fetus; iii) compelling them to terminate 
their pregnancies abroad; and iv) subjecting them to intense stigma.562 Ireland 
attempted to refute these claims by pointing out that the Committee’s CIDT 
holding in the KL case was due to KL being denied an abortion that was 
lawfully available. 563 By contrast, Mellet and Whelan had sought abortions 
that were unlawful in Ireland.  
The HRC found in favor of the women. It held that by forcing the women 
to leave the country for abortions in such circumstances — away from their 
families and local healthcare providers, and with the burden of having to 
leave the remains of their babies behind — Ireland’s abortion law subjected 
the women to “intense physical and mental suffering” that violated their right 
to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.564 Finding that 
Ireland’s abortion law itself, rather than a failure to implement the law, 
amounted to a human rights violation, marked significant progress in the 
Human Rights Committee's abortion jurisprudence. The decisions required 
Ireland, for the first time, to compensate a woman for the expenses and 
emotional distress tied to an abortion. It also called on Ireland to amend its 
laws criminalizing abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomaly, including its 
constitution, if necessary. 
While the Committee Against Torture has not heard an individual case 
on access to abortion, there are a number of very clear concluding 
observations by the Committee on abortion restrictions. CAT reiterates that 
restrictive abortion laws may lead to suffering tantamount to CIDT and urges 
 
558 Mellet at ¶¶ 2.1-2.2; Whelan at ¶ 2.1. 
559 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.4. 
560 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.5; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 2.4. 
561 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.5; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 2.5. 
562 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 3.1; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 3.1. 
563 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 4.6; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 4.5. 
564 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 7.4 - 7.6; Whelan v Ireland, ¶7.5 -7.7 
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States to reform their abortion laws as part of their obligation to prevent 
CIDT.  
The European Court of Human Rights has been more reticent than the 
Human Rights Committee to recognize claims for ill-treatment in abortion 
cases. In A, B, C v. Ireland, the applicants argued they had experienced 
inhuman or degrading treatment because Ireland’s criminalization of 
abortion stigmatized women who sought abortions. It was “degrading and a 
deliberate affront to their dignity.”565 The Court considered this claim to be 
“manifestly ill-founded” and thus inadmissible.566 Similarly, in the above 
mentioned Tysiac case, the applicant claimed that the state’s failure to ensure 
she could access her right to an abortion—essentially forcing her to continue 
with a pregnancy knowing that her health could seriously deteriorate—
resulted in “anguish and distress” and amounted to inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3.567 The Court dismissed Tysiac’s claim without 
explicit reason.568 
In two cases, a couple of years later, the European Court went further 
than it had in Tysiac. In the abovementioned case of RR v. Poland,569 the 
European Court concluded that the public hospital’s deliberate delay in 
providing the legal genetic testing had both humiliated RR and caused her 
severe mental anguish. In combination with the woman’s “extreme 
vulnerability” as a pregnant woman, the abortion denial constituted a 
violation of the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment.570 Similarly, in P & S v. Poland571 the barriers that state actors had 
subjected her to in her attempt to obtain an abortion—one that she was 
entitled to under Polish law—violated her right to be free from cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.572 
The response of the European Court in RR and P & S emulates the 
approach of its privacy-based abortion access jurisprudence just discussed. 
The Court is willing to recognize human rights violations in situations where 
state actors frustrate a woman or girl’s access to abortion, but only if she was 
already legally entitled to that abortion under national law. Unlike the HRC’s 
move to recognize that it is the national law itself that produces the ill-
treatment, the European Court avoids censuring national legal restrictions on 
abortion.  
 
565 See, e.g., A, B, & C v Ireland, supra note 8, ¶ 162-163 
566 Id. 
567 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 468 at ¶ 65. 
568 Id. at ¶ 66. 
569 R.R. v. Poland, supra note, 
570 Id. ¶ 200. 
571 P & S v. Poland, supra note 479. 
572 Id. ¶ 162. 
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6. The right to equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender 
All international human rights law treaties offer protection for the right 
to non-discrimination and to equality, but the formulations differ. Article 26 
of the ICCPR, which outlines that “the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination”573 is the oldest self-standing general right to non-
discrimination in international law. Article 3 of the ACHPR, Article 24 of the 
ACHR, and Protocol 12 to the ECHR similarly recognize a freestanding 
right to equality before the law for all persons.  
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR establishes the treaty's prohibition against 
discrimination, proscribing "distinctions of any kind," including race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth, or other status, in the exercise of any rights promulgated by 
the Covenant. Explicitly including a right to be free from indirect 
discrimination, the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 18 
defines discrimination as that "which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal 
footing, of all rights and freedoms.”574 Similar accessory provisions against 
discrimination, including discrimination based on sex, can be found in most 
other human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, CRC, the IMWC, 
the ICRPD, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.575  
Gender-specific protections for equality are found in Article 3 of the 
ICCPR, which requires States to ensure the equal right of men and women 
to all civil and political freedoms in the treaty and throughout the CEDAW. 
States are obligated to modify or abolish existing laws and policies which 
constitute discrimination against women. The CEDAW's equality standard 
requires all laws that disparately impact women to be scrutinized to secure de 
jure and de facto equality for women.576 Additionally, both the UNCRPD and 
CEDAW Convention contain express obligations on States to eliminate 
harmful gender stereotypes as part of the States’ obligations to ensure 
equality.577  
 
573 Art. 26 provides: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status." 
574 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18 
575 Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter CRC], art. 2, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov 20, 1989); International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, [hereinafter CRPD], G.A. res. 61/106, art. 23(1)(b), Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 
61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49, entered into force May 3, 2008, Article 4. 
576 Discrimination against women under CEDAW Convention means “any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” Article 1, 
CEDAW. 
577 CEDAW Article 5(a); Article 8(1)(b) of the CRPD. 
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Surprisingly, the CEDAW Committee does not invoke the Convention's 
general prohibition on discrimination against women to address abortion 
restrictions. Instead, the Committee focuses its assessment of restrictive 
abortion laws under Article 12, which requires States to "take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health 
care." Using this approach, the Committee has recognized that "criminalizing 
services that only women need,"578 violates women’s right to health under 
CEDAW and has urged States to reform their laws on this basis.  
In LC v. Peru, the aforementioned case where a hospital refused to provide 
spinal surgery to a girl because she was pregnant, while also denying her a 
therapeutic abortion (that was legal in her circumstances), LC claimed that 
she had suffered discriminatory treatment based “on the stereotype of 
imposing the reproductive function of LC above her welfare” in violation of 
Article 5 of CEDAW — the Convention’s anti-stereotyping provision.579 
Article 5 requires state parties to take measures aimed at “the elimination of 
prejudices based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”580 The CEDAW 
Committee agreed that LC had been discriminated against per Article 5, but 
in quite confusing reasoning, articulated that LC had been denied surgery 
based on “the stereotype that protection of the fetus should prevail over the 
health of the mother.”581 
By contrast, in the Country Inquiry of Northern Ireland in 2018, the 
CEDAW Committee took a much more substantive approach to gender 
discrimination and abortion denial. The Committee invoked Article 2 
(requiring the elimination of laws which constitute discrimination against 
women), as well as the right to health in Article 12, and the right to sexual 
health and family planning in Article 16, when noting that States parties are 
required to legalize abortion, at least in cases of rape, incest, threats to the life 
and/or physical or mental health of the woman, or severe fetal 
impairment.582 Additionally, the Committee held that the UK’s “deliberate 
maintenance of criminal laws on abortion” in Northern Ireland violated 
women’s right to non-discrimination by perpetuating gender-based 
violence.583 The Committee also noted that the failure to combat stereotypes 
depicting women primarily as mothers exacerbates discrimination against 
 
578 See infra 
579 LC v. Peru, supra note 374. 
580 Id. ¶ 3.3. 
581 Id. ¶ 11.3. 
582 CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1, Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, ¶ 60. 




The Human Rights Committee gave short shrift to the non-
discrimination claims in its first abortion case, KL. v Peru. It declared 
complaints under Articles 3 (equal enjoyment of convention rights) and 26 
(equality before the law) of the ICCPR to be inadmissible, stating that they 
had not been “properly substantiated” because the petitioner had not 
“provided any evidence relating to the events which demonstrated 
discrimination.”585 However, the Committee did find a violation of Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR, the right to an effective remedy,586 confirming that “the 
State’s failure to exercise due diligence in safeguarding the legal right to a 
procedure required solely by women resulted in discriminatory treatment.”587 
In L.M.R. v. Argentina, the applicant claimed that the state’s failure to 
exercise due diligence in safeguarding her already legal access to an abortion 
under Argentina’s rape exception violated her right to equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of sex; she asserted that she had had a legal right 
to a procedure “required solely by women.”588 She underscored that the 
Committee itself had expressed concern about traditionalist attitudes 
impacting women’s rights in Argentina and emphasized that her treatment 
by health professionals and judges, as well as the authorities’ failure to 
implement the law, had all been motivated by gender-based prejudice that 
was discriminatory.589 The Human Rights Committee accepted her claim 
that she had not been provided with access to an effective remedy in relation 
to Article 3 (equal right of men and women to other rights) but did not provide 
any analysis as to why it considered that LMR’s right to non-discrimination 
had been violated. 
As described in the preceding section, in the cases of Mellet and Whelan, 
the applicants argued that Ireland's criminalization of abortion in cases of 
fetal impairment violated their human rights by denying their dignity, 
autonomy, and physical and psychological integrity.590 The women argued 
 
584 CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1, Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (2018) ¶ 72. 
585 K.L. v. Peru, supra note 503 at ¶ 11.1 
586Article 2 (3) off the ICCPR outlines that: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective 
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the state, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent 
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
587 K.L. v. Peru, supra note 503at ¶ 11.1. 
588 L.M.R. v. Argentina, supra note 511, at ¶ 3.5-3.6. 
589 Id. 
590 Mellet at ¶ 3.9; Whelan at ¶ 3.9. See also, Isaac Stanley-Becker, How an Irish-American woman’s legal case helped spur 





that Ireland imposed no restrictions on health services “that were needed only 
by men," as such, the state's abortion ban discriminated against them on the 
basis of sex.591 In addition, the women raised the structural and pervasive 
character of discrimination as a concern; Ireland’s law stereotyped them as 
reproductive instruments whose needs were subordinate to those of the 
unborn, non-viable fetus.592  
In its decision, the Committee made a point of saying that it "noted" these 
structural equality claims, but it took a different doctrinal approach. In its 
analysis, the Committee examined how Ireland treated the applicants as 
women who decided to terminate their non-viable pregnancies, in 
comparison to the treatment of women who had non-viable pregnancies but 
decided to carry the fetus to term.593 The latter set of women could continue 
to receive the full protection of the public health system in Ireland, and all 
their medical needs, including post-natal and bereavement care, were 
covered by health insurance.594 The applicants who decided to abort had to 
travel abroad at their own expense and were deprived of any care from the 
public health care system.595  
In a confusing conclusion, the Committee located its non-discrimination 
finding under Article 26, allegedly on the basis of sex, on the grounds that the 
Irish legal system imposed disproportionate socio-economic burdens on some 
women but not on other women, depending on whether they abort or carry 
to term a non-viable fetus.596  Prof. Sarah Cleveland provided a concurring 
opinion that articulated alternative bases for the finding of discrimination in 
Mellet and Whelan. She supported the claimant's argument that the 
criminalization of abortion is sex-based discrimination because it affects a 
health service that only women need and places no equivalent burden on 
men.597 Additionally, she emphasized that Ireland's abortion law 
disproportionately impacted low-income and vulnerable populations because 
these women faced huge burdens in traveling for reproductive healthcare.598 
Most critically for Cleveland, the ICCPR’s right to equal protection against 
gender discrimination prohibited the gender stereotyping the applicants 
complained of. Focusing on the women’s claim that they had suffered 
discrimination on the basis of gender stereotyping, Cleveland outlined that 
requiring women to carry a fatally impaired pregnancy to term underscored 
the extent to which Irish law has “prioritized (whether intentionally or 
 
591 Id. 
592 Mellet at ¶ 3.10; Whelan at ¶ 3.11. 
593 Mellet at ¶ 7.1; Whelan at ¶ 7.1. 
594 Id. 
595 Mellet at ¶ 7.1; Whelan at ¶ 7.1. 
596 Id. ¶ 7.11. 
597 Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 5. 
598 Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 14. 
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unintentionally) the reproductive role of women as mothers.”599 The state's 
claim that the law had a non-discriminatory purpose, i.e., protection of the 
unborn in line with the constitution, did not mean that "its laws may not also 
be informed by such stereotypes."600 Cleveland asserted that a law animated 
by a gender stereotype of women as mothers amounts to discrimination 
against women under Article 26.  
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, like Article 
2(1) of the ICCPR, provides protection for the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms in the Convention “without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, color, language, ….or other status.”601 In the abortion 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, a number of the 
applicants claimed, under Article 14, read with Articles 3 (freedom from 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) or 8 (the right to private life), that 
they had been discriminated against on grounds of sex and gender. But in all 
cases, discrimination was barely considered or was summarily dismissed 
without discussion.602 In RR, although the claimant included a sex 
discrimination claim in the pleadings, it never appeared among the claims 
considered by the Court.603 In P&S, the applicant's claim under Article 14 
was dismissed as inadmissible, and no reasoning was offered to explain the 
dismissal. In ABC, all three women argued that the domestic restrictions on 
abortion disproportionately burdened them as women and amounted to a 
violation of the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex.604A in ABC 
also sought to claim discrimination based on socio-economic status, given the 
greater difficulties that she faced, as a woman with few financial resources, in 
traveling to England for an abortion.605 The majority again declined to 
address abortion as an issue of non-discrimination.  Similarly, in Tysiac, the 
Court gave no explanation for why it did not address the applicant’s equality 
claims; Ms. Tysiac had argued that Poland’s failure to reasonably 
accommodate her disability during the investigations amounted to 
discrimination on the ground of her disability and that her treatment had 
been driven by sexism.606  
The foregoing jurisprudence evidences that in the absence of express legal 
 
599 Id. Annex II, ¶ 14. 
600 Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 11. 
601 Note that the position is different for states that have ratified Protocol 12 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Art. 1 of Protocol 12 introduced in 2005 an independent equality and non-discrimination right. 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has articulated that Article 14 can also function as an "autonomous" provision, 
i.e., it can be violated even where the substantive article relied upon to invoke Article 14 has not been violated. 
See, Belgian Linguistic case (1968) 1 EHRR 252, 283. 
602 See, e.g., ABC v Ireland, ¶ 270; P&S v Poland, ¶171. 
603 The Center for Reproductive Rights summarizes the original claim lodged at the Court on their website: 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/rr-vpoland-european-court-of-human-rights (accessed Nov 20, 2019). 
604 ABC, ¶¶ 126, 212–215, 268, 270. 
605 ABC, ¶270. Note, the Court cited its previous cases of Open Door, at ¶ 83; and Tysiac v. Poland supra note 468 
at ¶144 in support of its decision not to examine the equality-based claims. 
606 Tysiac, supra note 468 at ¶139. 
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guarantees on abortion rights, international and regional human rights bodies 
have provided interpretive and textual support to protect a woman's right to 
abortion in certain circumstances. At present, the law on abortion presents 
an "exception-based framework" whereby states are required to legalize 
abortion in cases where the pregnancy threatens the life or health of the 
woman, is the result of rape or incest, or where there is severe fetal 
impairment.607 Human rights bodies have mostly conceptualized abortion 
restrictions as violations of the right to health (CEDAW, CESCR), the right 
to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (HRC, European 
Court of Human Rights), and the right to privacy (European Court of Human 
Rights, HRC). Recognition of equality claims for abortion rights is evolving 
(HRC, CEDAW). Legal decisions have held states accountable for violations 
of human rights in situations where women are denied access to abortion (i) 
where states fail to provide affirmative protection for access to abortion that 
is legal in national law, and (ii) in the recent HRC decisions in Mellet and 
Whelan, the Committee went further and held that the state’s failure to legalize 






B. Human Rights in Action 
Returning to Ireland’s story of abortion law reform, the next section 
explores whether the international human rights law standards just discussed 
contributed to the recognition of abortion rights in Ireland. And if so, how, 
and to what extent?  
Legally, international human rights treaties are binding on States that 
have ratified such treaties, and the obligations set out on the treaties "must be 
performed in good faith."608 As noted, the content and substance of 
international treaty obligations are set out in detail by their respective Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies and, in the case of the European Convention on Human 
 
607 UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies have also urged states to decriminalize abortion and to eliminate punitive 
measures for women and girls who undergo abortion and for those who provide or assist with abortions. This is 
not unilateral. The UNCRPD diverges from the other UNTMBs and calls for access to abortion in cases of a 
fatal fetal anomaly rather than severe impairment. See, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Spain, 
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, (19-23 September 2011): Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Austria, 
CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1 (Sept 13, 2013). 
607 CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 24, Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, (Feb 5, 1999) at ¶¶ 14, 31(c). 
608 Art. 26 VCLT. 
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Rights, the European Court of Human Rights. Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights are binding on states,609  whereas the views of Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies are not. However, Treaty Monitoring Body decisions 
provide authoritative interpretations of the binding treaty obligations.610 
Notably, there exists no coercive sovereign to enforce international human 
rights law treaties. As a consequence, inquiries into the relative power of 
international legal rules and how international rules exercise power are 
perennial. 
Traditional studies on the relative impact of international human rights 
law on domestic law and practice focus much of their analysis on the 
interactions between States and the “formal” architecture of international 
human rights law, namely the extensive network of widely adopted treaties 
and the accompanying institutional infrastructure that monitor state 
compliance with such treaties.611 Under this view, the impact of international 
human rights law on domestic law and policy depends upon a top-down 
process whereby States respond to interstate or institutional coercion,612 
persuasion,613 or socialization.614 For others, the standards and institutions of 
international human rights law contribute to reform only when civil society 
actors — often via social movements — leverage human rights law to achieve 
their goals. These scholars go beyond the formal interactions between States 
and supranational structures to examine how civil society actors use 
international human rights advocacy to pressure governments to improve 
their practices.615 Keck and Sikkink, for example, identify how local 
 
609 Art. 46 European Convention on Human Rights. 
610 Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice asserts that the views of Committee experts are 
a subsidiary source of international law. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, entry into force Oct 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
611 See LOUIS HENKIN, THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (1989); See infra note 601.  
612 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 11 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (arguing that the 
process of implementation actually fails most of the time); Daniel Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties 
on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010) 1162; On the European Court of Human Rights, consider Mark W. 
Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN J INTL L 39, 39 (2000) 
613 See, ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY (2012) (arguing that 
states respond to “naming and shaming” by other states or multilateral institutions); see also Ken Roth, Defending 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 63, 63 (2004); THOMAS RISSE ET AL. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999) (arguing that foreign naming and shaming will be most effective in authoritarian 
states, precisely because in such an information-scarce environment, foreign condemnation will have a 
comparatively large impact in letting citizens and activists know that their rights are being violated). 
614 See, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 621, 630 (2004) (suggesting that human rights processes impact States as forms of persuasion or 
“acculturation” rather than coercion); see also, Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUSE. L. REV. 623, 642 (1998) (arguing that states comply not because they are coerced but because 
the “transnational legal processes” of human rights law leads to the “internalization” of human rights norms). 
615 See Kiyoteru Tsutsui, International Human Rights Law, and Social Movements: States' Resistance and Civil Society's 
Insistence 8 (1) ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 367(2012); NEIL STAMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2009) 2; Neil Stammers, Social movements and the social construction of human rights, 21 
HUM. RTS. Q. 980 (1999). BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); D. C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM (2001).  
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advocates (meaning advocates native to the impugned state) circumvent 
unmoving governments by transferring the debate to the international level, 
including by using international compliance mechanisms such as courts and 
treaty monitoring bodies.616 The authors also detail how local actors generate 
international or 'external' pressure on violating governments by connecting 
with established international human rights advocacy groups and like-minded 
States to amplify their cause on the global stage.617 As a result, civil society 
has overcome the weak enforcement capacity of most international human 
rights treaties. Notably, social movement scholars who study how legal 
mobilization (including international human rights law-based mobilization) is 
used by social movement actors similarly emphasize the agency and power of 
activists in driving social change.618 
Among international relations scholars who argue that civil society 
movements do the work of moving States to comply with international human 
rights standards, some contend that success depends on the extent to which 
such actors make human rights change a matter of domestic politics.619 
Rather than bowing to international pressure, this line of scholarship asserts 
that State compliance with international human rights law depends upon 
whether, and to what extent, human rights movements generate internal 
pressure for change. Highlighting how international norms bodies support 
their claims, advocates target a number of in-country audiences; the 
legislature, the judiciary, and/or the public. In domestic litigation, legal 
interest groups may prompt judges to invoke international human rights 
obligations for both normative insight and legal force.620 Moreover, litigation 
is newsworthy, and media reports of a citizen contesting State abuse abroad 
can both raise the profile for a cause and capture the attention of politicians 
and citizens. 621   
In their discussion of the human rights frame in connection to 
transnational feminism, Charlotte Bunch and Samantha Frost have argued 
that the “large body of international covenants, agreements, and 
commitments about human rights gives women political leverage and a 
 
616 MARGARET KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) [hereinafter KECK AND SIKKINK]; see also, BOB CLIFFORD, THE 
INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS (2008) (describing how local activists can connect with 
a broader global human rights movement of international NGOs, international organizations, state 
bureaucracies, foundations, journalists, individuals who devote significant resources to the cause and in some 
cases develop international legal codes to cover such as for wartime rape and HIV). 
617 Id. See also, Xinyuan Dai, The "Compliance Gap" and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions, in THE 
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE, 85. 
618 Michael W. McCann, Social Movements and the Mobilization of Law, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: PEOPLE, PASSIONS, AND POWER 201, 209 (Anne N. Costain & Andrew S. 
McFarland eds., 1998). 
619 BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) 
126 [hereinafter SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
620 For example, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human 
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZA L. REV. 253, 282 (1999). 
621 MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK 144, 145 (1994). 
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tenable point of reference.”622 Similarly, advocates can place previously 
unacknowledged abuses in the context of human rights to legitimize their 
claims and also to educate national constituencies at both governmental and 
local levels.623 In other instances, using human rights language to describe a 
grievance can depoliticize issues and generate space for dialogue on 
contentious or taboo topics. Activist claims may also become more evident, 
and in turn more salient, in the public consciousness when demands for 
change are centered upon specific rights.624 As such, international human 
rights advocacy not only shames the state abroad but can be leveraged to 
change opinion at home. 
Another body of the literature contends that the real influence of 
international human rights on social change can be measured by studying the 
impact of human rights advocacy on movement actors.625 Scholars note that 
the language of human rights can serve as a focal point to engage a broader 
range of allies in a movement626 or individuals who oppose governing powers 
for other reasons may offer support to a human rights-based movement in the 
hopes of undercutting State power. A movement’s base may expand as rights-
based framing enables individuals and groups to see themselves as bearers of 
rights in a way that they did not before.627 Others have studied how 
international human rights advocacy facilitates networking opportunities—
via international forums in which activists and social movement organizations 
interact with each other—that have myriad advantages for a movement.628 
Human rights activists may share ideas or technical expertise629 and forge 
coalitions to advance a cause on the global stage to increase pressure on 
perpetrators to offer redress.630 Global networks can also help social 
movements gain funding. 
Overall, the literature on the significance and efficacy of human rights 
discourse, norms, and strategies includes myriad theories, many of which 
contest the relevance and legitimacy of the international system and its 
 
622 Charlotte Bunch and Samantha Frost, Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
WOMEN: GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES AND KNOWLEDGE, VOL. 2 (Cheris Kramarae and Dale Spender, eds. 2000) 
1078. 
623 See, e.g., Alicia Yamin and Paolo Bergallo, Narratives of Essentialism and Exceptionalism: The Challenges and 
Possibilities of Using Human Rights to Improve Access to Safe Abortion 19(1) HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 
(2017). 
624 SALLY ENGLE Merry, Human rights and transnational culture: regulating gender violence through global law, 44 OSGOODE 
L.J. 53, 58. 
625 See Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan: Transformation of Movement Actorhood and Local-
Global Feedback Loop (4) 122 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1050 (2017); NITZA BERKOVITCH, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO 
CITIZENSHIP: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1999). 
626 BETH SIMMONS, supra note 614 at 145. 
627 See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing processes and social movements: an overview and assessment 26 
ANNU. REV. SOCIOLOGY 611 (2000); SIDNEY TARROW THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM. 
628 See Keisuke Iida, Human rights and sexual abuse: the impact of international human rights law on Japan 26(2) HUM. 
RIGHTS Q. 428 (2004). 
629 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE. 
630 Keck & Sikkinck, supra note 312 at 169. 
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instruments.631 Rachel Rebouche suggests that human rights rhetoric may 
inhibit struggles to redistribute power and resources for reproductive rights at 
both the global and local levels.632 Susan Marks refers to human rights as 
“‘blinders that narrow our field of vision and prevent us from seeing (and 
hence from challenging) the wider scene.”633 Studies also present accounts of 
how that human rights discourse can serve both limiting and expansive ends 
and, depending on the context, constrain and enable transnational 
solidarity.634 Some critical legal scholars contend that rights-based claims 
constrain movements since they require validation by the state, and in turn, 
should be recognized as 'depoliticized constructs.'635 And from a post-colonial 
perspective, human rights claims are often deemed 'western,' elitist, 
imperialist.636 
By exploring how international human rights law and advocacy impacted 
Irish abortion law reform, the following account provides empirical evidence 
to support much of the scholarship just outlined. On its face, the course of 
abortion rights reform in Ireland was a multi-faceted process that required 
legal, political, and social change. Formally, it required political will to initiate 
a referendum to repeal the 8th amendment and majority societal support to 
vote in favor of repeal to enable the Oireachtas to legislate for abortion access. 
Ultimately, it was the civil society movement for abortion rights that triggered 
both events to deliver reform. At different junctures in their struggle, 
international human rights advocacy was one of their most useful resources 
in pressuring the state to initiate reform, in strengthening the composition 
and reach of the movement, and in legitimizing the claim for abortion rights 
enhance its legitimacy. At other points, however, human rights-based 
advocacy presented potential drawbacks for the movement. When the 
movement’s call for a referendum to repeal the 8th became a reality, the 
formal legal standards on abortion rights in international law no longer 
aligned with the movement's goals for liberalization. Recognizing a woman's 
right to abortion in the limited situations where a pregnancy is a result of rape 
or is not viable, or where abortion is necessary to protect a woman's life and 
 
631 See generally, Frédéric Mégret, Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18 
Vignettes, 3, NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (J M Beneyto and D Kennedy eds., 2012). 
632 Rachel Rebouche, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and Human Rights, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 579 (2017). 
633 Susan Marks, Human Rights, and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57, 59 (2011). 
634 David Landy, Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists Are Constructed and Constrained by Human Rights 
Discourse, 28 (4) INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY (2013) (describing how Jewish activists appeal to the “universalist 
nature of human rights language” to justify their criticism of Israel and to counter critiques from Zionists, while 
Palestinian activists use human rights discourse to decry torture of Palestinian prisoners and counter Islamic 
fundamentalism or other claims with which they disagree). 
635 See, e.g., Mary Bernstein, Anna-Maria Marshall, and Scott Barclay, The Challenge of Law: Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Identity, and Social Movements, 1 in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW (Scott 
Barclay eds., 2009). 
636 See, e.g., Inderpal Grewal, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’: Feminist Practices, Global Feminism, and Human Rights 
Regimes in Transnationality, 3(3) CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 337 (1999). 
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health, reform based on international human rights law would have fallen far 
short of the movement's calls for 'free, safe and legal abortion access. As such, 
this study contributes to debates about both the opportunities and tensions 
generated by international human rights advocacy. 
1. A formative role 
A human rights-based movement to liberalize Irish abortion law emerged 
only in the latter half of the 8th amendment's existence. As described in 
Chapter 1, it was the anti-abortion campaign that assertively mobilized both 
to pass the abortion amendment and subsequently turned to the courts to 
copper-fasten Ireland's status as a "pro-life nation."637 Their activism 
successfully centered on human rights for the fetus. When the amendment 
was debated in the legislature, the majority view was that “the amendment is 
all about the most fundamental right, the right to life”638 – that of the 
"unborn," not a pregnant woman. In fact, for PLAC, the recognition of 
positive rights for the unborn child—not just prohibiting abortion—was 
fundamental; when the Attorney General recommended that the amendment 
read "[n]othing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate or to 
deprive of force or affect, any provision of law on the grounds that it prohibits 
abortion" the PLAC rejected it because it did not explicitly recognize the right 
to life of the child.639  
For the anti-amendment activists who resisted the tactics of the PLAC 
campaign, it was challenging to make a case against the 8th amendment in 
terms of women’s rights.640 Such was the impossibility of making feminist 
arguments that the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC) made a strategic 
decision to mute forceful calls for women’s rights and instead argued against 
the amendment on the grounds that it was a “sectarian law”  that would deny 
non-Catholics equal rights to citizenship in Ireland (in particular those in the 
six counties of Northern Ireland). The AAC reasoned that the country should 
“support pluralism” and thereby reject the constitutional amendment.641 The 
AAC went as far as to contend that the “radicals” who refused to lessen their 
demands for women’s abortion rights were “playing into the hands of the Pro-
Life Amendment campaign.”642  
Asset out in Chapter 1, ultimately, the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign 
prevailed in the referendum such that Irish law required the state to respect 
 
637 The author borrowed this term from sociologist Lisa Smyth. See LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION: THE 
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND (2009). 
638 Rory O'Hanlon, TD (Feb 17, 1983) https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1983-02-17/3/. 
639 See, e.g., Gerard Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland from Independence to the Present Day 35(1) 
AM. J. OF COM. L. 37, 78 (1987). 
640 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, From Anti-Amendment Campaigns to Demanding Reproductive Justice supra note xx. 
641 CHRYSTAL HUG, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL MORALITY IN IRELAND, 149. 
642 Alan MacSimoin, How free can you be if you can’t even control your own body? Red and Black Revolution, Mar 14, 2008, 
15 at, http://www.wsm.ie/c/red-and-black-revolution-14. 
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"the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right to life of the 
mother” and to defend and vindicate the unborn’s life “as far as practicable.” 
And though victorious, anti-choice groups continued their battle. 
Following the passage of the amendment (1983), the anti-abortion groups 
turned their attention to the family-planning clinics that were advising Irish 
women about the availability of lawful abortions in England. The Society for 
the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) successfully obtained an 
injunction against the clinics by arguing that their activities violated the 8th 
amendment’s right to life of the unborn.643 The clinics were forced to close.644 
In response, Irish pro-choice groups turned to international human rights 
mechanisms for the first time. 
In 1988, the clinics launched a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights. In Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, they argued that 
by preventing the clinics from disclosing abortion-related information to 
women, Irish courts were in breach of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in particular the Convention's protections for freedom of expression 
(Article 10).645 The clinics also asserted that the injunction discriminated on 
the basis of political opinion on the grounds that persons who sought to 
counsel against abortion were permitted to express their views without 
restriction.646 Additionally, the clinics argued that women have a right to 
abortion under Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the “right to 
respect for . . . private and family life.”647 
For the Court, there was no dispute about whether the injunction 
interfered with the clinics’ rights to impart and receive information under 
Article 10(1); the injunction expressly prohibited their speech.648 Though the 
state argued that because Article 2 of the European Convention protected the 
right to life, it was justified in prohibiting information that would threaten the 
right to life of the "unborn,"649 the Court declined to address this. 
Additionally, the Court did not address the applicants’ claim that the right to 
private life conferred a right to abortion or that restricting abortion 
information was a form of political discrimination. Judicial deliberations 
focused on whether the restrictions on the clinics’ speech could be justified 
under Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
permits restraints on speech where they are “prescribed by law” and 
 
643 S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 618, 621 (Ir. S.C.). 
644 Pro-choice activists continued to provide information on abortion to women. The founder of Open Door 
Counselling, Ruth Riddick, used her own phone number to continue non-directive counselling from her home. 
See Linda Connolly, THE IRISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 70. 
645 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) [hereinafter Open Door]. 
646 Id. 81, 82. 
647 Id. 32. 
648 Id. 
649 Open Door, ¶ 28. See generally, David Cole, Going to England: Irish Abortion Law and the European Community, 17 
Hᴀsᴛɪɴɢs Iɴᴛ'ʟ & Cᴏᴍᴘ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 113 (1993). 
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“necessary in a democratic society” to further one of a series of specified 
interests. The specified interests permitted under the Convention include 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary.650 The Court accepted that Ireland had a "legitimate aim" in 
adopting the injunction, namely, the protection of morals. However, the 
injunction failed the Court's proportionality test; the Court reasoned that 
because Ireland allowed thousands of women to travel abroad to obtain 
abortions, and had not disputed that resourceful women could get this 
information in other ways, preventing the clinics from  disseminating abortion 
information seemed to be doing little work in actually stopping women from 
having abortions, meaning that the injunction had little impact on the 
'protection of morals.'651 For such reasons, the Court held that the injunction 
was not narrowly tailored to its purpose. Additionally, the Court asserted that 
the injunction disproportionately harmed women who did not have the 
resources to find out how to get the information and only served to prolong 
the amount of time that women would have to wait before having an 
abortion—which could be detrimental to their health.652 
For pro-choice activists in Ireland, their first foray into the institutions of 
international human rights was successful; neglecting any question that 
related directly to abortion or the status of the “unborn,” the European Court 
of Human Rights invalidated the injunction against the clinics in its entirety. 
In contrast to the clinics, the student groups who were banned from 
distributing information on abortion services abroad did not appeal to the 
European Court of Human Rights. Their barrister, Mary Robinson (who 
went on to become the first woman President of Ireland and later UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights), had defended the students in the Irish 
High Court, arguing that their information sharing activities were protected 
by European Community law resulting in the Irish High Court itself referring 
these questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).653 In 1991, the ECJ 
in Grogan agreed with the defendant students that abortion was a "service" 
 
650 Article 10(2) of the Convention provides: The exercise of these freedoms since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary for a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955). 
651 Open Door, 18. 
652 Open Door, 24. 
653 Grogan, 1989 I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.). Under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, a domestic court may refer 
questions concerning EC law to the ECJ where it “considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment.” EEC Treaty Art. 177. 
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within the Treaty of Rome and that the Irish citizens had the right to receive 
and impart information about medical services that were lawful in another 
Member State of the European Economic Community.654 However, the ECJ 
held that the student groups did not have standing to raise the claim because 
they lacked an economic relationship with the English providers of abortion 
services.655 In consequence, the ECJ then did not need to decide whether the 
High Court's injunction prohibiting the distribution of abortion services in 
other EU States violated the treaty. In this way, the ECJ avoided a showdown 
with the Irish Courts, nor did they need to address any questions of human 
rights. 
Though Open Door and Grogan frustrated the goals and unchecked success 
of the pro-life lobby in Ireland, the two decisions were limited in scope and 
did nothing to liberalize abortion access in Ireland. Nevertheless, some anti-
abortion campaigners responded to the European cases with claims that 
Ireland was on its way to allowing “abortion on demand.”656 The X-case in 
1992657—where the Supreme Court concluded that abortion was lawful in 
Ireland where there was a real and substantial risk to the life of women, 
including risk from suicide—elevated these fears dramatically. Responding to 
the case, William Binchy, legal advisor to PLAC, alleged that Ireland now 
had the “most liberal abortion law in the world.”658 In reality, abortion 
remained a criminal offense; in theory, abortion was available if a pregnant 
woman was suicidal, but in practice, no abortions were carried out on that 
basis. Information was still restricted. The Regulation of Information Act 
(1995)—the legislation intended to give effect to the right to information 
following the Open Door decision and the 1992 referendum—criminalized 
“advocacy or promotion” of abortion. “Advocacy or promotion” was not 
defined. Devoid of guidance on what advice was permissible, healthcare 
providers rarely spoke about abortion to women for fear of prosecution. 
Doctors were also explicitly prohibited from providing referrals.659 The first 
comprehensive study of women and crisis pregnancy in Ireland found that in 
practice, women and girls found it very difficult to obtain information on both 
contraception and abortion.660  
 
654 Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 21. See also, Siofra O’Leary, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services: 
The Court of Justice as a Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: An Examination of the Abortion Information Case, 16 EUR. L. 
REV. 138, 156 (1992). 
655 Id. 
656 See, e.g., Michael O' Regan, Leading Judge Condemns Abortion Information Act, IRISH TIMES, Jul 10, 1995, at 4 
(quoting Mr. Justice Brian Walsh, a member of the European Court of Human Rights and a former Irish 
Supreme Court justice). 
657 Attorney Gen. v. X, supra note 155. 
658 Andy Pollak, Hierarchy Criticizes Supreme Court, IRISH TIMES, Jul 1, 1995, at 8. 
659 Regulation of Information Act (1995), 1995 Act, § 8 (1) reads; "It shall not be lawful for a person to whom 
Section 5 applies or the employer or principal of the person to make an appointment or any other arrangement 
for or on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the state for the termination of 
pregnancies. Sections 9 and 10 set out the legal enforcement of the offense." 
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Nor was anti-abortion hegemony significantly undermined in the decade 
that followed X, Open Door, and the 1992 constitutional amendments. During 
this period, pro-choice activists concentrated their efforts (unsuccessfully) on 
lobbying successive governments to give effect to the X-case through 
legislation, i.e., to make clear through a statute that women could legally 
obtain an abortion if their life was at risk. In 1997, a group of women formed 
the umbrella group, the ‘Alliance for Choice,’ and condemned political 
inaction on X through demonstrations, leaflets, and direct lobbying. The pro-
choice ask was relatively modest; the Government had been chastised by the 
country’s own Supreme Court for not providing legislative guidance on life-
saving abortion access.661 And the State’s Constitutional Review Group—a 
group established by the Irish government in 1995 to review the Constitution 
of Ireland and to recommend alterations—also recommended that the 
Government introduce legislation to implement the X-case.662 As described 
earlier in this chapter, at this time internationally, feminist human rights 
groups were succeeding in gaining recognition for reproductive health rights: 
the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, agreed by 187 UN 
member states, listed the right of a woman to control her own sexuality and 
reproduction as a human right. Closer to home, most of Europe operated 
liberal abortion laws (with the exception of Malta, San Marino, and Poland) 
such that Ireland was firmly out of step. However, in Ireland, not even the 
most conservative calls for action on women's rights could move the 
Government, or any sizeable political party, to touch abortion rights. Unless 
that is if it was to constrain such rights. In March 2002, at the urging of anti-
abortion groups and four independent TDs, the Taoiseach introduced yet 
another constitutional referendum designed to roll back the very limited legal 
right to abortion. The proposed amendment — like its predecessor 10 years 
before — aimed to overturn the X-case ruling by removing the risk of suicide 
as grounds for abortion.663 With just a 40 percent turnout, 618,485 people 
voted in favor of the Government's motion, and 629,041 voted against it.664 
The anti-abortion lobby had lost once again. 
In the aftermath of the 2002 referendum, the Irish Family Planning 
Association (IFPA), a Dublin-based reproductive health clinic that provided 
services including counseling, contraception, and post-abortion care, decided 
that pro-choice advocacy in Ireland needed a new strategy. Recognizing that 
since the first constitutional referendum on abortion in 1983, the Irish public 
had consistently voted against further restrictions on abortion access, it 
seemed clear to the IFPA that the main barrier to change was not the cited 
religious or even anti-choice views of the Irish people; rather it was political 
 
661 See Chapter 1. 
662 Constitution Review Group, Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996). 
663 See Chapter 1. 
664 Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2001 (Bill no. 48 of 2001). 
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recalcitrance.665 Similarly, the consistently high numbers of women traveling 
for abortion indicated that the personal beliefs of thousands of Irish women 
were not 'anti-abortion.' Rather than wait another attack by anti-abortion 
advocates or sit through another decade of political indolence, the IFPA 
resolved to proactively campaign for women's abortion rights. International 
human rights offered key resources to match the movement's shift in 
approach, namely the first proactive legal challenge to the 8th amendment. 
Legal mobilization via strategic legislation for abortion law reform was 
first suggested by a consultant lawyer at the organization, Ms. Julie Kay, who 
had worked as a litigator for a pro-choice advocacy organization, the Center 
for Reproductive Rights, in New York.666 The Irish judicial system’s 
conservative interpretation of the 8th amendment—such that the Courts had 
judged the amendment to permit abortion only where there is a “real and 
substantial risk to the life” of the pregnant woman that can only be averted 
by termination of the pregnancy667—meant that chances of success were poor 
if the IFPA litigated for reform domestically. International human rights 
institutions presented the only viable venue for legal challenge.  
 
Embracing international human rights as a strategy was a matter of 
pragmatism in one sense—it provided the only forum where court-based 
activism to pressure the State into changing its restrictive laws could plausibly 
succeed. However, as noted already in this chapter, research indicates that 
litigation can yield many indirect effects for a social movement. While the 
IFPA aimed to use international litigation to force the hand of the State, they 
also viewed this advocacy as an opportunity to educate people about the 
harms of the 8th amendment and move people to recognize the injustice that 
women endured.668 Beyond this, they envisioned the case, and their media 
and advocacy around it, as an opportunity to mobilize people to join their 
campaign for abortion rights.669 Additionally, for the IFPA, using 
international human rights-based advocacy seemed like a natural progression 
in some ways. In the late 1960s, the organization was founded on human 
rights principles by doctors and nurses who were concerned by the health 
impacts of the denial of contraception and abortion in Ireland on the lives of 
women (particularly women with repeated unwanted pregnancies). Such 
impacts were heightened for women with few financial resources, and the 
founders felt that using a human rights framework helped address these 
 
665 Interview with Niall Behan, Irish Family Planning Association, June 2018. Notes on file with author. 
666 Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, Former Lawyer for the Irish Family Planning Association, New York, Sept 9. 
2018. Headquartered in New York but with regional offices in Geneva, Bogota, Nairobi, and Kathmandu, the 
Center for Reproductive Rights is the leading advocate for sexual and reproductive rights in the international 
arena, as well as a well-known domestic organization. 
667 Attorney Gen. v. X., supra note xx. 
668 See, e.g., press release, https://www.ifpa.ie/ifpa-launches-campaign-for-safe-and-legal-abortion-in-ireland/. 
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challenges.670  Furthermore, the IFPA was an affiliate of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), whose IPPF Charter draws on 
international sexual and reproductive rights.   
Amongst the venues for international litigation, the European Court of 
Human Rights was the most attractive for the IFPA because its decisions are 
binding on the Irish state.671 The Court provides for individual petitioning 
and a general obligation to provide recourse to a remedy. It also has a 
mechanism to allow the Council of Europe’s (COE) Committee of Ministers 
to bring infringement proceedings against States that refuse to implement the 
Court’s judgments.672  
The first international legal challenge that the IFPA worked on did not 
work out as the advocates hoped. First, the applicant did not retain the IFPA 
as her supporting organization because the IFPA hoped to make a joint 
application on behalf of a number of women, while the applicant, D, did not 
want to join this approach.673 Second, her case, D v. Ireland, was deemed 
inadmissible by the European Court.674 D involved a woman pregnant with 
twins, one of which stopped developing at eight weeks gestation. The other 
twin was diagnosed with Edwards’s Syndrome, a severe abnormality that 
would lead to the death of the baby shortly after delivery.675 Her doctors 
informed her that there was nothing they could do for her—abortion was 
illegal, and referring her to a clinic abroad was also illegal. She was left to “go 
home and sort it out” herself.676 She did so and terminated her pregnancy in 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, where abortion was legal in cases of fetal anomaly.  
D’s application to the European Court complained that the 8th 
amendment and Ireland's Regulation of Information (Services Outside the 
State for Terminations of Pregnancies) Act 1995 prevented her from 
terminating her pregnancy in the jurisdiction where she lived and restricted 
her medical team from referring her to services outside the State, in violation 
of her rights to (i) be free from cruel and inhuman treatment (Article 3), (ii) to 
private life (Article 8), (iii) to receive and impart information (Article 10) and 
 
670 Interviews with Maeve Taylor, Chief Advocacy Officer, Irish Family Planning Association, Dublin, Jan 4, 
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(iv) to be free from discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights 
(Article 14) of the European Convention on Human Rights.677 In response, 
Ireland argued that it was “an open question,” given the circumstances of D, 
as to whether the 8th amendment could allow for a lawful termination,678 
claiming that “there might be an issue as to the extent the State was required to 
guarantee the right to life of a fetus that would not survive beyond birth.”679 
(Yet in 2013, when the ministers for health and justice were defending the 
limitations of the new PLDPA, they argued that they were prevented by the 
Constitution from allowing for abortion in cases of fatal fetal abnormality, 
and as a result, no provision was made.) The European Court decided there 
was a “feasible argument to be made” that the 8th amendment’s balance 
between the right to life of the mother and the fetus could have shifted in 
favor of the mother as the fetus was not viable.680 D should have taken her 
case to the Irish Courts to find out, the Court concluded. Accordingly, in June 
2006, the Court deemed her case inadmissible because she had not exhausted 
available domestic remedies.681  
The IFPA lodged their challenge to Ireland’s ban on abortion in 2005 as 
part of their ‘Safe and Legal in Ireland Abortion Rights Campaign,’—the first 
pro-choice campaign in the country outside of a referendum.682 Four years 
later, the Grand Chamber of the European Court heard the case A, B, C v. 
Ireland in Strasbourg. Asset out in Part I, the applicants made a cluster of 
claims under Article 8 of the European Convention, arguing that Ireland's 
abortion law violated the right to private life by interfering with their physical 
integrity, limiting relevant information on abortion and instigating stigma, 
delay, hardship, and stress in forcing women to travel secretly to England for 
an abortion.683  Under Article 3, they argued that the two options open to 
women—make their way to another country to get an abortion or maintain 
their unwanted pregnancies—were degrading and a deliberate affront to their 
dignity.684 These claims were argued in conjunction with Article 14, the right 
to be free from discrimination, on two grounds.685 First, they argued that the 
criminalization of abortion was discriminatory, as it amounted to “crude 
stereotyping and prejudice against women” and caused an affront to women’s 
dignity.686 Second, they emphasized that the requirement to travel imposed 
 
677 D v. Ireland, supra note x. 
678 Id. ¶ 98. 
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680 Id. ¶ 90-92. 
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682 IFPA Launches Campaign for Safe and Legal Abortion in Ireland (Aug 8 2015) https://www.ifpa.ie/ifpa-
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685  Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, supra note 662; Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666. 
686 A, B, and C v. Ireland, supra note 12, ¶ 162. 
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severe burdens on women with limited financial resources.687 As Irish 
abortion advocates reiterate, although women from all walks of life have 
abortions, it is predominantly women who are poor, young, disabled, living 
in rural areas, or have migrant status who disproportionately bear the burden 
of travelling abroad. 
Given that Ms. A and Ms. B had aborted their pregnancies for reasons 
relating to their wellbeing and socio-economic status, their abortions were 
clearly outside the life-saving exception to Ireland’s abortion ban. As such, 
the ABC litigation fundamentally challenged the Irish abortion regime—a 
marked contrast to the incremental approach of D v. Ireland, which had 
contested only the law’s failure to exempt from criminalization abortion in 
cases of fatal fetal anomaly. The plaintiffs’ narratives in ABC also differed 
strikingly from D. D was a married woman who aborted a much-wanted 
pregnancy. Ms. A and Ms. B were both single, poor, and terminated 
unwanted pregnancies. Additionally, A was a recovering alcoholic, and B a 
non-national. Though plaintiff selection in impact litigation often prioritizes 
conservative narratives688—plaintiffs who look and sound like other members 
of respectable society—the IFPA carefully selected the three women to 
represent the diversity of women affected by the 8th amendment.689 The IFPA 
considered that Ms. A, Ms. B, and Ms. C were women who made "rational 
and empowering decisions" after weighing their circumstances: women who 
have economic reasons for terminating pregnancies; women who have 
consensual sex but contraception fails; and women with complex family 
demands, as well as women who need abortions to preserve their lives and 
health or to tragically end a non-viable pregnancy.690 The advocates did not 
wish to risk reinforcing narrow conceptions of the "reasonable" or "deserved" 
abortion by taking a case that centered on an exceptionally tragic case (such 
as pregnancy due to rape, incest, or fatal fetal anomaly). For the IFPA, taking 
this case was an opportunity to inclusively present narratives of the women 
they served in a respectful way, away from the vitriol that had silenced women 
for decades.691  
The advocates considered that their Article 14 non-discrimination claims 
were among their strongest and that the European Court would decide ABC 
in their favor on the grounds of non-discrimination and equality. They 
believed that the Court would not find it difficult to recognize the de jure 
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discrimination in requiring women to go abroad for health services when men 
were not sent to other countries for any health service.692 Similarly, the 
disproportionate impact of the law on women without financial security was, 
in the advocates’ opinion, a blatant example of socio-economic 
discrimination. 
In response, the Government lawyers argued that Ireland’s abortion law 
represented the “profound moral choice of the Irish people as to the nature 
of unborn life.”693 Ireland's Attorney General at the time, Paul Gallagher, 
pleaded with the 17 judges to accept that Ireland’s abortion law embodied 
moral values that were “deeply embedded” in the country’s history and 
traditions.694 This was the winning argument. Asset out in the prior section, 
though the Court found that there had been an interference with Ms. A's and 
Ms. B's right to private life, "owing to the acute sensitivity of the moral and 
ethical issues raised by abortion,"695 Ireland was entitled to a wide degree of 
difference in how it dealt with abortion.696 And once it had rejected A and 
B’s Article 8 claim, the Court dismissed their Article 3 claim and simply did 
not discuss their claims of discrimination. The European Court upheld the 
8th amendment.  
In a narrow decision, the majority found in favor of Ms. C, holding that 
Ireland’s failure to give legislative effect to the X-case exception to the 
abortion ban (i.e., where the woman's life was threatened by the pregnancy) 
violated Ireland's positive obligations under the right to private life.697 Rather 
than deliver Europe’s ‘Roe v. Wade,’ the European Court served as “an ally 
with a small ‘a’” for abortion rights in Ireland.698 
Limited legal “win” aside, the strategic use of human rights litigation 
finally provided the abortion right movement with a foothold in its struggle 
against the Irish State. Up to this point, the Ireland in which the IFPA and 
other pro-choice activists had attempted to campaign in presented advocates 
with many of the same challenges that autocratic States impose on human 
rights struggles—rule of law was weak (given that successive governments 
rebuked the judiciary by failing to legislate for X);699 political activism was 
stymied by the need to concentrate resources on services (in this case, 
supporting women who needed to travel); pro-choice groups had no influence 
on decision-makers, and victims of the law were too fearful to speak out about 
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their experiences.700 International human rights litigation did not directly 
produce the desired results. Nonetheless, the case enabled the movement to 
legally challenge the 8th amendment for the first time and to proactively 
campaign for abortion rights for Irish women.701  
In the absence of political leadership and a viable legal forum domestically, 
going to the European Court of Human Rights provided an institutional 
environment for advocates to go on the offensive and to initiate a proactive 
campaign for abortion rights.702 
 
2. Formal legal role  
“A decision from Strasbourg in your favor is the gold standard in terms of enforceability and 
seriousness.”703 
Commentators and skeptics usually cite the weak enforcement 
mechanisms of international human rights law as a key reason for the system's 
limited impact on national law. Still, even skeptics recognize the impressive 
oversight mechanisms of the European Court of Human Rights.704 Described 
as a “bright spot” in terms of international human rights compliance,705  a 
decision from the Strasbourg Court “in your favor is the gold standard for 
advocates in terms of enforceability and seriousness.”706 
As described in Chapter 1, following ABC, the Irish Government 
committed to establishing an 'expert group' to advise the state on the 
implementation of the European Court's ruling.707 It was against this 
backdrop that a newly elected independent, TD Clare Daly, prepared 
legislation to give effect to the X-case ruling (legislative recognition while 
making clear that she favored access to abortion in any circumstances that a 
woman sought it). Her bill in private member's time on April 18 and 19, 2012, 
was heavily defeated. Still, it was the first time that abortion was proactively 
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discussed in the Dáil without a tragedy provoking it, instead from "the 
standpoint that abortion was an important human rights issue."708 Later that 
year, Savita Halappanavar died after being refused an abortion, in a situation 
where her inevitable miscarriage carried the risk of fatal sepsis on the grounds 
that her medical team could detect a fetal heartbeat.709 The report of the 
expert group was published only two weeks after news of her death, and the 
circumstances of her death broke. The expert group’s report was explicit that 
implementation of ABC required legislation to give effect to the right to lawful 
abortion where there was a risk to a woman’s life.710 While inaction followed 
all of the prior State-commissioned reports on abortion, both Savita’s death 
and the gravity of the European judgment meant that this report could not 
be shelved. In December 2012, the Government announced that it would 
enact legislation to implement ABC. Following two sets of parliamentary 
hearings,711  the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act was signed into law 
in July 2013 and came into force on January 1, 2014. 
The law implementing ABC did not liberalize Ireland’s abortion 
restrictions in any way. The Act clarified, in regulatory form, the single 
recognized exemption to Ireland’s abortion. Arguably the Act made the 
process of getting a life-saving abortion more difficult—it set out a 
cumbersome assessment process whereby both an obstetrician and a specialist 
had to certify the risk to a woman’s life, and in the case of suicide risk, two 
psychiatrists and an obstetrician were required. Additionally, the Act 
included a penalty of up to 14 years imprisonment for a woman procuring an 
abortion or anyone helping a woman to access an abortion in anything other 
than the prescribed circumstances. In short, Ireland retained one of the most 
restrictive abortion prohibitions in the world. Nonetheless, the introduction 
of a legislative framework to provide for legal abortion in Ireland, albeit in 
limited and highly medicalized circumstances, was a historic move. For more 
than 35 years, successive governments had avoided or side-stepped (e.g., by 
holding a referendum to further restrict abortion access) legislating on the 8th 
amendment. There had been an almost total political paralysis (Deputy Clare 
Daly’s bill being the exception) due in part to the culture of fear and toxicity 
that surrounded abortion in Ireland. Even when national polls in the late 
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2000s began showing evidence that the public desired reform, the legislature 
would not touch the 8th amendment to liberalize abortion access.712   
ABC helped bring about the first occasion in the existence of the Irish 
State that the legislature recognized a woman's right to abortion (albeit in 
highly restrictive circumstances). In this way, the case fits the 'top-down' 
model of international human rights law impact, whereby the state adjusted 
its behavior in line with its international human rights obligations when 
pressured to do so by an oversight body. The 'change in behavior' was limited, 
but it was a focal legal development on the road to repealing the 8th.  
 
3. Structural role   
Though grassroots pro-choice organizations formed and disbanded 
during referendum campaigns, the IFPA was essentially alone actor amongst 
Irish civil society advocating for abortion rights in the 2000s.713 During the 
ABC litigation, the only domestic group that the IFPA succeeded in rallying 
to make an amicus submission to the Court was the informal group ‘Doctors 
for Choice.’714 The traditional Irish human rights organizations such as 
Amnesty Ireland and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties generally avoided 
abortion, arguably out of concern that they might lose support (including 
funding) for their more traditional human rights campaigns if they were seen 
to be campaigning for abortion.715 Even women’s rights organizations, such 
as the National Women’s Council of Ireland, reportedly held an ambivalent 
stance towards abortion.716 Similarly, the Irish Human Rights Commission 
did not advocate for change to Ireland’s abortion law.717  
Post-ABC, the landscape began to change—slowly at first. In 2011, the 
Irish Council for Civil Liberties campaigned for abortion access for the first 
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time at the international level using the UPR process718 to successfully 
convince six States to recommend that Ireland “introduce legislation to 
implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the A, 
B and C v. Ireland case, in order to clarify the circumstances in which abortion 
may be lawful.”719 At a public meeting in Dublin in July 2012, 40 young 
women and men laid the foundations for the first all-Ireland grassroots pro-
choice organization that would become known as the Abortion Rights 
Campaign (ARC).720 In a marked difference from past activism, members put 
the word “abortion” front and center in their new organization’s name. They 
also adopted an explicitly intersectional approach in their work for “free, safe, 
legal abortion” across Ireland.721 In contrast to the contention that rights-
based advocacy is often overtaken by elites and supplants community 
organizing,722 ARC bridged Ireland’s vaunted urban-rural divide and built 
non-hierarchal local groups across the country. Similar to the pro-active 
approach of the IFPA, ARC considered their abortion rights work as being a 
“forward-oriented claiming of rights,” in contrast to the reactionary protests 
following the “alphabet soup” of tragedies caused by the 8th amendment.723 
ARC's vision was that the law needed to "#trustwomen."  
An unexpected event changed the course and force of the nascent 
abortion rights movement. The death of Savita Hallapanvar on October 12 
at the hands of Ireland's abortion law provoked shock and outrage throughout 
the country. Though many argued that it was Savita's infection, not Ireland's 
law, that caused Savita's untimely death, for thousands of people (including 
those who investigated her death on behalf of the state), the culpability of the 
Irish 8th amendment was clear. Twenty thousand people took to the streets in 
a ‘Never Again’ march to call for reform of Ireland’s abortion law on 
November 17, 2014. And in addition to generating support for activism 
among individuals, her death forced the Government to move forward on 
implementing ABC via the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act. Savita’s 
death ultimately propelled the strategies being pursued by advocates within 
the IFPA, ARC, and independent campaigners to a scale that could likely not 
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otherwise have been reached.724 It enabled abortion rights campaigners to 
step over the threshold into the public domain. 
As the Dáil prepared to legislate to implement the decision in ABC in 
2013, ARC, IFPA, and many other grassroots advocates targeted both the 
legislature and the public to support the Protection of Life During Pregnancy 
Act. Though such activists supported the legislation, many made clear that 
while historic, the Act fell far short of what was needed to secure reproductive 
rights for women in Ireland.  Following the passage of the Act, Ailbhe Smyth, 
a leading figure in Ireland’s Marriage Equality campaign725 and longstanding 
feminist activist, coordinated 12 groups to form the Coalition to Repeal the 
Eighth Amendment (the Coalition) with one shared goal — to repeal the 
8th.726 The nascent Coalition did not call for "free, safe and legal" abortion 
access; rather, its founders sought to bring together organizations that were 
pro-choice and those not explicitly pro-choice but who agreed that a 
referendum should be held.727 Within twelve months, the Coalition had 
grown to a network of almost 100 organizations, including political parties, 
trade unions, and activists who called for a referendum to "protect and respect 
women's lives, health, and choices."728 Notably, five years later, the Coalition 
included over 300,000 people.  
Adopting a narrower advocacy goal, the activist group 'Terminations for 
Medical Reasons (also known as Leanbh Mo Chroí) emerged in response to the 
failure of the 2013 legislation to include a right to abortion for women with 
non-viable pregnancies. Made up of parents who had traveled to the UK to 
abort non-viable pregnancies, the activists began to publicly share their stories 
of heartbreak and implored the Government to "stop punishing tragedy."729 
And as will be described, one founding member, Amanda Mellet, contested 
Ireland's abortion ban and the suffering it forced upon her at the United 
Nations. 
At the annual general meeting of Amnesty Ireland in 2013, one of the 
most respected human rights organizations in the country, the majority of 
members voted to campaign for abortion law reform. The following year, it 
launched it's national 'My Body, My Rights campaign, which advocated for 
 
724 See, e.g., Cathie Doherty and Sinead Redmond, The Radicalisation of a New Generation of Abortion Rights Activists, 
270 in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2 (2015). 
725 The 34th Amendment, or Marriage Equality Act, was added to the Constitution of Ireland following a public 
referendum held on May 22, 2015, that passed with a 62.07% "yes" vote. The Amendment allows for marriage 
contracts without distinction as to the sex of either party. 
726 See, e.g., www.repeal8.ie. Interview with Ailbhe Smyth, Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment, June 2, 2016 
(notes on file with author).  
727 Interview with Sinead Kennedy, Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment, June 8, 2018 (notes on file with 
author). 
728 Id. 





abortion access in Ireland in line with international human rights standards: 
decriminalization of abortion and legalization in cases of risk to life and health 
or pregnancy that resulted from rape or carried a fatal fetal anomaly.730 
Notably, when Amnesty International had voted to adopt a pro-abortion rights 
campaign—marking a change in policy for the international human rights 
organization — the Irish section members of Amnesty International had 
opposed this change.731 
In 2014 the youth-led "socialist-feminist movement," Reproductive 
Rights Against Oppression, Sexism, and Austerity (ROSA), launched a 
campaign based on the premise that "abortion rights are women's rights" and 
called for abortion access based upon a woman's request. Taking inspiration 
from the reproductive justice movement in the US, their abortion rights 
campaign also included advocacy for full LGBTQ equality, free childcare, a 
reverse to all cuts to domestic violence and rape crisis services, equal pay, and 
State investment in public housing.732 
The emergence of a multitude of new actors in the Irish abortion rights 
movement was an incidental gain of the ABC litigation in a number of ways.733 
For the mainstream organizations such as the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, 
calling for the implementation of ABC was a hook to address abortion as a 
human rights issue when lobbying at home, both to the Government and 
political parties.734 For other groups, it was the two sets of hearings around 
the PLDPA in 2013 that had the most impact.  For long-active campaigners, 
the hearings were welcome as the first time that facilitating abortion access was 
on the political and social agenda, and their public platform expanded as 
national reporters began turning to women's groups for their perspectives in 
a way that had never happened before. For many younger women, the 
hearings were the first time they experienced their reproductive rights being 
deliberated in a national forum, and they became mobilized by their outrage 
at the scenes of a primarily male Dáil contesting their rights.735 For others, 
many of whom had suffered under the 8th amendment, the PLDPA raised 
their expectations that reform was possible, and such hope translated into a 
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growing number of activists.736 While the number of women forced abroad 
for abortions remained unchanged by the implementation of ABC, the 
number of women and men who were willing to tackle this injustice grew.  
Among the critiques of human rights advocacy that this chapter has 
briefly sketched is the claim that human rights rhetoric can cause advocates 
to miss possible alliances with other movements. Wendy Brown's thesis is that 
rights' claims are atomistic and alienate groups from one another; in turn, 
displacing, competing with, and rejecting other political projects.737 In a 
similar vein, Moron Horowitz contended that the individual specific 
framework of rights “draws energy and imagination away from campaigns 
directed at structural change.”738 While the aim of this chapter is not to mount 
a defense against such theories, the arguments do not hold for the Irish 
abortion rights movement. In terms of the ability of human rights advocacy 
to engage broad audiences and connect with other social justice projects, it 
appears that the opposite was true. International human rights advocacy 
directly facilitated the creation of alliances and coalitions to strengthen the 
Irish abortion rights movement.  
Prior to ABC, the IFPA was the only pro-choice group that had made 
submissions to UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies, drawing attention to the 
human rights impacts of Ireland’s abortion restrictions.739 When Ireland was 
examined by the Human Rights Committee in 2014, ten organizations made 
submissions calling for abortion law reform. For Ireland’s review by the 
CEDAW Committee in March 2017, the IFPA worked within the Women’s 
Human Rights Alliance—an umbrella group of non-governmental 
organizations that includes the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and the 
National Women’s Council of Ireland—to make a collective submission to 
the Committee to make reproductive health services, including abortion “a 
key issue” at the State examination in Geneva.740 Similarly, the Coalition to 
Repeal the 8th Amendment's report to CEDAW was submitted by a coalition 
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Mandate; National Women’s Council of Ireland; Northern Ireland Alliance for Choice; Parents for Choice; 
People Before Profit Alliance; Rape Crisis Network Ireland; Re(al) Reproductive Health ROSA; School of Social 
Justice, UCD; Socialist Party; Socialist Workers Party; TCDSU Repeal the 8th Campaign; TENI; TFMR 
Ireland; Trade Union Campaign to Repeal the 8th Amendment; The Workers Party; Union of Students in 
Ireland; United Left; and UNITE the Union.  
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of 77 diverse groups, including student groups, migrant rights groups, and 
unions.741 
Accordingly, as well as providing important legal claims (discussed in the 
next section), the UN Treaty Monitoring Body reviews provided 
opportunities for coalition-building among advocates. The collaboration in 
preparation for and advocacy during the human rights reviews of Ireland by 
different UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies enhanced relationships between 
organizations, attracted new groups, and led to the co-development of 
strategies and ideas.742 Beyond the Treaty Body reviews in Geneva, many of 
the same alliances collaborated at home to seek the implementation of the 
human rights bodies’ recommendations and push for reform. In addition to 
continuing to advocate jointly and produce joint reports,743 disparate actors 
pursued different tactics according to their strengths and resources.  
A study of digital activism, particularly on Twitter in the Irish abortion 
movement, also suggests that the new alliances were expanded online.744 
Grassroots organizations used social media, in part, to highlight who their 
allies were, possibly to enhance their own legitimacy amongst the public. For 
example, newer organizations such as the Abortion Rights Campaign and the 
Coalition to Repeal the 8th frequently retweeted more established 
organizations such as the National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI).745 
Retweeting statements and/or affirmatively supporting other organizations 
may also have helped maintain consensus amongst the different groups. 
The collaborative human rights documentation and drafting was 
designed to provide evidence to the different UN human rights Treaty bodies 
about the harms of the 8th amendment, but the work itself reportedly 
impacted advocates’ skills and capacity. Upon reflection after the 
referendum, advocates described how their persistent international and 
domestic advocacy around the UN Treaty Monitoring Body processes 
provided valuable training opportunities for hundreds of advocates.746 
Though resources were few, activists from numerous organizations were able 
to become highly skilled in legal and human rights argumentation by the time 
 
741 Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women by the Coalition to 
Repeal the 8th Amendment (February 2017) 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRL/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRL_263
53_E.pdf. 
742 Id. For more on using human rights processes and training, see Shai Dothan, International Courts Improve Public 
Deliberation, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L. 217 (2018). 
743 Interview with Therese Caherty, Congress of Trade Unions Ireland, June 2016 and June 2018. For examples 
of advocacy literature on which the groups coordinated, see Fiona Bloomer et al. Abortion as a Workplace Issue: 
Trade Union Survey - North and South Of Ireland UNITE the Union, Unison, Mandate Trade Union, the CWU 
Ireland, the GMB, Alliance for Choice, Trade Union Campaign to Repeal the 8th (2017). The Irish Family 
Planning Association coordinated with Akidwa to publish: Sexual health and asylum: Handbook for people working with 
women seeking asylum in Ireland (Irish Family Planning Association). 
744 Kate Hunt, Twitter, social movements, and claiming allies in abortion debates, 16(4) J. OF INFO. TECH. & POL. (2019). 
745 Id. 
746 Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666.  
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the referendum campaign finally came around.747 Advocates were confident 
in building on the criticisms that Ireland had received in international human 
rights institutions to make a convincing case for change locally. Additionally, 
many of their submissions focused on elevating women's stories about their 
experiences of pregnancy and abortion under the 8th amendment and 
included first-hand testimony in a deeply respectful way—a strategy that later 
became central to the abortion rights movement.748 
Irish pro-choice advocates also forged transnational human rights 
networks that provided both material and status-based advantages for the 
movement. The Open Society Foundation and the Center for Reproductive 
Rights provided funding to ARC, Amnesty Ireland, the National Women's 
Council, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties.749 Transnational links 
provided solidarity to Irish campaigners who could be parlayed for advocacy 
goals. For example, in August 2017, when Ireland's Taoiseach, Leo 
Varadkar, visited Canada, advocates used Twitter to connect with 
reproductive rights activists in Canada, who in turn lobbied Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau to raise the lack of abortion rights in Ireland with Varadkar. 
Trudeau explicitly urged the Irish Prime Minister to consider abortion "as a 
matter of human rights."750 Through policy and advocacy, media, and 
communication, people in Irish diaspora communities, particularly younger 
women, lobbied their adopted States and the Irish State to support abortion 
rights reform in Ireland. Prominent among diaspora groups for abortion 
rights, the 'London-Irish Abortion Rights Campaign' invoked Ireland's 
contravention of international law standards in its advocacy submissions both 
to the Citizens’ Assembly on the 8th amendment and to the British Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly (BIPA) in the UK.751 Diaspora communities also 
helped amplify international attention on Ireland's abortion laws, including 
by organizing marches in support of the movement at home across world 
cities, including Berlin, Brussels, Toronto, New York, Melbourne, and 
 
747 Id. 
748 Clodagh Schofield, How powerful conversations won abortion rights in Ireland, (September 18, 2018) available at 
https://mobilisationlab.org/stories/how-powerful-conversations-yes-ireland/. 
749 Interview with Laura Harmon, National Women’s Council of Ireland, June 16, 2018. 
750 See, e.g., Fiach Kelly Trudeau urges Varadkar to see abortion as a ‘fundamental right’ (August 21, 2017) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/trudeau-urges-varadkar-to-see-abortion-as-a-fundamental-right-
1.3192431. 




Irish ARC also wrote a joint letter on behalf of the global network of members of the Irish diaspora who 
support removal of the 8th Amendment from the Irish Constitution to the Minister for the Diaspora, 
available at https://londonirisharc.com/repeal-london/dearminister. 
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London.752 Later, the diaspora returned home in their thousands to cast 
ballots in the referendum.753  
 
“In what is becoming a familiar scene, the Irish state must once again answer to a UN 
committee as to why there has been no progress in ensuring the human rights of women and 
girls in Ireland are vindicated.”754 
 
As the number and diversity of Irish pro-choice advocates engaging with 
UN human rights bodies increased, the strength and urgency of 
recommendations from the UN urging the state to address abortion rights 
increased. Pro-choice advocates gained increasingly expansive international 
human rights recommendations to support and legitimate their calls to repeal 
the 8th amendment.  
The CEDAW Committee in 2005, and the Human Rights Committee in 
2008, had expressed concerns regarding the highly restrictive circumstances 
under which women could lawfully have an abortion, but the 
recommendations were weak. CEDAW recommended a "national dialogue 
on reproductive health," and the Human Rights Committee called for a 
measure "to help women avoid unwanted pregnancies so that they do not 
have to resort to illegal or unsafe abortions that could put their lives at risk."755 
By 2014, the Human Rights Committee directly recommended that Ireland 
“revise its legislation on abortion, including its Constitution to provide for 
additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, serious risks to the health of the 
mother, or fatal fetal abnormality.”756 The Committee also commented on 
the discriminatory impact of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act on 
women who were unable to travel abroad to seek abortions.757 The following 
year (2015) the CESCR Committee specifically recommended that the 
Government hold a referendum “to revise its legislation on abortion, 
including the Constitution and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
 
752 See, e.g., Paddy Clancy, Irish Diaspora want their say in Repeal the 8th abortion debate IRISH CENTRAL (December 2, 
2016) available at https://www.irishcentral.com/news/irishvoice/irish-diaspora-want-their-say-in-repeal-the-
8th-abortion-debate; see generally,  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37462862. 




754 See, e.g., Abortion Right Campaign spokesperson, Michali Hyams, available 
at, https://www.abortionrightscampaign.ie/2017/07/28/press-release-government-must-support-repeal-of-8th-
amendment-in-order-to-meet-human-rights-obligations-says-abortion-rights-campaign-arc/. 
755 UN Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Ireland’ UN Doc 
CPR/C/IRL/CO/3, 13. 
756 UN Human Rights Committee 'Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland' (August 19, 
2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4. See also, Anthea McTiernan Irish solutions on women’s rights not enough for the 





2013, in line with international human rights standards.”758 In February 
2016, the CRC Committee’s Concluding Observations called on Ireland to 
“decriminalize abortion in all circumstances.”759 And in 2017, the CEDAW 
Committee recommended that Ireland legalize the termination of pregnancy 
“at least in cases of rape, incest, risk to the physical or mental health or the 
life of the pregnant woman, and severe impairment of the fetus, and de-
criminalize abortion in all other cases.”760 
Rather than expecting the Treaty Monitoring Bodies to coerce Ireland to 
comply with its human rights obligations, the advocates sought to "embarrass 
the State."761 and legitimize their demands in the eyes of the Government.762 
Activists aimed to elevate the status—and acceptance—of their calls for 
liberalization at home, to elicit understanding that they were “not asking for 
something extreme, but that Ireland [was] extremely out of step with 
international standards.”763 And in contrast to the protracted processes 
involved with litigation, for local advocates, the UN review processes allowed 
for regular opportunities to keep “the [abortion] issue in the human rights 
context.”764 
International human rights groups supporting the national movement in 
Ireland similarly engaged with the Treaty Monitoring Body review processes 
but also embraced litigation as a strategy. Considering the legal and policy 
impacts of litigation to carry more weight Committee recommendations in 
Concluding Observations, the international NGO, the Centre for 
Reproductive Rights (CRR), hoped that the state's desire to comply with an 
international decision would outweigh its strong inclination against liberal 
abortion reform.765 Choosing the UN Human Rights Committee as their 
venue, in part, out of fear that the European Court would rebuke their case,766 
in 2013, the CRR logged a case on behalf of  Amanda Mellet - the Irish 
 
758 UN CESCR Committee 'Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Ireland' (July 15 2015) UN 
Doc E/C.12/IRL/CO/3. 
759 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth Period 
Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, March 1, 2016, ¶ 58(a), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-
4&Lang=En. 
760 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Concluding observations on the combined 
sixth and seventh periodic report of Ireland’ (March 3, 2017), UN Doc CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7. 
761 On the role of ‘naming and shaming’ in prompting state compliance with human rights, see Robert O. 
Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 487 (1997). See also, STUART 
A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 147 (1974) (describing the capitalization of advocates on the less 
formal and more political function of rights as “the politics of rights”). 
762 See generally, Beth Simmons, supra note 145. See also Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 429 (2006); Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights 
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 395 (2006). 
763 Interview with Deirdre Duffy, Deputy Director, Irish Council for Civil Liberties, June 16, 2016 (notes on file 
with author). 
764 Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666. 
765 Interview with Leah Hoctor, Litigation Director, Centre for Reproductive Rights, Geneva, March 11, 2017 




American woman who co-founded Terminations for Medical Reasons after 
travelling to England to abort a non-viable pregnancy.767 The CRR felt that 
they could successfully frame Amanda’s suffering at being unable to get an 
abortion in Ireland despite her pregnancy having a fatal fetal anomaly as a 
violation of the right to be free from cruel, degrading treatment.768 Aware 
that Amanda’s case presented a narrow and potentially sympathetic claim, 
their goal was to “push the jurisprudence in a way that would be domestically 
accessible and implementable.”769  
The CRR's hopes were realized. In June 2016, the Human Rights 
Committee held that Ireland's abortion ban had violated Mellet's right to be 
free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, right to privacy, right to 
seek and receive information, and right to equality before the law.770 Mellet’s 
case marked the first time that the UN Human Rights Committee found that 
a State’s law on abortion (rather than its practice around the law or the 
actions of a third party) violated women’s human rights.771 The Government 
paid Amanda Mellet $30,000 in compensation. Siobhán Whelan’s case the 
following year was near identical.772 Ms. Whelan commented that she was 
grateful that the Committee recognized the human rights violations she had 
faced and that the state had provided reparations. But she emphasized that 
she had taken the case to bring about change and to move the Government 
to reform the law so that other women did not have to suffer.773 
Evidence to support the notion that Government actors were directly 
influenced by the decisions or recommendations emanating from the 
successive UN bodies is mixed. In response to the decision in Mellet v. Ireland, 
for example, the then-Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, dismissed the Human Rights 
Committee's decision as "not binding" on the state and "not like the European 
Court."774 At the same time, there is evidence that the UN-based human 
rights advocacy was productive from a legitimacy standpoint. In the 
aftermath of the country's financial crisis (2008-2012), Ireland was still 
rebuilding its international reputation; some advocates noted the concern 
amongst politicians that condemnation from international human rights 
bodies contravened this progress and this provided openings in their 
 
767  supra note 755. 
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769 Id. 
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771 See also Center for Reproductive Rights, Ireland must legalize abortion to end violations of women’s human rights (2006), 
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772 Whelan v. Ireland, supra note xx 
773 See, Pat Leahy, Woman, paid €30,000 over having to travel for abortion 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/woman-paid-30-000-over-having-to-travel-for-abortion-1.3283416. 




advocacy.775 ARC recognized the limitations of soft law measures but 
leveraged the authority of international human rights jurisprudence in their 
advocacy.776 Maeve Taylor of the IFPA reflected on how Ireland's then 
Minister for Justice, Frances Fitzgerald, a former director of the National 
Women's Council, appeared visibly embarrassed as she defended the state's 
position on abortion before the Human Rights Committee.777  
UN human rights bodies’ supportive recommendations also served to 
legitimize the demands of legislators who were allies to the reform 
movement. In 2016, the Children’s Minister, Katharine Zappone—an 
independent TD who at the time supported the minority Government in 
exchange for the Government’s commitment to consider a referendum on the 
8th amendment—capitalized on the UN’s ruling in Mellet to pressure her 
fellow cabinet members to discuss the decision and to progress in setting up 
the promised assembly.778 Notably, Minister Zappone was experienced in 
deploying international human rights as a strategy to advance social change 
in Ireland. In 2003, together with her wife Ann Gilligan, Minister Zappone 
had contested, through domestic litigation, the state's failure to recognize 
their same-sex marriage (which had taken place in Canada). In the course of 
litigation, Zappone and Gilligan highlighted Ireland's international human 
rights obligations to recognize family types beyond those based on 
heterosexual marriage.779 Though she was ultimately unsuccessful in her bid 
for recognition of same-sex unions in the Irish Courts in 2003, she prevailed 
in her attempts to force movement on abortion law reform at the cabinet-
level. A week post-Mellet, the Government announced that it would 
commence the process of setting up the Citizen’s Assembly, and less than a 
month later, in July 2016, the Oireachtas voted to establish the assembly—
made up of 99 randomly selected individuals—to deliberate on a number of 
issues, including the 8th amendment.780  
The members of the Citizen’s Assembly heard evidence from a number 
of experts covering legal regulation of abortion in Ireland and internationally, 
the intricacies of constitutional law, the relationship between domestic law 
and international human rights law, the experience of medical practitioners 
 
775 See, e.g., Amelia Gentlemen, UN Calls on Ireland to Reform Abortion Laws After Landmark Ruling, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ 
(June 9, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/ireland-abortion-lawsviolated-human-rights-
says-un (quoting Colm O’Gorman, Executive Director of Amnesty International Ireland). See also: Sarah Bardon 
et al, UN criticism of abortion regime to be taken seriously, Fitzgerald says, Iʀɪsʜ Tɪᴍᴇs (June 9, 2016) available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/un-criticism-of-abortion-regime-to-be-taken-seriously-fitzgerald-says-
1.2678763. 
776 Interview with Michael Haymes, Abortion Rights Campaign, March 2, 2017 (notes on file with author). 
777 Statement made by Maeve Taylor, Advocacy Director, Irish Family Planning Association, Abortion and 
Reproductive Justice - the Unfinished Revolution II' Conference, June 3, 2016. 
778 See, e.g., Ellen Coyne, ‘Action must be taken on UN abortion ruling’ THE TIMES (June 14, 2016) available at 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/action-must-be-taken-on-un-abortion-ruling-n752s6kjh. 
779 Zappone & Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404. 
780 See, e.g., Luke Field, The abortion referendum of 2018 and a timeline of abortion politics in Ireland to date, 33(4) IRISH 
POLITICAL STUDIES 609 (2018). 
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in the UK treating women from Ireland who access abortion in England, 
ethicists, pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates, and (anonymized and 
recorded) testimony from women who had accessed abortion and from 
women who had decided not to. 
Later, in 2018, as the Government and legislature considered to 
undertake the actual work of reform and determine the wording of the 
referendum question and legislation to follow repeal,781 legislators sought 
advice on Ireland’s human rights obligations from international human rights 
lawyers and the Irish Human Rights Committee. More significantly, the 
argument that international human rights law required constitutional change 
appears to have been significant for the Joint Oireachtas Committee in 
reaching its conclusions in consideration of the Assembly’s Report. 
There is also evidence that the legitimatization of pro-choice advocacy 
impacted activists personally, as well as politically. Though not related to 
international human rights advocacy per se, as Michael McCann suggests in 
his book, Rights at Work, making legal claims and taking part in political 
struggle influences how individuals perceive themselves. Legal mobilization 
can enable advocates to feel more entitled and empowered. 782 For many 
involved in the Irish abortion rights movement, the recognition by 
international human rights bodies that Irish law violated their human rights 
impacted their confidence, resilience, and even identity. Post-referendum, 
newspapers depicted open pride in the nation's vote, but for decades before, 
activism for abortion rights was taboo. Many activists, even right up to the 
referendum, we're hesitant to tell their families about their campaign work, 
fearful of stark disapproval. Others became distanced from their families.783 
As one volunteer with ARC stated: “I feel as though my work has been 
validated. All of a sudden, abortion isn’t taboo. It is a human rights issue. I 
tell my family about it.”784   
4. Framing  
Though the movement’s first proactive foray into international human 
rights advocacy in ABC was in large part unsuccessful, the litigation, and 
advocacy surrounding it, influenced the dialogue on abortion reform in 
Ireland in a significant way. At the parliamentary level, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, from the 1980s onwards, political discussion on abortion had 
generally been confined to consideration of whether and how to heighten 
restrictions on abortion access. Moreover, the tenor of abortion debates was 
 
781 See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussion of the deliberations of the Joint Oireachtas Committee 
in 2017 and 2018). 
782 See, e.g., MICHAL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION (2004). 
783 Interview with Vicky Conway, Lawyers for Choice, July 2, 2016 (notes on file with author). 
784 Interview with Sinead Corcoran, ARC, January 4, 2016 (notes on file with author).  
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generally wrought with hostility. such that divisiveness of discussion on 
abortion was cited by parliamentarians as one of their reasons for inaction. 
Politicians consistently balked at a discussion on abortion law reform, in turn, 
maintaining the idea that abortion was too sensitive and too controversial a 
topic for the legislature to reasonably deal with.  
Legislating for ABC demanded parliamentary action on abortion, notably 
in a way that discussed access to abortion as a right (albeit limited to a right to 
keep women alive). The emotive tenor was far from fully dissipated, but the 
hearings differed from the parliamentary debates that had gone before. The 
Oireachtas invited the Irish Council for Civil Liberties to comment on 
Ireland's obligations under the European Convention.785 The National 
Women’s Council submission invoked statements by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health criticizing the criminalization of abortion 
in Ireland.786 More generally, from this point onwards in Ireland’s abortion 
law trajectory, “women’s human rights” was among the frames used by 
parliamentarians to discuss abortion. 
Additionally, both the institutions of human rights law and its content 
provided the abortion rights movement with significant opportunities to 
communicate specific harms of the 8th amendment to both domestic and 
international bodies. In making submissions via individual complaints and the 
Treaty Monitoring Body processes, advocates documented the testimony and 
experiences of women and their healthcare providers in a way that had not 
been done before.787 Irish women’s experiences of the 8th amendment had 
largely been “out of sight, out of mind.” Women went to England for 
abortions legally but in secret.788 Now advocates translated those silenced 
experiences into a body of evidence that the 8th amendment violated human 
rights and needed to go. As successive UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies made 
the same, or similar recommendations, calling on Ireland to liberalize its laws 
and to protect women’s rights, abortion-seeking women were no longer 
 
785 Presentation by Dr. Alan Brady, ICCL, Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children. 
Report on public hearings on the implementation of Government decision following the publication of the expert 
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“fallen women”789 but were rights holders with a claim on the state. Indeed, 
certain advocates commented that often the impact of their international 
advocacy was a lot less about what the international bodies said and more 
about the personal stories of women that entered the public domain.790 
Abortion moved from being a peripheral subject spoken about in hushed 
tones to a national question of human rights and how the state treated 
women. As one advocate put it: 
 
The Irish public, many of whom first encountered abortion via 
screenings of ‘The Silent Scream’791 Within their Catholic-run schools, 
were now opening up national broadsheets to see that the UN has 
described Ireland's abortion ban as a violation of women's rights.792 
 
Engaging both state actors and the public in a new discourse on abortion, 
international advocacy provided the movement with many of the advantages 
that scholars attribute to international human rights-based ‘framing’:793 
educating the public, producing a new way of understanding the issue, and 
offering captivating narratives.794 Advocates commented that international 
advocacy facilitated creative media messaging that could both chastise the 
state and mobilize sympathetic audiences.795 In 2014, the Chair of the 
Human Rights Committee asserted that Irish law treated women who were 
victims of rape “as a vessel and nothing more.” His observations attracted 
national media attention, and ARC capitalized with the hashtag 
#NotAVessel on social media. This slogan quickly gained traction, with 
women all over the world posting pictures of themselves proclaiming “I am 
#NotAVessel.”796  
 
789 Term taken from CAELAINN HOGAN, REPUBLIC OF SHAME: STORIES FROM IRELAND’S INSTITUTIONS FOR 
‘FALLEN WOMEN’ (2020). 
790 Interview with Leah Hoctor, Centre for Reproductive Rights, Geneva, March 11, 2017 (notes on file with 
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791 ‘The Silent Scream’ is a 1984 anti-abortion educational film that was produced in the U.S. in partnership with 
the National Right to Life Committee. 
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contexts they may be much less effective than in others—but for many of the world’s women, they offer the best 
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In addition to discursive advantages, scholars demonstrate that human 
rights framing can be crucial for its legal authority.797 Such was the case for 
the Irish abortion rights movement. Advocates articulated a variety of claims 
in terms of human rights law. When addressing the Human Rights 
Committee in 2014, advocates were able to build on ABC to underscore that 
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act was not a solution for women’s 
human rights. Given that the Act only addressed the situation of women 
whose pregnancy posed a serious risk to life, advocates argued that Ireland’s 
ban on abortion access in cases where there was a risk to a woman's physical 
or mental health, where the pregnancy was the result of a crime or where 
there was a serious fetal anomaly, interfered with women’s rights to be free 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to life under the 
Covenant.798 In their submissions to the CEDAW Committee, advocates 
used public health evidence to underscore that the state violated Article 12 
(the right to health) of women in Ireland by imposing an unsound distinction 
between risk to the life of a pregnant woman and risk to her health,799 and by 
imposing onerous barriers to abortion access in cases of suicide.800 Advocates 
emphasized that “abortion needed to be taken out of the criminal law and 
addressed as part of an integrated approach to women’s reproductive 
health.”801 Similarly, when engaging with the CESCR Committee802 and the 
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799 See, e.g., Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) in Respect of the Combined Sixth and 
Seventh Periodic Review of Ireland Under the CEDAW Convention (2017), 
https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/irish_family_planning_association_submission_to_cedaw_january_2017
_1.pdf; See also, Comments of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission to the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Ireland’s Combined Sixth and Seventh 
Periodic Reports (on file with author). 
800 Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments of the Abortion Rights Campaign to the Pre-sessional Working Group of the 
CEDAW Committee (2015) (on file) [hereinafter, Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments to CEDAW; National 
Women’s Council Oral Statement to the Pre-Sessional Working Group of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
https://www.nwci.ie/learn/article/oral_statement_to_the_pre_sessional_working_group_of_the_committee_on
_the_e. 
801 id. Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments to CEDAW. 






Committee on the Rights of the Child, advocates highlighted Ireland’s non-
compliance with the Convention where a woman faces a risk to her health 
and requires access to abortion.803 And following the HRC’s decision in 
Mellet, advocates emphasized that Ireland had still not taken action to comply 
with the decision by holding a referendum and legislating for abortion access 
for women whose pregnancies had fatal fetal abnormalities.804 
The disproportionate impact of Irish abortion law on "vulnerable 
women" or "marginalized women" featured as a prominent theme in 
advocates' human rights submissions. The label "vulnerable women" was 
code for women living in poverty, asylum seekers, and minors in the care of 
the state, i.e., women for whom travel was laden with barriers, some of them 
insurmountable. Exposing multiple barriers that women in poverty and/or 
immigrant women faced in accessing abortion, the movement drew attention 
to the intersection of needs of women in Ireland.  ARC and the IFPA 
collaborated with Akidwa (Ireland's National Network of Migrant Women) 
to support migrant women's groups in developing submissions on their 
challenges. They drew upon the 'alphabet' of tragedies in Irish abortion law; 
Ms. Y, who had been raped but could not travel, and Ms. C, who had been 
raped and went the whole way to High Court to overcome the restrictions on 
her right to travel. Others explained how accessing the funds to cover flights, 
accommodation, transportation to and from the airport, and the abortion 
itself, was impossible for some women. Advocates highlighted the 
discriminatory impacts of the 8th amendment on women and girls in lower 
socio-economic groups.805 Significantly, the state was forced to admit that it 
had "no solution" for women who were unable to travel for abortion.806 
The Irish abortion rights movement elicited strong recommendations 
relating the state's responsibility to reform Irish abortion law from UN human 
rights bodies. Almost in unison, the UN human rights bodies outlined that to 
comply with its legal obligations, Ireland needed to hold a referendum to 
repeal the 8th amendment and legislate thereafter to legalize abortion in cases 
where abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, where 
a woman is a victim of rape or incest or where the pregnancy was not viable. 
Though the views of such bodies are not binding on States under 
 
803 Maeve Taylor, Women's Right to Health and Ireland's Abortion Laws, 1 INT. J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 
130, 132 (2015). 
804 See, e.g., Siobhan Mullally, Mellet v. Ireland: Legal Status of the UN Human Rights Committee’s ‘Views” CCJHR BLOG 
(June 16, 2017) http://blogs.ucc.ie/wordpress/ccjhr/2016/06/16/mellet-v-ireland-legal-status-un-human-
rights-committees-views-2/T.   
805 See, e.g., IFPA, Abortion in Ireland: Statistics, https://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics (last visited 
September 1, 2018). See also Ashley Kirk, Nine a Day: The Women who Have to Travel for Abortion as Ireland Prepares for 
Referendum, Tʜᴇ Tᴇʟᴇɢʀᴀᴘʜ (May 24, 2018).  




international law, their views are treated as authoritative interpretations of 
binding treaty obligations.807  
At another level, however, the scope of abortion reform recommended by 
the myriad human rights bodies was substantively limited. As set out in Part 
I of this chapter, international human rights standards on abortion access 
developed from a growing international concern that thousands of women 
were dying or suffering severe health complications from unsafe abortions. 
The law responded in two ways. First, it tried to ensure that women could 
access abortion where it was legal, i.e., where a State permits legal abortion 
domestically, human rights law is clear that States must put procedures in 
place to enable women to access a safe, legal abortion. The litany of cases in 
Part II (KL, LMR, Tysiac, LC, P & S, RR, ABC, Mellet, Whelan, Beatriz, etc.) 
demonstrate that under current international human rights law 
jurisprudence, States are culpable if individual service providers or a lack of 
medical guidelines impede a woman's access to abortion—if that state has 
already legalized abortion. If a State has not already legalized abortion, 
international human rights law recommends that States make exceptions to 
their restrictions to legalize access in cases where the life or health of the 
woman is at risk, if the pregnancy is the result of rape or if the pregnancy is 
not viable. 
While such norms were initially very useful in providing legal and political 
legitimacy to advocates’ calls for a referendum to repeal the 8th amendment, 
as the movement progressed towards a public vote in 2017 and 2018, 
international human rights law ran out as a resource.  
To recap from Chapter 1, the Government officially committed to 
holding a referendum on Ireland's constitutional abortion law following the 
recommendation from the Citizen's Assembly in that it do so. Not only did 
the Committee recommend a referendum, but that the state move to permit 
abortion without restriction as to reason up to 12 weeks of pregnancy, allow 
abortion where there is a risk to life or of serious harm to health after 12 weeks 
but until fetal viability, and without gestational time limit where the fetus has 
a condition that means it is likely to die before or within 28 days of birth.808 
Only one human rights organization, Amnesty Ireland, addressed the 
assembly over its 25 meetings. 
Fewer movement actors were content with the notion that reform would 
enable women to access abortion only in exceptional circumstances. The 
need for thousands of women to leave Ireland for abortion care would remain 
 
807 Art 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice also provides that the views of experts are a 
subsidiary source of international law. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, entry into force October 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.   





intact. 'Real world' access to abortion would remain heavily dependent on 
financial means, visa status, ability to travel, ability to take time off of work, 
the availability of childcare for the pregnant person's children, or the ability 
and willingness to order medication abortion online and take it illegally within 
Ireland. For many involved in the campaign over the decades, incremental 
and exceptions-based abortion law reform had never been their goal. The 
ABC had been initiated as a case to contest the discrimination caused to the 
diversity of Irish women, not just women in exceptional circumstances.809 
ARC's foundations committed to "free, safe, and legal abortion" for all 
women.810 The IFPA was driven by the need to recognize the rights of women 
with “everyday abortion experiences.”811 Grassroots activists campaigned for 
a law that would end the exile of Irish women who wanted to control their 
reproductive autonomy. For thousands of women, the movement was a fight 
to demand that the State #trustwomen.  
In this way, if strictly adhered to, human rights law had the potential to 
undermine the Irish abortion rights movement by tempering its ambitions 
and limiting their demands significantly. Strict compliance with international 
human rights law would have delivered a much more limited abortion right 
than what was sought and ultimately achieved by pro-choice campaigners.  
Notably, as noted in the last section, when the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on the Eighth Amendment had the opportunity to recommend 
whether Ireland should have a referendum on the 8th amendment, the 
Committee cited Ireland’s international human rights obligations “as 
evidenced in the cases of Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland” among their 
reasons for recommending constitutional change.812 However, an approach 
to abortion reform predicated upon compliance with Mellet and Whelan would 
only have required the state to guarantee access to abortion for women with 
non-viable pregnancies—a much narrower reform than that recommended 
by the Citizen's Assembly, which essentially called for a legal right to abortion, 
without restriction as to reason, within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. If the 
Joint Committee had not also been presented with the Citizen's Assembly's 
recommendation,813 perhaps the Joint Committee, and in turn, the 
 
809 See supra note 356. 
810 See, e.g., ARC Inclusivity Statement, supra note 136. See also, IFPA Submission to the Citizen’s Assembly, A 
health and rights approach to abortion in Ireland, 
https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/ifpa_submission_to_the_citizens_assembly.pdf (outlining their position 
that an abortion law based on exceptions where a woman has been raped or received a diagnosis of severe or 
fatal anomaly, "would, in the same way, fail to meet the needs of the very group it aimed to serve"). 
811 See, e.g., Irish Family Planning Association, Women Have Abortions Every Day: It's Just One Choice, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4SSHkgD73E. 
812 See, e.g., Houses of The Oireachtas, Report of The Joint Committee On The Eight Amendment Of The Constitution, 
December 20, 2017, at 5, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/committees/32/eighth-amendment-constitution 
[hereinafter, Oireachtas, Report Of The Joint Committee] 
813 First Report And Recommendation Of The Citizens’ Assembly, The Eight Amendment Of The Constitution, June 29, 2017, 
https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-the-Eighth-
Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-incl-Appendix-A-D.pdf  See Government Of Ireland Department 
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Oireachtas, would not have offered the Irish people the option to vote for 
unrestricted access to abortion in the first trimester in the 2018 referendum. 
In practical terms, the Government may have presented (and later enacted) a 
post-repeal abortion law that was far less progressive than what was published 
in March 2018.814 If the primary impact of human rights advocacy had been 
to move the state to comply with its international human rights law standards 
on abortion, the Irish people might not have been able to vote in favor of a 
woman's right to abortion without restriction as to reason. Thousands of 
women in Ireland might still be travelling to the UK every year to realize their 
reproductive rights. 
Interestingly, even though human rights law standards on abortion are 
actually quite conservative, when it came to the official referendum campaign 
in the eight weeks before the public vote, the Together for Yes campaign 
dropped the framing of abortion as a ‘right,’ believing this language to be too 
political.815 Rather than articulating abortion as a human right for women, 
abortion was framed, primarily, as a medical need. The campaign’s policy 
paper described the proposed law as a way for “women and girls to access the 
abortion services which they need, in a safe and regulated medical 
environment within the Irish health system.”816 There was little talk of 
‘trusting women’, but much of trusting women and their doctors.817 The 
dominant campaign message articulated that Repeal was about providing 
healthcare to women within the state's jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the 
campaign leaned heavily on medical arguments for repeal, foregrounding 
supportive obstetricians and gynecologists as spokespersons.818 With an 
undertone of paternalism, the message was that Ireland should be caring for 
its women at home. Additionally, campaign events foreground the stories of 
women and couples who had experienced a diagnosis of fatal fetal 
abnormality and had been forced abroad for an abortion. "Repeal," the 
refrain went, was a vote for "compassion and care for your sister, your 
daughter, your mother, or for your wife."819 Civil society campaigners, 
 
Of Health, General Scheme Of A Bill To Regulate Termination Of Pregnancy, March 27, 2018, https://health.gov.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-for-Publication.pdf. 
814 Id. 
815 Interviews with the following in June 2016: Sineád Kennedy, Together for Yes; Laura Harmon, Niall Behan, 
the Irish Family Planning Association. 
816 Together for Yes, Position on Bill to Regulate Termination of Pregnancy, (April 5, 2018) 
https://www.togetherforyes.ie/12-weeks/. 
817 For example, during live TV debates, Together for Yes tweeted, "We need to trust women and trust doctors 
to do their jobs":https://twitter.com/Together4yes/status/989998165616185344. 
818 The support of the medical profession for reform is similar to the experience of the United States, where 
physicians feared criminal and civil liability because of the vague standards at work. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s 
Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2010) [hereinafter Siegel, Roe’s 
Roots]; BEFORE ROE V.WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RULING 25 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010). 
819 See, e.g., Senator Colette Kelleher, Seanad Debates, 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/2018-01-17/9/; Ivana Bacik, Ireland’s abortion referendum: 
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politicians, and even celebrities who became voices for 'Yes' repeated this 
refrain. Emblazoned in bright colors across roadside posters, t-shirts, and 
campaign literature, a Yes vote was a vote for "compassion and care."   
Market research conducted in 2016 had provided the impetus for the 
change in framing.820 According to this research, the so-called 'middle 
ground' voters in Ireland (those who were seemingly not firmly in the 'pro-
choice' or 'pro-life' camp) responded well to the reproductive health frame.821 
These 'middle ground' voters, also known as 'middle Ireland' or the 
'concerned center,' felt emotionally torn; they wanted gradual change 
according to the focus group. And they wanted there to be a reason for an 
abortion. The involvement of doctors in the abortion decision was key. 
Together for Yes pitched their campaign of compassion and care to this 
constituency. Moving away from the themes of choice and rights, their 
narrative focused on women’s health needs and the tragedies of the 8th—
women with much-wanted pregnancies who had been diagnosed with a fetal 
anomaly; women who had been raped; women whose health was at risk.822 
The Director of the National Women's Council and co-chair of Together for 
Yes, Orla O'Connor, emphasized that "[f]or women it's (abortion), not a 
political issue. It's a personal and private one."823  
For a movement that had consistently highlighted the impacts of the 8th 
amendment on women with multiple vulnerabilities in the international 
advocacy, immigrant women, traveler women, and black and brown women 
became almost invisible in official campaign activities during the 
referendum.824 The messaging no longer detailed the struggles of the women 
who were most penalized by the law—migrant women, women in poverty, 
or children in care. Rather, it seemed as though the official campaign believed 
that the public could only be convinced to trust women who fitted traditional 
norms of respectability.  
It is not clear whether the depoliticization of abortion rights was necessary 
to win the public vote. When 'Yes' voters were asked to name which factors 
were important to them in making their decision, the most important issues 
were the right to choose (84%), the health or life of the woman (69%), and 
 
why I’m campaigning for repeal Tʜᴇ Cᴏɴᴠᴇʀsᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, (March 22, 2018) https://theconversation.com/irelands-
abortion-referendum-why-im-campaigning-for-repeal-96938. 
820 Interview with Laura Harmon, Mobilization Director, Together for Yes (June 10, 2018) (explaining that in 
2016, the National Women's Council had conducted focus group studies, paid for with funding from the Center 
for Reproductive Rights, which revealed that a less combative tone was preferable amongst middle-ground 
voters). 
821 Interview with Ailbhe Smyth, Co-chair, Together for Yes (June 16, 2018). 
822 See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
823 See e.g. Pat Leahy, Women’s council appeals to ‘middle ground’ in abortion debate IRISH TIMES (November 13, 2017), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/women-s-council-appeals-to-middle-ground-in-abortion-debate-
1.3289391. 
824 Interview with Eileen O' Flinn, activist on behalf of Irish Travellers and women's rights, June 4, 2018. 
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pregnancy as a result of rape (52%).825 Furthermore, when asked when they 
decided how to vote, 75% said they always knew; 8% said following the Savita 
Halappanavar case; 1% said following the Citizens' Assembly; 1% said 
following the Oireachtas committee, and 12% said during the Referendum 
campaign.826 
This chapter examined how human rights-based activism for abortion law 
reform in Ireland helped Irish advocates unravel one of the most restrictive 
abortion laws in the world. Playing a formative role, the strategic decision of 
the IFPA in the early 2000s to focus on international human rights advocacy 
initiated the first proactive campaign for women’s abortion rights in Ireland. 
Somewhat unique to Ireland, the international legal system provided a venue 
for legal challenge in a situation where the domestic legal system precluded 
legal action for abortion law reform. Though limited in terms of its 
recognition of substantive abortion rights, the outcome of the litigation 
campaign the European Court’s 2010 decision in A, B, and C v. Ireland forced 
legislative action at home, compelling the Oireachtas to clarify the legal 
framework around access to abortion where a woman’s life was at risk (the 
PLDPA). The death of Savita Halappanavar in 2012 was an unexpected, yet 
watershed, moment for the abortion rights movement and gave significant 
momentum to the emerging national mobilization against the abortion ban. 
The international human rights advocacy that followed both her death and 
the PLDPA was influential less in terms of its legal force, but by attracting 
new actors, creating opportunities for coalition building, and enhancing the 
legitimacy of the movement (particularly from 2012-2017), human rights 
activism had important structural impacts on the movement itself. And 
during those years, framing abortion as a human right helped shift both 
parliamentary and public discourse on abortion to discuss abortion denial as 
a potential violation of women's rights —a marked difference from the 
abortion debates in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s described in Chapter 1.  
While this case study evidences significant institutional and analytical 
benefits that human rights strategies offered to the pro-choice movement, it 
suggests that the actual scope of international human rights law had the 
potential to constrain the liberalization of Ireland’s abortion law. In 
protecting access for abortion in just a subset of cases, for a subset of women, 
international human rights standards did not reflect the full extent of the pro-
choice struggle, nor the diversity of women who sought its protection. The 
next chapter, the final in this dissertation, probes the doctrinal underpinnings 
of this gap in human rights protection. 
 
825 David McCullough, Exit poll indicates large majority vote to change abortion laws (updated May 30, 2018) 
https://www.rte.ie/news/politics/2018/0526/966120-eighth-amendment-referendum/. 

































CHAPTER 3: GENDER BLIND: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON 
ABORTION 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation set out current international human rights 
law standards on abortion: the doctrine recognizes that in certain 
circumstances, denying women access to abortion can violate a woman’s right 
to life, right to health, right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, right to privacy, freedom from discrimination in the context of the 
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right to health and freedom from socio-economic discrimination. In practical 
terms, this jurisprudence recognizes that States have a duty to decriminalize 
abortion and legalize abortion access in three situations: where a woman (and 
usually a number of medical or state officials) can show that abortion is 
necessary to preserve her life or health; where the pregnancy is the result of 
rape; or where the pregnancy has a fatal anomaly. Forged through impressive 
advocacy by reproductive rights groups, these doctrinal developments have 
been groundbreaking in numerous concrete ways. Across the world, 
lawmakers and judges have invoked these law standards to liberalize national-
level laws and policies on abortion. 827 A number of international and 
multilateral organizations and agencies have referenced human rights 
standards in the technical guidance and recommendations they provide to 
States on women’s health828 and empowerment. Chapter 2 studied how 
international human rights law was a powerful lever for Irish abortion rights 
activists to drive political, social, and legal change — a phenomenon that is 
not limited to this jurisdiction. 
Chapter 2 concluded, however, on a sober note that pointed to the limits 
of this jurisprudence. The international human rights framework provided 
formative legitimatizing, mobilizing, and institutional resources to the Irish 
abortion rights movement, but it was not a panacea. The case study 
highlighted that the scope of international legal protection for abortion rights 
fell short, far short of the emancipatory goals of the Irish movement. If Irish 
lawmakers had directly mirrored human rights law when legislating for 
reform, only a slightly improved abortion law would have followed the repeal 
of the 8th amendment. Rather than legal availability upon request within the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy, women may only have been entitled to an 
abortion within the health-life-rape and FFA exceptions. As before repeal, 
women outside of those categories could have resorted to ordering abortion 
pills online or going abroad to access abortion, but that would hardly have 
been a revolutionary change for "Mná na hEireann."829 
 
827 Courts in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, the UK, and Nepal have directly relied upon 
these standards in decisions to liberalize abortion laws; See, e.g., Stefano Gennarini, Court in Argentina Cites UN 
‘Experts’ To Establish ‘Right’ to Abortion, LIFESITE (January 9, 2014), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/court-in-
argentina-cites-unexperts-to-establish-right-to-abortion. Lawmakers in Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
Rwanda, Uruguay, and Peru have also invoked international standards to decriminalize abortion. 
828 WHO, SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS 1‒2 (2d ed. 2012); See 
also UNFPA, Sexual And Reproductive Health And Rights: An Essential Element Of Universal Health Coverage: Background 
document for the Nairobi summit on ICPD25 – Accelerating the promise (2019) 34 
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UF_SupplementAndUniversalAccess_30-online.pdf 
(outlining that “[o]ne essential legislative reform is to widen the grounds on which abortion is permitted” to 
ensure a “a comprehensive approach to sexual and reproductive health rights.”). 
829 “Mná na hEireann" translates from Irish to English as "Women of Ireland." In popular lexicon, it is associated 
with a rallying cry for Irish women ever since its use by former President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, who, in her 
victory speech, gave special mention to Irish women “who instead of rocking the cradle, rocked the system.” 
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As well as being limited in terms of the substantive rights offered, a closer 
look at human rights law jurisprudence on abortion830 tellingly reveals a 
narrow understanding of the socio-political importance of abortion rights. 
Delinking abortion, for the most part, from gender equality, the doctrine fails 
to interrogate the gendered purposes and effects of abortion restrictions. One 
line of jurisprudence treats abortion regulation as a cultural issue of “domestic 
morality” that domestic powers can regulate with a significant degree of 
deference.831 Under this model, abortion's status as a human right receives 
scant attention, and the gender discrimination inherent to abortion 
restrictions receives no attention at all. In other decisions, the law has been 
willing to recognize that denial of abortion rights by 'third parties, such as 
hospitals, doctors, or judges, interferes with women's rights. While these are 
welcome decisions in many regards, it enables the state to escape 
accountability for giving such the third parties power over women's decisions. 
In addition to failing to contest the gendered roots of abortion denial, 
human rights law tends to obscure the gendered impacts of restrictive 
abortion regulation. By conceptualizing abortion denial primarily as an 
interference with the right to health, the right to privacy, and the right to be 
free from ill-treatment, human rights law has made powerful inroads in 
recognizing many of the human rights abuses women suffer when denied 
abortions. But this analysis appears to have come at the expense of sufficient 
recognition of the inequalities caused by abortion restrictive regulation. Even 
when the law recognizes the discriminatory impacts of abortion restrictions, 
the inequality is addressed as one of unequal access to healthcare, rather than 
the rejection of women's agency, autonomy, and equal position in society.832 
To be sure, abortion access is a reproductive health issue, and denial of a 
wanted abortion impedes a woman's right to health. Relatedly, abortion 
rights implicate many aspects of an individual's private life that should not be 
intruded upon by state actors. And without doubt, the experience of forced 
pregnancy can cause suffering that reaches the threshold of cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment. But recognition of these harms should not be 
divorced from the understanding that abortion denial impairs the status of 
women as equals. 
Finally, the human rights law understanding of abortion—again, as 
currently applied—is wanting from a gender perspective because the 
jurisprudence trades in narratives of women as powerless, tragic victims. A 
primary example is its “exceptions-based” approach to abortion. Affirmative 
 
830 In analyzing human rights law’s approach to abortion rights, the chapter primarily examines human rights 
law decisions, rather than recommendations emanating from UN Treaty Monitoring Body concluding 
observations. However, where the doctrinal approach of a human rights body differs in its decisions from its 
approach in concluding observations, the difference is acknowledged.  
831 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12, at ¶ 227. 
832 See infra note xx and accompanying notes. 
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abortion rights are recognized only in conditional (quite tragic) cases — 
where there is danger of maternal mortality, where the pregnancy is non-
viable, or where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. The agentic 
women who choose abortion for reasons unrelated to the aforementioned 
tragedies are excluded from the law’s protection. In this way, the law creates 
a hierarchy of rights-holders (and abortions) whereby only women who can 
engender compassion and sympathy are considered to be rights-holders. 
Moreover, the positioning of women as powerless victims risks inscribing the 
patriarchal vision of women as vulnerable beings whose suppression is 
natural.833 As this chapter will discuss, human rights law’s uneasy relationship 
with women’s agency extends to playing a role in erasing it.834 In the seminal 
A, B, &C case at the European Court of Human Rights, when assessing 
whether Ireland had violated A and B’s human rights, the majority relied, in 
part, on the fact that the women overcame national barriers to abortion 
access to dismiss the claimants. The women's success in extricating themselves 
from the unjust laws of their state meant that their state had not really violated 
their human rights and had acted proportionately. Put differently, their 
display of agency stripped the women of their status of rights-holders. 
Conditioning women’s recognition as rights holders on their powerlessness, 
the human rights law itself could be accused of suppressing women’s agency.  
This chapter, the final in this dissertation, critiques human rights law from 
a feminist perspective. Before the doctrine is scrutinized, the chapter builds 
its case for recognizing abortion as an issue of gender equality. First, it invokes 
different strands of feminist legal scholarship that condemn anti-abortion 
regulation as grounded in harmful gender stereotypes835 and contextualizes 
these theories by revisiting the Irish abortion story. Examining the history of 
Irish abortion law and the experiences of women under its rule, the chapter 
demonstrates that Ireland’s near-total abortion ban was designed to enforce 
gender stereotypes related to women’s roles as mothers and wives.  
Second, building on feminist approaches that foreground women’s 
experiences, the chapter analyzes the discriminatory impacts of abortion 
restrictions. Examining the social meaning of Ireland’s abortion regime and 
the law’s concrete impacts on women, the chapter demonstrates how the 8th 
rejected the autonomy of abortion-seeking women and punished them 
through exile and stigma. The analysis of women's experiences takes care to 
emphasize that generations of Irish women withstood those burdens of 
shame, rejection, and stigma to travel abroad for abortion or take pills at 
home. In this way, the Irish abortion story adds to feminist thought on 
abortion by conceptualizing Irish women’s experiences of restrictive abortion 
 
833 See infra note xx accompanying text.  
834 See infra notes 1065-1068 and accompanying text. 
835 Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments supra note 24, at 833-34; Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010). 
 
 142 
regulation, not only as an injury but also as an exemplar of women’s agency. 
Considering how generations of Irish women withstood the burdens of shame 
and rejection to travel abroad for abortions or take pills at home, those who 
suffered can also be seen as defiant and active dissenters.  
Third, the chapter argues Ireland's abortion law and policy doubly 
suppressed women's agency by purposefully censoring women's rejection of 
the state's gendered dictates. By casting women who had abortions as 
criminals or exemplars of shame, Ireland's abortion regime did its best to push 
women's defiance underground. 
Part 1 of this chapter presents the theory case for recognizing abortion as 
an issue of gender equality. 
Part 2 details the main ways in which human rights law on abortion fails 
to identify or challenge the gendered nature of abortion restrictions. This 
analysis is informed by the longstanding "feminist international law 
critiques."836 and a reinterpretation of the feminist challenge to international 
law's public/private divide.837 Operating as a veil to keep women's 
experiences of human rights abuse beyond legal intervention, the chapter 
argues that the public/private divide manifests in abortion jurisprudence by 
hiding gendered roots and harms of abortion restrictions. 
Part 3 levels another feminist international law critique at abortion 
jurisprudence: the law’s reproduction of harmful stereotypes of women as 
inherently vulnerable and powerless. Analyzing the cases when the law does 
recognize women’s experiences of abortion restrictions as human rights 
violations, the critique suggests that this recognition is dependent upon 
women fitting a mold of female powerlessness. 838 
Part 4 concludes the chapter by sketching how nascent jurisprudential 
developments indicate that human rights law is capable of scrutinizing 
national regulations from an anti-stereotyping perspective and of reckoning 
with subordinating harms of abortion restrictions. 
 
A. Abortion law in Ireland from a feminist perspective 
 
1. Purpose-based equality arguments for abortion rights  
As with most issues of gender discrimination, equality arguments for 
abortion rights are rejected by those committed to formalistic conceptions of 
 
836 Of course, feminists, whether in scholarship or activism, are not uniform in perspective, and this analysis 
privileges certain trends among feminist approaches. 
837  See infra note _ and accompanying text. 
838  See infra note _ and accompanying text. See also, Jayne Huckerby, Feminism and International Law in the Post—
9/11 Era, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 533 (2016) (demonstrating how women's political agency is denied in discourse 
on counter-terrorism and human rights). 
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equality. Their view contends that because men and women are not similarly 
situated in matters of reproduction, anti-abortion laws do not treat men and 
women different.839 By contrast, feminist approaches to equality undercut 
attempts to justify discrimination against women on the basis of biological 
difference.840A starting point for many feminists arguing for abortion rights 
as necessary for women’s equality is the straightforward argument that 
because women are the sole targets of abortion regulation to the exclusion of 
men, anti-abortion laws amount to prima facie or de jure sex and gender-based 
discrimination.841 
Examining whether regulations have been shaped, at least in part, by 
gender stereotypes is one of the tools that feminists have used to expose the 
role of gender in abortion restrictions. Analyzing the history of American 
abortion law and politics, feminist legal scholar Reva Siegel demonstrates that 
abortion restrictions in the US are grounded in and foster gendered 
stereotypes of women as mothers.842Siegel illustrates that in the nineteenth 
century, calls to restrict abortion access were led by physicians, whose stated 
goal was to regulate women – women’s bodies, women’s decisions and 
women’s roles in society.843 The physicians argued that women were 
corporeally bound for motherhood844 and should therefore be restricted from 
accessing abortion. And when the physicians’ arguments converged with 
prominent antifeminist discourses about women’s traditional familial roles, 
anti-abortion discourse was endowed with overlapping accounts of women's 
obligations as mothers—accounts that successfully supported anti-abortion 
campaigns.845 
Progressing into the 20th century, Siegal demonstrates how those anti-
abortion movements replaced their overt role-based claims about women’s 
place in society with a discourse centered upon protecting the right to life of 
the unborn.846 Notwithstanding the muting of the women-as-mothers dictate, 
Siegel contends that abortion restrictive policies remain animated by the 
stereotype.847 Even if anti-abortion regulation is driven in part by a desire to 
 
839 See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 453, 456 (1995). 
840 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281, 1308–24 (1991). 
841 See, e.g.,  Rebecca J. Cook & Susannah Howard, Accommodating Women’s Differences Under the Women’s Anti-
Discrimination Convention, 56 EMORY L.J. 1032 (2007) [hereinafter Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences]; Simone 
Cusack & Rebecca J. Cook, Combating Discrimination on Sex and Gender, in International Protection of Human Rights: A 
Textbook 205, 214–15 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); Sheelagh McGuinnes and Heather 
Widdows, Access to basic reproductive rights: global challenges in The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics (Leslie 
Francis ed. 2017); Writing from the U.S. perspective, see, Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special 
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 - 44 (1992). 
842 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20, and accompanying text. 
843 Id. 301. 
844  Id. 319-321. 
845 Id. See also, LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE 
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING (2010). See also JANET FARRELL BRODIE, 
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994). 




safeguard “the unborn,” she argues, the harms of forced motherhood—the 
social, physical, emotional, and economic implications of bearing and rearing 
a child—are so significant that the State could only force women to withstand 
such injuries if it considers motherhood to be the natural order of things for 
women848 using an instrument of public power to compel motherhood is not 
merely about protecting fetal life, she says, but is also about gender scripting. 
 
2. The gendered roots of Ireland's abortion restrictions 
Siegel’s thesis resonates across the Atlantic. As described in Chapter 1 of 
this dissertation, those who led the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) 
in 1983 presented the 8th amendment as a necessary legal intervention to 
block Irish Courts from changing recognizing a right to abortion in the Irish 
Constitution.849 Because the Supreme Court in McGee850 had inferred a right 
to contraception from a right to marital privacy (from Article 40.3.1 and 
Article 41.1.1)851 PLAC asserted that the Court could potentially recognize a 
right to abortion in the same source. They argued that a constitutional 
guarantee for unborn life could prevent such judicial activism. However, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was clear that the Court did not consider it 
possible to interpret the Irish Constitution as containing a right to abortion. 
In fact, the Supreme Court was explicit in McGee that the right to 
contraception did not extend to limiting family size by abortion.852  
Moreover, the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act made intentional 
miscarriage a felony; abortion carried a life sentence of penal servitude and 
anyone who assisted with an abortion was guilty of a misdemeanor. Both 
constitutionally and legislatively, the "unborn" was safe. 
The absence of a possibility that abortion could be legalized in Ireland 
suggests that the proponents of the 8th amendment had additional motives 
beyond legal protection for the "unborn." A number of scholars assert that 
the 8th amendment was part of an ongoing nation-building project that the 
State had pursued since its formation in the 1920s.853 Having gained 
independence from the British Empire in 1922 to become the 'Irish Free 
State, Ireland sought to distinguish itself from its former colonizer. 
 
848  Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20, 371-380. 
849 See, e.g., Chapter 1, supra note 50-51. 
850 McGee, supra note 27. 
851 [1974] IR 284; Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.1 ("The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far 
as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state 
recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."). 
852 See McGee, supra note 27, (Walsh J stated that “any action on the part of either the husband and wife or of the 
State to limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offence against 
the common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question.”).  
853 For this argument, see Ruth Fletcher, Post-Colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics, 28 
J.L. & SOC'Y 568 (2001); Lisa Smyth, Feminism and Abortion Politics, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 335 (2002); LISA 
SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION (2005). 
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Unfortunately for Irish women, the burdens of this identity-building fell to 
them.854 While the 1922 Free State Constitution—the State's first 
Constitution—guaranteed equal rights and equal opportunities to all its 
citizens  "without distinction of sex," within a couple of years of its founding, 
Ireland's laws, policies, and practices entrenched the primacy of the 
patriarchal family as the measure of the new State.855 Within a decade of its 
founding, Ireland’s national policies included a ban on divorce,856 the 
criminalization of the importation of contraceptives,857 and limits on the 
ability of married women to participate in the public workforce.858 No law 
was more glaring in its affirmation of women’s familial role than Article 41.2.2 
of the 1937 Constitution. Expressly asserting that the "common good" 
depends upon a woman's "life within the home," the State defined women's 
capacity to contribute to the new nation to performance of the maternal 
role.859   
Evidence suggests that the enactment of the 8th amendment in 1983 was 
a forceful attempt to maintain this status quo and protect it from a nascent 
threat. In the late 1970s, the global movement for the emancipation of 
women finally reached Irish shores. A small group of campaigners became 
vocal on issues of gender inequality, demanding action on violence against 
women, employment discrimination, discrimination against single mothers 
and their children, and access to contraception.860 The campaign for the 
latter received a significant boost from the 1974 Supreme Court decision in 
McGee, which recognized a constitutional right to contraception for married 
 
854 Notably, the demarcation of gender roles in nation-building is not specific to Irish nationalism; this practice is 
common in postcolonial states. Scholars have demonstrated how observing differentiated gender roles enables 
formerly oppressed male subjects to assert masculinity and right to power See ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE 
ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER COLONIALISM DELHI (1983).  
855 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, The regulation of sexuality in the Irish Free State in MEDICINE, DISEASE AND THE STATE IN 
IRELAND, 1650– 1940, (Eoin Malcolm eds. 1999) at 253–266. 
Additionally, it is likely that the Catholic Church was aided in its assumption of a prominent national role due to 
the limited capacities of the new State. Though less explored in scholarship relating to Ireland, the power vacuums 
that are common to emerging (and fragile) States are often filled by non-State actors; from armed groups to 
religious orders, non-state actors can gain significant political and social influence by providing services, finances, 
and even employment. For an example of this in the Syrian context, see Yassin al-Haj Salih, The Syrian Shabiha and 
Their State, 16 MIDDLE EAST ARTICLES, (2012), https://lb.boell.org/en/node/1355. 
856 Divorce was constitutionally prohibited until 1995. It is now permitted, subject to strict requirements. See 
Family Law Act 1995 (Act No. 26/1995), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1995/en/act/pub/0026/. 
857 See McGee, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
858 Women in state employment were required to quit their positions upon marriage, and the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce had the power to limit the number of women employed in any industry. Conditions of 
Employment Act 1935, § 16, (Act No. 2/1936), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1936/act/2/enacted/en/html. See also, Caitriona Beaumont, Women, 
Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948, 6 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 563 (1997) [hereinafter, 
Caitriona Beaumont, Women, Citizenship, and Catholicism] (describing how girls attending convent schools were 
taught the importance of obedience, modesty, and chastity). 
859 Article 41.2.1° states that: In particular, the State recognizes that by her life within the home, woman gives to 
the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 
Article 41.2.2° sets out that: The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by 
economic necessity to engage in labor to the neglect of their duties in the home. 
860 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in Ireland, supra note 67. 
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couples861 and from subsequent legislative reform that enabled married 
couples to request contraceptives on prescription.862 It was a modest 
increment in facilitating access to contraception that was nevertheless met 
with significant concern amongst conservative factions of Irish society.  
As the Government legislated to implement McGee and legalize 
contraception for married couples in 1979, politicians suggested this move 
would force a deluge of social reforms on the country, including on abortion. 
"As soon as we have contraception, there will be abortion, divorce, 
euthanasia, and all the evils of venereal disease," argued Fianna Fáil's Michael 
F. Kitt.863 Another deputy, Oliver J. Flanagan, alleged that some 
contraceptives were actually abortifacients in their method of operation and, 
in the same breath, suggested that Irish society now suffered from a lack of 
respect for authority for the State, parents, and church.864 Outside the Dáil, 
conservative Catholic groups echoed Kitt and Flanagan's concern about the 
loosening grips on Irish traditional society. Catholic Family Life attested that 
"abortion cannot be divorced from contraception," while members of Parent 
Concern a later picketed the Well Woman Centre on Dublin's Lower Leeson 
Street with posters that read "Parents! Contraception means promiscuity and 
abortion!"865 In a sign of things to come, the Irish Family League later 
distributed a leaflet advocating an amendment that would enshrine a ban on 
abortion in the Constitution.866  
The following year, the PLAC formed and argued that the existing 
legislative criminalization of abortion was not enough of a guarantee against 
legal abortion in Ireland. The only way to Ireland against abortion, they 
claimed, was via a “pro-life” constitutional amendment that would require 
the State to protect the unborn.867 It also provided an opportunity to strike 
back against and quash the burgeoning advocacy and action on women's 
liberation. Using an anti-abortion amendment to the Constitution as their 
vehicle, the PLAC succeeded in reasserting women’s role as mothers in the 
State’s basic law for a second time.868 Indeed, those who were involved in 
moving the referendum forward were so successful in strengthening the 
notion of women as mothers that the word “mother” is used in place of 
“woman” in the language of the amendment: 
 
 
861 See McGee, supra note 27. 
862 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, (Act No. 20/1979). 
863 274 Dáil Deb. (July 11, 1974), Control of Importation, Sale, and Manufacture of Contraceptives Bill, 1974: Second Stage  
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1974-07-11/3/. 
864 Id. 
865 See, e.g., EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT.  
866 Id. 
867 See, e.g., Siobhán Mulally, The abortion debate: re-partitioning the State in GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM, at 142. 
868 See, e.g., Paula Hanafin, Defying the Female: The Irish Constitutional Text as Phallocentric Manifesto 11 TEXTUAL 
PRACTICE 249 (1997).  
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The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right. 
 
Additionally, evidence from the referendum debates suggest the desire to 
protect “the unborn” was inconsistent. During the campaign in 1983, anti-
amendment activists contested the purported interest of anti-abortion activists 
in protecting unborn life.869 To be consistently "pro-life," they argued, the 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign would also campaign to end legal 
discrimination against children born outside of marriage, who at the time 
were considered 'illegitimate' under Irish law and had no legal status.870 In 
stark contrast, John O'Reilly, the man who first conceived of PLAC's "pro-
life" amendment, argued that the amendment was necessary to tackle what 
he deemed to be "anti-life practices," including contraception and, notably, 
the rising number of children conceived out of marriage.871 The birth of 
children to unmarried women could undoubtedly be considered as 
contravening for the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, the desire to protect 
unborn life extended only to unborn life that would within exist within the 
patriarchal family; the beacon of Ireland's identity upon which women's 
conformity depended. 
Analysis of abortion law and politics after 1983 illustrates that the State’s 
approach to abortion remained animated by gender stereotypes. The X-case 
and the subsequent 1992 referendum established two abortion-related rights 
for Irish women: the right to obtain an abortion where there was real and 
substantial risk to a woman’s life and the travel for an abortion. Some 
commentators considered such legal developments to be significant progress 
for Irish women because the State was acknowledging the potential need for 
 
869 Women’s Right to Choose Campaign (WRCC), 1982 as quoted in Sandra McEvoy, supra note xx. 
870See, e.g., Illegitimate Children (Affiliation Orders) Act, 1930 (Pub. Stat. No. 17/1930), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1930/en/act/pub/0017/index.html; Additionally, historical research and human 
rights reports establish that the State’s policy on “illegitimacy” involved the incarceration of thousands of infants 
and children in Mother and Baby Homes and other institutions; illegal adoption, including the ‘sale’ of children, 
and high infant mortality rates; See also, UN DOC A/HRC/40/51(2018) Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Sale and Sexual Exploitation of Children on her Country Visit to Ireland, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Children/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx. 
871 See, e.g., Fintan O’ Toole, Why Ireland Became the Only Country in the World to Have a Constitutional Ban on Abortion, IR. 
TIMES (August 26, 2014) http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/why-ireland-became-the-only-country-in-the-
democratic-world-to-have-a-constitutional-ban-on-abortion-1.1907610 (“For O’Reilly “pro-life” was the opposite 
of “anti-life”, a term which incorporated the availability of contraception and (weirdly) the rising number of babies 
born out of wedlock”). Recently released evidence also points to extremely high mortality rates among 'illegitimate 
children who were raised in so-called 'Mother and Baby Homes.' A Commission of Investigation of Mother and 
Baby' homes was established in 2015 following allegations about the deaths of 800 babies and the manner in 
which they were buried in one of the homes. See S.I. No. 57/2015—Commission of investigation (mother and baby homes 
and certain related matters) Order 2015. 
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abortion872 In reality, however, the State was acting in accordance with the 
same gendered ideology that had dominated in 1983. The right generated by 
X allowed women to end their pregnancies if they could prove that there was 
a substantial risk to their lives. But the dying woman did not challenge the 
norm of motherhood; her abortion was "life-saving treatment."873 and she 
would not want a “termination” if it were not for her tragic circumstances. 
The travel amendment provided an option for women to end their 
pregnancies but required women to leave the jurisdiction to do so. Thus, 
women who resisted their prescribed role as mothers were sent away, leaving 
the nation’s patriarchal gender order intact. 
Similarly, analysis of anti-abortion discourse surrounding the passage of 
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA) reveals the 
harmful gender stereotypes driving anti-abortion advocates. As described in 
Chapter 1, the PLDPA 2013 was the first piece of legislation to give effect to 
a woman’s right to therapeutic abortion. The Act provided a statutory 
framework based on the 8th amendment and the X-case (legality of abortion 
if the woman’s life was at risk) as required by the European Court of Human 
Right’s judgment in A, B & C,874 and was spurred into urgency following the 
death of Savita Halapanavar. Notwithstanding that the Act did not liberalize 
Irish abortion law in any way, an intense and highly polarized debate 
accompanied the parliamentary process. Taking issue with the proposed 
decriminalization of abortion in circumstances where a woman's life was at 
risk owing to suicide, anti-abortion advocates mobilized around two claims. 
Firstly, as in recent decades in the U.S., Irish anti-abortion campaigners 
characterized their attempts to restrict abortion as a way of 'protecting 
women from abortion.875 Expressing alleged concern for women, they argued 
that abortion fuels depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts among women 
because women regret their decisions to end their pregnancy. Asserting that 
"there is nothing so devastating as guilt to the depressed mind," Lucinda 
Creighton, then a Government minister, claimed that abortion "may push[es] 
someone to contemplate suicide."876 Deputy Billy Timmons echoed 
Creighton’s claim, arguing that rather than protecting the right to life of the 
woman, by enabling abortion access, the bill would “potentially put women's 
 
872 See, e.g., Laury Oaks, Abortion is Part of the Irish Experience, It Is Part of What We Are, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 
315 (2002). 
873 Catholic teaching differentiates between abortion and medical treatments, which do not directly and 
intentionally seek to end the life of the "unborn baby." See Statement by the Four Archbishops of Ireland in Response to the 
Decision Today by the Government to Legislate for Abortion http://www.catholicbishops.ie/2012/12/18/statement-
archbishopsireland-response-decision-today-government-legislate-abortion. 
874 Id. 
875 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion 
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008). 





lives at risk.”877 Invoking Norma McCorvey, the applicant in Roe v. Wade who 
went on to join anti-abortion campaigns many years afterwards, other TDs 
alleged that it was axiomatic that a woman would regret ending their 
pregnancy. 
Outside the Dáil Chambers, anti-abortion activists embraced the 
argument that abortion, rather than the coercive continuation of an 
unwanted pregnancy, posed a risk to women’s lives. The Pro-Life Campaign 
parked a van less than 10 minutes away from the Dáil (and directly outside 
the doors of the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre) with a sign reading “[t]he 
abortion bill won’t make women safer.” Women Hurt – an anti-abortion 
group modelled upon U.S. based Catholic group ‘Rachel's Vineyard’ for 
women who believe they had been harmed by abortion — lobbied politicians 
and held vigils. Spreading the message that their members had experienced 
deep guilt and regret after terminating their pregnancies in England, they too 
took advantage of the space, albeit narrow, that had opened for women’s 
voices in the abortion debate.878  
The narrative that women who terminate pregnancies experience regret 
from which they must be protected was likely an import from across the 
Atlantic; in the U.S., the notion that women suffer "post-abortion syndrome" 
akin to depression and PTSD has been in play since the mid-1990s. And 
though there is no evidence that abortion leads to mental illness.879, the idea 
that abortion hurts women has gained significant legal salience. In 2007, 
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing the majority opinion 
Gonzales v. Carhart , upheld a federal ban on physicians from performing intact 
dilation and extraction of fetuses - an abortion procedure performed later in 
pregnancy - on the grounds that if a women was enabled to choose this 
procedure, it was likely that her mental health would later suffer owing to the 
guilt she would feel at having had such an abortion.880 Agreeing with a friend 
of the court brief that relied on statements from women who claimed to regret 
their abortions rather than any medical evidence of mental harm associated 
with having an abortion,881 the Justice concluded that “it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to 
 
877See, e.g., 808 No. 3, Dáil Deb., Deputy Billy Timmons (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/ga/debates/debate/dail/2013-06-27/7/. 
878 Stand For Life Vigil - Dungarvan - Bernadette Goulding (March 5, 2013)   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2AxQsJK-Gw&ab_channel=JasonBrower. 
879 A review of global scientific evidence by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges in the UK found that “the 
rates of mental health problems for women with an unwanted pregnancy were the same whether they had an 
abortion or gave birth.” Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Induced Abortion Mental Health (2012) 
https://www.aomrc.org.uk/reports-guidance/induced-abortion-mental-health-1211/. 
880 Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007). 
881 Brief of Sandra Cano at 22-24, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. 
Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner.). 
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abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and 
loss of esteem can follow.”882 
In addition to imposing a ban on dilation and extraction, the narrative 
that women considering abortion need protection from their own decisions 
underpins a number of legislative restrictions in the U.S. and beyond; 
compulsory waiting periods, third-party authorization, and compulsory 
ultrasounds all curtail women's autonomy under the guise of protecting 
women. As Reva Siegel and other feminist legal scholars have explained, such 
contentions about women's health and women's choices rely upon claims 
about women's nature — women are destined to be mothers and will be 
harmed if they don't fulfill their natural role.883 The reasoning holds that law 
must restrict abortion because if a woman decides to terminate a pregnancy, 
she will suffer at having rejected her natural duty to care for her offspring. 
Pathologizing women's decisions to get abortions as "misled, coerced or 
abnormal"884 anti-abortion campaigners contend that it is in a woman’s own 
interest that the law reject her decision.  
For the anti-abortion legislators who argued against the Protection of Life 
During Pregnancy Bill in Ireland, rather than resounding the Irish 
legislature’s legacy of misogyny on issues affecting women, the woman-
protective arguments enabled politicians to justify their anti-choice positions 
as born from legitimate concern for women, vulnerable women in particular. 
Deputy Michael Healy Rae proclaimed that many of the women who came 
to him to discuss their isolation, low self-esteem, and nightmares post-
abortion had "not been warned about the mental effect of an abortion."885 In 
the main national broadsheet, a high-profile psychiatrist queried how law 
could recognize the capacity of a "mother" to consent to an abortion given 
that such a woman would be "emotionally overwhelmed to the extent that 
her judgment is impaired."886  
 
882  Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
883 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 
1694, 1696 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective 
Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) [hereinafter, Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons]; Chris Guthrie, 
Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 CAL. L. REV. 877, 882 (2008). Historian Karissa 
Haugeberg has shown how the argument that abortion hurts women date to the 1960s and the early years of the 
abortion reform movement. This line of advocacy, however, existed primarily amongst workers in crisis pregnancy 
centers set up by Catholic women to persuade women in their communities not to end their pregnancies. The 
argument gained prominence following the supreme court decision to uphold the right to abortion in Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The wider anti-abortion movement adjusted their advocacy 
accordingly to argue that what women really needed was to be protected from abortion, KARISSA HAUGEBERG, 
WOMEN AGAINST ABORTION: INSIDE THE LARGEST MORAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (WOMEN, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY) (2017). 
884 Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, id., at 1687. 
885 See, e.g., 808 No. 2 Dáil Deb., Deputy Michael Healy Rae, Parliamentary Debates, (June 26, 2013) 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013062600009?op
endocument#G01900. 




The second argument against the PLDPA warned that the legislation 
would “open the floodgates” to “abortion on demand.”887 In contrast to the 
depiction of the vulnerable woman needed to be rescued, the abortion-
seeking woman was now perceived as deviant and deceitful. The Act's 
opponents claimed that having a suicidality exception to the abortion ban was 
a slippery slope because abortion-seeking women could lie about being 
suicidal and manipulate health practitioners into approving their abortion. In 
the Dáil, Deputy Denis Naughton asserted that “if a woman states that she is 
suicidal, a doctor has no option but to believe her. There is no way to disprove 
the claim.”888 In other words, if abortion was legalized in cases of risk to life 
owing to suicide, the law would leave doctors in a situation where they would 
have to trust women, and even worse, abortion-seeking women. To avoid this 
scenario, anti-abortion advocates argued, the law must exclude suicidality 
from the legitimate grounds for abortion in the first place.  
Though the anti-abortion campaigners failed in their efforts to prevent 
the PLDPA from passing, the narratives about the dishonesty and 
irrationality of abortion-seeking women pervaded the legislation, particularly 
the procedural process to access abortion in situations of suicidality. In such 
cases, the law created an obstacle course whereby a woman was required to 
demonstrate to three medical practitioners that there was a 'real and 
substantial risk' to her life.889 If she failed to obtain a joint certification from 
all three medical practitioners, the decision had to be reviewed by a further 
three practitioners.890 Suggesting that without being certified by at least three 
medical practitioners, a woman would lie about having suicidal thoughts, the 
law depicted and treated abortion-seeking women as unworthy of trust. 
 
3. Effects-based equality arguments for abortion rights  
In addition to the feminist technique of examining whether abortion 
restrictions are grounded in stereotypical notions of women, to support the 
theory that abortion restrictions amount to gender-based discrimination, 
 
887 808 No. 2 Dáil Deb.,Joe McHugh TD, (June 26, 2013), 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013062600046#T
T00200 (“the precedent in California, in France and in the United Kingdom is alarming. The figures are 
alarming. People are genuinely concerned that if this legislation is introduced, the floodgates will open."); See also, 
Fiona de Londras & Laura Graham, Impossible Floodgates and Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate, 3 IRISH J. 
LEGAL STUD. 54, 61-62 (2013); Clare Murray, The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Suicide, Dignity and the 
Irish Discourse on Abortion, 25(6) SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 677 (2016). 
888 See, e.g., 808 No. 3 Dáil Deb., Deputy Denis Naughten, (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/ga/debates/debate/dail/2013-06-27/7/. 
889 PLDPA, (Act No. 35/2013) at § 9 (1)(a)(ii). See also Veronica O' Keane, Ireland’s Abortion Law Turns Healthcare into 
Obstacle Course, AMNESTY IRELAND https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/irelands-abortion-
lawturns- healthcare-into-obstacle-course/. 
890 PLDPA, (Act No. 35/2013) § 10. Notably, in the first year of the act, medical teams sanctioned just three 





feminists scrutinize the effects of abortion restrictions on women. Asserting 
that no aspect of male-only healthcare is restricted by law is one basis on 
which feminist scholars, particularly those writing from an international law 
perspective, impugn abortion restrictions as discriminatory.891 Another 
iteration of this differential treatment argument is that law does not require 
men to sacrifice their bodily autonomy for "the use and control by others," 
whereas abortion bans can compel women to continue unwanted pregnancies 
and give birth.892  
Other argues that denying a woman's right to choose is an equality issue 
because laws that reject women's autonomy impair women as a class. Though 
advocating for autonomy presupposes the protection of individual decisions, 
893  the social consequences of invalidating women’s reproductive decision-
making are significant.894 Communicating that women are not valued as 
moral agents in the State, anti-abortion laws devalue women, as a group, in 
society. 
Often, this latter critique of the limits anti-abortion laws place on women's 
autonomy is translated as an issue of privacy rather than equality. This is due, 
in large part, to the fact that in Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
constitutional right of privacy was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”895 However, Roe also 
prompted a greater understanding of abortion as an equality issue – albeit 
outside the Court. Because the Court in Roe essentially shared a woman’s 
abortion decision with the abortion provider,896 feminists rallied to retake the 
 
891 Rebecca Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences, supra note x at 1039. This was one of the principal equality 
arguments used by the Irish abortion rights movement; access to sexual and reproductive healthcare for men 
incurred no criminal punishment as compared to abortion access for women; See, FIONA DE LONDRAS & 
MAIREAD ENRIGHT, REPEALING THE 8th (2018); Trade Union Campaign to Repeal the 8th Amendment, Model 
Trade Union Motion, https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/tu4repeal-leaflet.pdf; 784 No. 2, 
Dáil Deb., Alan Shatter (November 27, 2012), 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/WebAttachments.nsf/($vLookupByConstructedK
ey)/dail~20121127/$File/Daily%20Book%20Unrevised.pdfopenelement (arguing that there is no impediment to 
men seeking and obtaining any required medical intervention to protect not only their lives but also their health 
and quality of life). 
892 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, supra note 19; EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE 
ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996); Arunima Sarkar, Articulating Various Facets of Female 
Reproductive Laws: Issues and Challenges, 2 INDIAN J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 168, 174 (2014) (describing abortion rights as 
freedom from the “servitude” of bearing an unwanted child). 
893  Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (explaining how liberal legal theory's focus 
on individualism and autonomy reflects a male perspective); See also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016-28 (1984); See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
15-10, at 1353 (1988). 
894 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT'L J. L. POLY & FAM. 
305, 313 (2004); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 409, 417–18 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger, Decisional Dignity] Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work 
and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L. REV. 567, 613-14 (2010).  
895 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 125, 153 (1973). 
896 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1020 (1984) (arguing that Roe 
gives doctors undue power over abortion decisions); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1185, 1199-200 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society was less 
prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her 
physician’s medical judgment). 
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“right to choose” for women.897 Recognizing that decisions about abortion 
can implicate a broad range of decisions that are critical to a woman's 
freedom—decisions about education, career, family, relationships, and health 
— feminists, scholars, and judges asserted that respecting a woman's decision 
about whether to bear a child is fundamental to women's socio-political 
equality.898 Now embedded within larger feminist campaigns, protection for 
women’s decisional autonomy in the abortion context was championed as a 
matter of gender equality.899   
Articulating the toll that motherhood takes on women’s right to 
participate and flourish in the marketplace and public sphere is another way 
that feminists have uncovered the subordinating harms of abortion denial.900 
Though women's participation in the workplace has risen dramatically in the 
past 50 years, long-standing gender stereotypes related to family and work 
result in women assuming the bulk of child-care and domestic responsibilities. 
Such responsibilities create time deficits for women that can inhibit their 
participation and progress in the paid labor force, education, and politics. In 
the U.S., for example, more than half of women who are prime age for work 
(25- to 54-year-olds) who are outside the labor force list caregiving as their 
reason for nonparticipation.901 And the trend extends worldwide; women and 
girls commit substantially more time than men to unpaid care work, which 
undermines the possibility of economic, political, and social equality between 
the genders and entrenches women's disproportionate vulnerability to 
poverty across their lifetime.902 Diana Foster Green's landmark 'Turnaway 
 
897 For an analysis of the “right to choose” slogan in the American women’s movement, see ROSALIND POLLACK 
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 
(1990) [hereinafter, Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice]; For early scholarship that articulated decision making 
autonomy as an aspect of equality, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
1281, 1308 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20. 
898 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (legal challenges to undue 
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center 
on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."). Feminist 
scholars may also have been motivated to counter the narrative that the 'right to choose' was a right for selfish 
mothers to pursue their own self-interest as contended by some, including anti-abortion activities. For example, 
prominent feminist scholars Joan Williams, Ruth Colker, and Majorie Schultz critiqued the right to autonomy as a 
basis for women's abortion rights for being excessively individualistic and engendering rhetoric about selfish 
mothers and unnurtured children. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1559, 1584 (1991); Joan Williams, Mothers’ Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of Motherhood, U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 818 (2004); Robin West, Forward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79 - 85 (1990); Ruth Colker, 
Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Majorie Schultz 
(arguing that autonomy rhetoric and exclusively “women-regarding positions” undermine pro-choice arguments 
because it presents abortion decisions as about a woman’s self-interest alone). 
899 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (legal challenges to undue 
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center 
on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."). 
900 Id. 
901 See, e.g., Audrey Breitwieser, et al, The recent rebound in prime-age labor force participation, BROOKINGS (August 2, 
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/08/02/the-recent-rebound-in-prime-age-labor-force-
participation/. 
902 See, e.g., DEBBIE BUDLENDER, TIME USE STUDIES AND UNPAID CARE WORK ( 2010 ); Claire C. Miller, Children 




study' on the outcomes of women who received the abortions they sought and 
those who were compelled to carry their unwanted pregnancy to term, 
provides recent empirical evidence of the economic costs incurred by women 
when their reproductive autonomy is rejected; Foster Green's study finds that 
women who were 'turned away' and denied abortion have higher odds of 
poverty six months after denial than women who received abortions. 
Additionally, women who are denied abortions are more likely to be in 
poverty for four years subsequent to being denied an abortion.903  
Escalating this critique, feminists demonstrate how such harms 
disempower women as a class: by foreclosing opportunities for women to gain 
power in social, political, and economic life, abortion restrictions limit the 
ability of women, in the aggregate, to compete with men for power.904 In turn, 
the practice of gender — the construction of social differences, namely power 
inequalities, between men and women—is reproduced.905 Moreover, as 
intersectionality theory recognizes that gender is only one potential axis of 
discrimination and that discrimination against women is often combined with 
and compounded by oppression based on race, class, sexuality, and 
ethnicity.906 For women who are marginalized in society— women with 
minority racial, ethnic, or religious identities, women with low incomes, 
migrant women—the gendered impacts of abortion denial are compounded 
by economic, racial, religious, caste, citizenship status, and other social 
inequities.907 As the founders of the reproductive justice movement have laid 
bare, for women of color, control over their lives and bodies is challenged not 
only by gender but by systemic poverty and racism.908 Human rights 
advocates document the racial and socioeconomic disparities that plague 
access to reproductive rights, even where abortion and other reproductive 
health services are legal.909 As such, the denial of abortion rights can entrench 
 
See also, Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and Practice, 
HRC/A/68/293, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/422/71/PDF/N1342271.pdf?OpenElement. 
903 DIANA FOSTER GREEN, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A THOUSAND WOMEN, AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING—OR BEING DENIED—AN ABORTION (2019). 
904 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63 (2013); Reva Siegel, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE 
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 103 (Jack. M. Balkin 
ed., 2005). 
905See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184 (1989) (“In women’s 
experience, sexuality and reproduction are inseparable from each other and from gender.”). 
906 See generally, Kimberly Crenshaw et al, Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis (2013) 
38 SIGNS 785. 
907 For the compounded harms on native women in the USA, see Alan J. Shelfer, Indigent Women and Abortion: 
Limitation of the Right of Privacy in Maher v. Roe 13 (2) TULSA L. J. 287 (1977). A discussion of the heightened barriers 
that women endure in accessing reproductive freedom can be found in DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE 
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). 
908 Loretta J. Ross et al., Just Choices: Women of Color, Reproductive Health, and Human Rights, in POLICING THE 
NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION 147 (Jael Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 2002); 
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1411 (2009). 
909 See, e.g., Centre for Reproductive Rights & National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, Nuestra Voz, 
Nuestra Salud, Nuestro Texas: The Fight for Women’s Reproductive Health in the Rio Grande Valley (2013) 
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social and economic inequalities for marginalized women in addition to 
inscribing power inequalities based on gender.   
 
4. The gendered harms of Ireland’s abortion law 
The impacts of Ireland’s legal abortion ban fueled gender subordination, 
albeit through different means than those just described. The majority of Irish 
abortion-seeking women went to the United Kingdom and other European 
countries to end unwanted pregnancies, and in the decade before the ban was 
overturned, a substantial number of women ended pregnancies with abortion 
medications at home.910 These women did not suffer the inequalities of forced 
motherhood censured by feminist legal scholars and pro-choice advocates. 
The law had a different vice: when women asserted moral authority over their 
lives and choose abortion, they were either exiled from the State or 
criminalized.  For rejecting the State's normative ideas about gender, women 
were punished through expulsion, rejection, and significant burdens of 
stigma. 
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that a significant number of Irish 
women were, in fact, subjected to harms of forced pregnancy and childrearing 
by the 8th amendment; abortion travel is beset by social inequality. For 
unemployed women or women earning low wages, the freedom to travel was 
often illusory. Traveling to England for an abortion cost between €2,000 and 
€3,500 on average.911 Some women were forced to obtain loans from illegal 
money lenders to fund their abortions; others reported temporarily entering 
prostitution to raise the necessary finances.912 Additionally, for asylum-
seeking women, the constitutional freedom to travel did not apply. To leave 
the country, asylum seekers must apply to the Irish Department of Justice for 
a temporary travel document and a re-entry visa to return to Ireland, a 
process that is complicated, costly, and sometimes arbitrary. And as in all 
jurisdictions that restrict abortion, the subordinating harms of forced 
pregnancy and motherhood in Ireland were compounded by discrimination 
based on class and ethnicity.913  
Nonetheless, every year, at least 4,000 Irish women crossed borders to 
exercise their right to choose, and another approx.1,000 women ordered 
 
http://nuestrotexas.org/pdf/NT-spread.pdf. (campaign to highlight the discriminatory policies that impede 
immigrant women’s access to reproductive health care); Brief for National Latina Institute for Reproductive 
Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-
274.) 
910 See, e.g., Chapter 1. 
911 Christine Zampas, She is Not a Criminal, supra note 11. 
912 As reported in Citizens’ Assembly, First report and recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution https://ptfs-
oireachtas.s3.amazonaws.com/DriveH/AWData/Library3/CAdoclaid290617A_110031.pdf . 
913 See, e.g., Abortion Rights Campaign, Submission to the Citizens Assembly (2017) www.abortionrightscampaign.ie. 
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abortion pills to take illegally at home.914 These women escaped coerced birth 
and parenting. But as subjects who challenged the dominant gender order, 
they were punished.  
Feminist human rights law scholars and practitioners have explored how 
the criminalization of abortion.915 and other restrictions on access916  generate 
intense stigma about abortion-seeking women and abortion itself. By 
presenting abortion as wrong and deserving of severe punishment, abortion 
and abortion-seeking women are stigmatized as immoral and deviant by anti-
abortion laws. The impacts include imposing burdens of shame, secrecy, and 
exclusion.917  As an “attribute that is deeply discrediting,” stigma is capable of 
spoiling or tainting one’s identity and discounting them in society.918 Marked 
as “others,” those who are stigmatized may become subject to boundaries or 
barriers to the communities to which they would otherwise belong.919 
Moreover, from a policy perspective, the stigmatization cycle is reinforcing; 
when stigma perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral practice, this 
can reinforce the continued criminalization or restriction of the practice.920 
In the Irish context, the burdens of abortion stigma on abortion seeking-
women manifested in two main ways. Firstly, many women felt compelled to 
conceal their abortions.921 Even though women who traveled had done 
nothing illegal, women reported feeling "like criminals" over the course of 
their journey and upon return, such that they hid their experiences.922 Not 
only did very few women publicly discuss their abortion journeys—few 
disclosed their abortion histories to anyone beyond a select band of 
confidantes; in 2012, Ireland’s Crisis Pregnancy Program reported that 
“approximately 1 in 4 women experiencing a crisis pregnancy that ended in 
 
914 Evidence indicates that a significant number of women and girls, who may not have been able to travel, 
illegally took the abortion pill in Ireland in a clandestine manner in Ireland. See Aiken, Online Telemedicine, supra 
note 6. 
915 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 346 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, & Bernard M. Dickens 
eds., 2014). 
916 Anu Kumar & Leila Hessini, Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma 11(6) CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625 (2009); 
Anne Norris, et al. Abortion stigma: a reconceptualization of constituents, causes, and consequences 21(3) WOMEN’S HEALTH 
ISSUES 49, 54 (2011). 
917 Id. 
918 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (1963). 
919 Brian Link et al. Conceptualizing Stigma 27 ANNU REV SOCIAL. 63, 65 (2001). 
920 See, e.g., Anand Grover (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Interim Rep. 11 ¶ 35 (2011), 
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/66/254 (August 3, 2011) (http://www.acpd.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/SR-Right-to-Health-Criminalization-of-SRHR-2011.pdf. (The stigma caused by 
restrictive abortion laws induces a ‘chilling’ climate of fear and shame that impacts on both those who seek 
abortions services and those who carry out the procedure.); Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 410 (2013) (commenting on the role of abortion disgust in lawmaking on abortion in 
the USA). 
921See, e.g., Zampus, She is Not a Criminal, supra note 11 at 86; Irish Family Planning Association, Briefing on Abortion 
Stigma 2014, https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/abortion_stigma_pack_jan_2014_final.pdf. 
922 Id.  
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abortion did not tell their sexual partner.”923 For those who traveled, upon 
return to Ireland, many women lied to medical practitioners back in Ireland 
about their abortion histories for fear of the censure such a revelation might 
provoke. Women reported feeling isolated from their usual communities of 
support: 
 
You don't talk about it. You can't even tell your amazing 
mother or your amazing family. This landscape of silence and 
stigma has distanced me from my family, and I am not ok with 
that.924 
 
[I]t's an awful feeling, knowing that the only help you can 
receive is across an ocean. How alone do you think I felt? The 
pain and humiliation is something I still carry with me.925 
 
In the second instance, it is submitted that the law operated to produce a class 
of devalued persons. By being forced to travel for abortions or have an 
abortion at home in fear of criminalization, the State rejected women for 
acting as moral agents. In addition to the acute burdens of indignity and 
stigma experienced by individual women, such devaluation of women’s 
autonomy impaired the status of women in the country.926 Socially, abortion-
seeking women were branded as outsiders. Though different in many 
important ways, parallels can also be drawn between the law’s banishing of 
abortion-seeking women and the State’s treatment of unmarried mothers in 
the 20th century. From 1922 to 1996, over 10,000 women and girls—
predominantly unmarried mothers, the daughters of unmarried mothers, and 
pregnant, unmarried women—were sent by their families, the Church, and 
the State to institutions known as Magdalene Laundries or Mother and Baby 
Homes.927 In Magdalene Laundries, women were segregated from society, 
 
923 Crisis Pregnancy Programme, Report No. 24, Irish Contraception and Crisis Pregnancy Study (2012) 105. For more on 
the stigmatizing impact of criminal abortion laws, see Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 299, 319 (2014); A Hessani Kumar, Conceptualising Abortion Stigma Culture, 11 (6) HEALTH & 
SEXUALITY 625 (2009); Maeve Taylor, Abortion Stigma: a health service provider’s perspective, in THE ABORTION PAPERS 
IRELAND 217, (Aideen Quility ed., 2016); Kristen M. Shellenberg, Social Stigma and Disclosure about Induced Abortion: 
Results from an Exploratory Study, 6 (1) GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2011); Eileen V. Fegan. 'Subjects ' of 
Regulation/Resistance? Postmodern Feminism and Agency in Abortion- Decision-Making, 7 FEM. L. STUD. 241; Joanna 
Erdman, The law of stigma, travel, and the abortion-free island 33 (1) COL. J. GENDER & L. 29 (2016). 
924 Susan Cahill, My abortion was not remotely traumatic ... I have no regrets, IRISH TIMES (February 21, 2016) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/susan-cahill-my-abortion-was-not-remotely-traumatic-i-have-
no-regrets-1.2542740. 
925 Submissions to the Citizen’s assembly, https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Submissions/Eighth-Amendment-
of-the-Constitution/. 
926See, e.g., Eithne Luibhéid, Sexual Regimes, and Migration Controls: Reproducing the Irish Nation-State in Transnational 
Contexts, 83 FEMINIST REV. 60 (2006). 
927See, e.g., GOV’T OF IR., INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS OF STATE 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MAGDALENE LAUNDRIES (2013), 
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deprived of their liberty, and forced to work without pay.928 In Mother-and-
Baby Homes, women who had become pregnant out of wedlock were hidden 
from the public before they gave birth, after which their babies were adopted 
- often illegally.929 Though run by religious orders, these institutions were 
supported financially by the State.930 The State had an interest in hiding the 
women whose alleged sexual immorality transgressed the country’s 
patriarchal order; sexual activity out of wedlock—and the illegitimate child 
as evidence of such—contravened the primary role of women of marriage 
and motherhood.931 And while being forced to travel for an abortion is very 
different to incarceration in state institutions, in both cases, women who 
deviated from gendered expectations were forced out of sight. 
On the other hand, what is often overlooked in accounts of women’s 
experiences of inequality, including in the abortion context, is that women 
exercise resistance in significant ways. As well as being victimized, women 
actively dissent. Women who were denied abortions by Ireland’s laws were 
injured, but many took action to determine their own lives. Under the weight 
of a legal regime that sought to control them, and in the face of significant 
burdens of stigma, Irish women developed radical practices of resistance. 
Secretly and subversively, Irish women overcame the burdens of travel and 
criminalization in their thousands every single year. Or they self-sourced and 
self-administered their own abortions at home and helped other women to do 
the same.932 Women shared information and resources, used networks of 
friends, diaspora, and strangers,933 to both travel abroad and to obtain 
medication abortion at home.934 And even before travel and telemedicine 
were the dominant means for Irish women to have abortions, evidence 
suggests that significant numbers of Irish women took pills, potions, or 
purgatives to induce miscarriage and control their fertility.935 Women took 
risks to fulfill their reproductive decisions, and most women felt high levels of 
conviction in the choice they made and the action they took.  
 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/MagdalenRpt2013 [hereinafter Magdalenes Report] (confirming that 
more than a quarter of the women held in the laundries were sent directly by the State). 
928 Id. 
929 See, e.g., Maeve O’Rourke, et al., CLANN: Ireland’s Unmarried Mothers and their Children: Gathering the Data: Principal 
Submission to the Commission of Investigation into Mother and Baby Homes (October 15, 2018) http://clannproject.org/; see 
also, Padraic Halpin, UN rights body criticizes Ireland on abortion, church homes, REUTERS, (July 24, 2014), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-ireland/u-n-rights-body-criticizes-ireland-on-abortion-church-homes-
idUSKBN0FT1EX20140724. 
930 See, e.g., Magdalenes Report, supra, note 952 (confirming that more than a quarter of the women held in the 
laundries were sent directly by the State). 
931 See, e.g., Caroline Fischer, Gender, nation, and the politics of shame: Magdalen laundries and the institutionalization of feminine 
transgression in modern Ireland 41(4), SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 821, 843 (2009). 
932 See also, Cara Delay, Pills, Potions, and Purgatives: Women and Illegal Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 (draft on 
file with author). 
933 Interview with Mara Clarke, Abortion Support Network, Irish Times Women’s Podcast. 
934 LORETTA ROSS, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION (2017), 11; See also, Cara Delay, Pills, Potions, 
and Purgatives: Women and Illegal Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 (draft on file with author). 
935 Cara Delay, From the Backstreet to Britain: Women and Abortion Travel in Modern Ireland, Forthcoming in TRAVELLIN’ 
MAMA: MOTHERS, MOTHERING, AND TRAVEL, (Charlotte Beyer et al eds., 2018). 
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Through a practice of both self-direction936 and solidarity with other Irish 
women asserted their agency, even though the Irish State denied this 
autonomy by attempting to make it invisible.  Abortion exile, illegality, and 
the climate of fear and stigma they engendered drove women to conceal the 
actions they took to in resistance to the State. Women were required to 
"cover"937 their defiance of the State’s gendered ideology and their active 
resistance of gender dictates was forced underground.  
In revisiting the Irish abortion story from a feminist perspective, this 
section has uncovered the gendered nature of the laws that denied women’s 
abortion rights in Ireland. The 8th amendment systematically rejected 
women’s agency and attempted to institutionalize gender roles that 
subordinate women to men. The movement for abortion rights in Ireland 
(documented in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation) struggled in order to 
upend this system of gender inequality. In seeking abortion rights in Ireland, 
women demanded that their State affirm their life choices and divest itself of 
laws that claimed authority over women’s decisions.  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, embracing human rights law as a strategy 
offered vital resources to advance the abortion rights’ movement at different 
junctures in the road to repeal. But when it came to undoing the legacy of the 
8th amendment and legislating for reform, international legal standards on 
abortion could not accommodate the affirmative recognition of women’s 
moral autonomy that the movement sought. As currently applied, 
international human rights law recognizes as rights-holders only the subset of 
women who seek abortions because their life and health is at risk; or because 
they have been raped, or because their pregnancies have a fatal fetal 
abnormality. Women who seek abortion rights on the basis of their choices 
rather than on the grounds of tragedy are excluded from the law’s protection. 
The next section investigates this shortcoming in human rights protection 
and identifies a deeper problem with the law’s jurisprudence. Drawing on 
feminist international law critiques of human rights law and the feminist 
analysis of abortion in Ireland just outlined, the second half of this chapter 
examines how the relative invisibility of gender analysis limits recognition of 
abortion rights and obscures the root cause of abortion rights violations.  
 
 
936 The term ‘self-direction’ is borrowed from Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-
Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 829 (1998) (describing self-direction as the direction of one's own course, 
including the identification of particular goals and the implementation of particular projects and life plans). 
937 See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (describing 




B. International law on abortion from a feminist perspective 
1. International law’s public/private divide  
The international legal system for the protection of human rights emerged 
at a particular historical moment, namely, the aftermath of the atrocities of 
the Second World War.938 Over the course of almost two decades in the 
middle of the last century, States debated and eventually adopted the two 
seminal UN Human Rights Covenants: the United Nations Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR). Though these two Covenants both expressly recognize "equal 
rights of men and women,"939, from a women's rights perspective, the texts 
are almost more remarkable for what they do not say about women. Absent 
from the Covenants, for example, are protections from myriad harms that 
markedly impact and often determine women's lives; inequities such as 
unpaid domestic work, forced pregnancy, or intimate partner violence are 
missing from the normative standards. In the early '90s, feminist international 
law scholars launched a robust critique of international human rights law's 
failure to adequately account for women's human rights. Dominant amongst 
their concerns was the claim that international human rights law reproduces 
the "public/private divide" of the liberal state.940 This refers to the long-
standing feminist theory that the liberal state structurally privileges men and 
masculinity over women and femininity by dividing the world into public and 
private spheres; in accordance with this division, the state applies liberal 
principles of rights and justice in the 'public' sphere but excludes the 'private' 
sphere — that of the home, the family and the community—from 
intervention.941 The problem from a feminist perspective is that both 
historically and empirically, women's lives are more likely to be relegated to 
 
938 From 1948 until the late 1960s, the United Nations finalized and adopted the two main UN human rights 
covenants: the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) Covenants. Regional organizations during this period similarly drafted agreements 
listing internationally guaranteed human rights. For more on the development of the modern architecture for the 
international legal protection of human rights, see PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2003) and SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 
(2010). 
939 Art. 3, ICCPR; Art 2, ICESCR. 
940 The leading, early feminist international law critique of the public/private divide in international law is found 
in Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright's seminal 1991 article, Feminist Approaches to International Law,  Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 
(1991); See also, Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (1999); Karen 
Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517 (1992); Celina 
Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 87, 100 (1993); Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea 
Wolper eds., 1995); Christine Chinkin , A critique of the Private/Public Divide, 10 (2) EJIL, 387, 388 (1999). 
941 As described in CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1989). 
See also Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 
281, 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983). 
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the private sphere, the realm from which rights and justice are excluded.942 
Moreover, feminists maintain that by demarcating the private as a sphere of 
non-intervention, the state allows pre-existing power relations to go 
unchallenged in the private; and that these power relations have historically 
favored men.943 In this way, feminists indict the public/private divide as a 
sinister tool that the state uses to both perpetuate and hide structures that 
sustain male dominance.944 
In arguing that international human rights law reproduces the public-
private dichotomy, feminist international law scholars identified different 
features of the human rights system that operate to exclude, marginalize and 
diminish women’s interests. International human rights law’s traditional 
design as means of protecting citizens against the totalitarianism of States was 
one such feature.945 For women's human rights protection, the state-centric 
structure left a significant gap because 'non-state' or 'private' actors, such as 
family members or private organizations such as religious groups, are often 
the perpetrators of the abuses women suffer.946 Feminists emphasized that in 
spite of profuse evidence that women worldwide suffered at the hands of their 
husbands, relations, and communities, international law disregarded this 
suffering and focused instead on violence carried out by the state (usually 
against men).947 The contrast between the law's ambivalence to women's pain 
at the hands of private actors and its interventionist response when men are 
victims of non-state violence (e.g., slavery, racial discrimination, and acts of 
genocide) was further evidence that the public/private divide was a tool to 
sidestep women's suffering.948 As in the liberal state, this policy of non-
 
942 See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 691, 692 (3d ed., 
1998). 
943 As described by Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy, 20 J. OF L. AND 
SOC’Y 93, 97 (1993). 
944 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) 117 (“the liberal state 
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a gender—through its 
legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies”). 
945 See, e.g., Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. DOC. 
A/56/10 (2001); See also, Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Private/Public Divide, 10 EJIL, No. 2, 387 388 (1999); 
Catherine MacKinnon, Theory is not a Luxury, in RECONCEIVING REALITY, 90. 
946 Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical 
Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 67 (1993);  Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a 
Feminist Perspective in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, at 11 (discussing widespread violence against women); 
Julie Mertus, State Discriminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, 135, 137, 
140 (Julie Peters and Anne Wolper eds. 2005) (discussing the role of global family law in perpetuating domestic 
abuse); Rebecca Cook, International Human Rights and Women’s Reproductive Health in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 256- 260 (Julie Peters and Anne Wolper eds. 2005). 
947 Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, 116 
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994); Catharine Mackinnon, Are Women Human? in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993). 
948 See, e.g., Catharine Mackinnon, Are Women Human? in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (questioning why the international community was able to immediately 
adapt international law to ignore the public-private divide when “on September 11th, nonstate actors committed 
violence against mostly nonstate (non-governmental and civilian) actors,” but had failed to act to counter the 
violence being continuously committed by the same organization against women within the borders of 
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intervention in the private sphere legitimates existing power relations, which 
inevitably favor men. 
Though international human rights law has since evolved to condemn the 
state for many harms perpetrated by non-state actors, including harms 
against women such as domestic violence949 sexual harassment,950 and 
trafficking951 according to the feminist international law critique, the 
public/private divide remains salient in myriad ways. Feminist scholars 
caution that violations perpetrated by so-called 'non-state actors against 
women are still not taken as seriously as State infringements on the rights of 
men; blame is still laid at the hands of individuals rather than patriarchal 
gender structures and values that entrench women' inequality.952 
Moreover, the dichotomy’s persistence can be detected among the issues 
that international human rights law accepts as ‘internal’ to states and 
therefore beyond international law’s reach.953 Scholars and activists alike 
contend that governments are less likely to be held accountable to their 
international human rights commitments in situations where violations 
impact so-called 'cultural,' 'traditional' or 'religious' affairs in a State.954 
Usually justified as a means of respecting differences between cultures vis-à-
vis the universalistic strategy of the international human rights framework, 
both States and scholars alike have argued in favor of relativism that permits 
deviance from international norms on ethical, moral, and cultural issues since 
the inception of the international framework.955 Feminist scholars underline 
that it is usually abuses towards women that are reduced to questions of 
custom while the injustices endured by men engender international human 
rights condemnation.956  
As such, the feminist critique of international human rights law laments 
human rights law's deference to culture as a legitimate form of relativism that 
protects gender oppressive cultures. Non-western feminist scholars, however, 
 
Afghanistan); See also, Karima Benounne, Remembering the other’s others: Theorizing the approach of International law to 
Muslim Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RES. REV. 635 (2010). 
949 See, e.g., Opus v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 158–76 (2009) (domestic violence); Eremia v. 
Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 3564/11, ¶¶ 48–66 (2013) (rape) I.G. & others. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 
15966/04, ¶¶ 112–26 (2013) (forced sterilization). 
950 See, e.g., Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107. 
951 See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (1990). 
952 ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 219–29 (2011); 
see generally, Agnès Callamard, The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF 
PLATFORMS 191, 204 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 2019). 
953 See, e.g., Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human 
Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 100 (1993). 
954 See, e.g., Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and 
Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 69 (1993). 
955 For a defense and account of the doctrine of cultural relativism in international human rights law, see Jack 
Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 4 (6) HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1989). 
956 Celia Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 
6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 97 (1993) (questioning "why white supremacy belongs to the 'community while male 
supremacy belongs to the individual). 
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took pain to adjust this critique and reject the essentialist tendencies among 
some feminists and policymakers.957 to characterize whole cultures as bad for 
women. Problematizing the assumption in both human rights law and in 
feminism that culture is a static monolith, they emphasized that cultures and 
religions are negotiable, dynamic practices that are rarely unified.958  
Non-western feminists also highlighted the imperialist bias of the western 
feminist cultural relativist critique by pointing to the preoccupation with so-
called ‘cultural practices’ affecting non-Western women (as well as minority 
and immigrant women in the West), while failing to appreciate the ways in 
which cultural and religious norms limit women's human rights in the 
‘developed’ world.959 They noted how the customs which human rights law 
has deemed inherently oppressive—female circumcision, honor-crimes, child 
marriage, and polygamy960—are drawn from non-Western religious or 
customary practices, but the habitual discriminatory rites of Christians, 
including those that reject women's leadership capacities, enforce 
heterosexuality, and limit women's access to reproductive choice, escape the 
label of 'harmful practices.'961 Reminding everyone that patriarchy governs 
societies north and south,  non-western feminists illustrated the reticence of 
the West to understand that the norms which define gender relations in 
western countries are just as ‘cultural’ as those in the ‘third-world.’962 Under 
this view, deference to custom and culture in international human rights law 
risks reifying patriarchy in the global north and global south alike.  
 
 
957 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? in (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha 
C. Nussbaum eds., 1999); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western 
Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 69 (1993). 
958 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994); Ratna 
Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
333 (2001). 
959 For the Non-western feminist critique of western feminism’s tendencies to condemn non-western cultures as 
gender oppressive (without proof), and to present non-western western women as powerless within these cultures, 
See, e.g., Chandra Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse 89 in THIRD WORLD 
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (Chandra Mohanty ed., 1992); Ratna Kapur, Revisioning the Role of 
Law in Women’s Human Rights Struggles in THE LEGALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, (Saladin Meckler-Garica and Basak Cali eds.. 2006); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 
12 YALE J.L. & HUM. RTS. 89 (2000); 
Vasuki Nesiah, The Ground Beneath Her Feet: “Third World” Feminisms,” 4(3) J. OF INT’L WOMEN'S STUD. 30; Anne 
Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 275 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18 (2002). 
960 For example, the 2014 Joint CEDAW-CRC General Recommendation/Comment on Harmful Practices 
CEDAW/C/GC/31. CRC/C/GC/18 condemns a litany of abuses known to be more common in Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia, including, but not limited to, honor crimes, FGM, child marriage, and polygamy. 
961 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Ratna Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic 
Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333 (2001); Karen Engle, 
After The Collapse of The Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian 
Women and the “Cultural Defence,” 17 HARV. WOMEN‘S L. J. 57, 78; See also, SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 11-16 (2006). 
962 See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 201 (1999). 
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2. The public/private divide in abortion law jurisprudence 
Operating as a veil to keep women’s experiences of human rights abuse 
beyond legal intervention, the reproduction of the public/private divide in 
human rights law can explain, in part, human rights law’s failure to address 
the gendered aspects of abortion regulation. The divide is visible, albeit in a 
more complex form, in two ways. First, human rights law insulates the 
gendered roots of policies and practices that deny women abortions from 
review. Second, by treating abortion primarily as an issue of healthcare rather 
than an issue of gender inequality, the doctrine conceals many of the 
subordinating harms of anti-abortion laws. 
 
a. The Hidden Roots 
 
Current human rights law approaches shield the state from scrutiny of the 
gender-based discrimination underlying abortion restrictions in two ways. 
First, human rights law treats anti-abortion laws as an issue of culture over 
which human rights law has a limited supervisory role. Second, international 
human rights law mischaracterizes the root causes—or perpetrators—of 
abortion denial to indirectly limit its review of the state's perpetration of 
gender inequality.   
Europe's regional human rights system explicitly categorizes abortion 
regulation as a matter of "domestic morality," with the result that the law 
limits its oversight of any human rights violations occasioned by national 
abortion restrictions. In Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany963 
the European Commission asserted that Germany’s criminal restrictions on 
abortion implicated aspects of a woman’s right to private life but did not find 
in favor of women who challenged the anti-abortion regulation.964 Adopting 
a  relativist approach,  the Commission concluded that since that all 
European Convention member states had their own “heated debates” and 
“own legal rules” on abortion, Germany could not be liable for violating the 
women’s right to privacy.965 Because European States governed abortion in 
accordance with their own national norms, the Court recused itself and 
nullified the human rights violations suffered by the applicants.  
Similarly, in A, B & C v. Ireland966 (a case that has been discussed many 
times in this dissertation) the European Court of Human Rights addressed 
the impugned harms of Ireland’s abortion regulation within the sphere of 
Article 8 (the right to private life); and reasoned that by preventing applicants 
‘A’ and ‘B’ from getting a legal abortion in Ireland, the country’s abortion 
 
963 Bruggemann and Scheuten, supra note 81 at ¶ 50. 
964 Id. ¶ 50. 
965 Id. ¶ 53. 
966 A, B, & C v Ireland, supra note 12. 
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law did, in fact, interfere with the women’s right to privacy. But the Court 
shifted its attention away from the impairment the women’s rights by 
classifying abortion as an issue of “domestic morality”967 on which the state 
was entitled to almost total deference. Asserting that Ireland's interference 
with the women's privacy rights fell within the European Convention's 
permissible grounds968 for limiting the right to private life, namely the 
protection of morals, the state's responsibility for respecting women's rights 
evaporated. Reasoning that the Irish Government's "direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their country" empowered the state to ascertain 
the content and requirements of national morals, the Court accepted that the 
human rights implications of criminalizing women who get abortions was a 
legitimate means of protecting national mores.969  
Notably, the state's assertion that the purpose of the 8th amendment was 
the protection of national norms about abortion engendered no scrutiny; the 
Court accepted—without question—that the 8th amendment was designed to 
protect “the profound moral views of the Irish people which demanded strong 
protection for prenatal life.”970 But as set out in Part 1, if considered through 
a gendered lens, the value of unborn life was not the only ideology underlying 
the 8th amendment; the law expressed a vision of Irish women as bearers and 
mothers of the Irish race and attempted to enforce this role through punitive 
sanction. 
Moreover, as feminist international law scholars have underscored, there 
is a danger in resorting to cultural explanations for women's subordination; 
invocations of culture, tradition, and custom, particularly by those in power, 
often make it seem as though violations of women's rights are intractable and 
almost natural features of their societies.971 But feminists argue that imposing 
religious, moral, or cultural beliefs on others through law or public policy is a 
political act, not an exercise of cultural rights.972 And in the abortion context, 
not only was the regulation misrepresented as an issue of national morality, 
but in doing so, the European Court also rejected the moral autonomy of the 
thousands of women who travelled abroad every year to end their 
pregnancies.  
 
967  Id. at ¶263 - 264. 
968 According to the text of European Convention, States can limit “personal freedoms” (Articles 8-11 of the 
Convention, including the right to private life), where “necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
969 ABC, supra note 12 at ¶ 232. 
970 Id.at ¶227. 
971 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003). 
972 See, e.g., Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Report, U.N. DOC A /67/287; 
Farida Shaheed, Violence Against Women Legitimised by Arguments of “Culture”—Thoughts from a Pakistani Perspective, in 




By not imposing responsibility on States for violations committed in 
service of 'national morality, the European Court ignores the inequalities 
engendered by anti-abortion laws. But as described in Chapter 2, 
international human rights law does not entirely absolve States from 
responsibility in the context of abortion; current doctrine holds States 
accountable for not applying their own domestic laws on abortion access. 
Following the human rights law principle that human rights must not be 
“theoretical or illusory” and must be accessible,973 human rights bodies have 
upheld women’s access to abortion in situations where national law already 
legalizes access in certain circumstances but where third parties deny women 
that access. For example, in four abortion cases at the European Court of 
Human Rights—Tysiac v. Poland, P & S v. Poland,974 R.R. v Poland,975 and Ms. 
C in A, B, and C v Ireland—and two of the abortion cases at the Human Rights 
Committee—LMR v Argentina976 and KL v. Peru977—the respective human 
rights bodies held that the States in question had violated a woman's right to 
private life—and in some cases, her right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment—in contexts where the woman's circumstances 
qualified her for an exception-based abortion, but her rights were denied by 
individuals or institutions (such as individual doctors or hospitals).978  
While closing the implementation gap between legal rights and practically 
enforcing them is usually a welcome development in human rights law, the 
result is that human rights bodies opt to underscore exemption-based 
abortion laws rather than examine such laws from a human rights or gender 
perspective. From a gender perspective, the scope of review is unduly narrow. 
In each case, human rights bodies found against the respective state on the 
grounds that the state was obliged to provide procedural safeguards or 
regulatory guidance clarifying legal exemptions to national abortion bans to 
protect women’s rights. Matters distinct from the underlying criminal 
abortion laws—the “procrastination of the health professionals”979 or 
inadequate regulatory guidance980— occasion scrutiny by the human rights 
bodies at the expense of the state's role in legitimizing the denial of 
reproductive choice through its own legislation.  
On one hand, courts (and quasi-courts in this instance) can be forgiven 
for confining their review to narrow grounds, but in most of the 
aforementioned cases, human rights bodies were directly called upon to 
 
973 See, e.g., Tysiąc, supra note 392 at ¶113. 
974 P & S v. Poland, supra note 569. 
975 R.R. v. Poland, supra note 472. 
976 LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507 at ¶7.2.  
977 KL v. Peru, supra note 543. 
978 See also Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in Abortion Law in 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman & 
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014). 




address state action on abortion beyond the state's duty to enforce its own 
law. In LMR—where a hospital refused to provide an abortion even though 
the woman’s pregnancy fell within the rape exemption of the national 
abortion ban—the applicant requested, as part of her claim, that the Human 
Rights Committee urge Argentina to review its domestic legal framework for 
abortion and to decriminalize abortion access.981 Notwithstanding the direct 
call to scrutinize the state's anti-abortion legislation, the Human Rights 
Committee confined its review to the illegal and arbitrary interventions by 
judicial officials and medical professionals.  
Similarly, in Tysiac — the Polish case where a woman's health was risked 
by her pregnancy, but her doctors would not issue her the necessary 
certification for her to get a health-based legal abortion982 — the European 
Court avoided the applicant's facial challenge against Poland's abortion 
restrictions. Without explanation beyond noting "the circumstances of the 
applicant's case and in particular the nature of her complaint," the Court 
confined its review to Poland's "positive obligations" to implement its national 
abortion law.983 The European Court did the same in the A, B & C case; 
though the applicants’ challenged Ireland’s abortion ban, the only State 
action that received full review was the failure to implement national law.984   
Again in RR, the European Court asserted that the hospital’s failure to 
provide diagnostic testing and an abortion violated the woman’s rights and 
that insofar as the state was liable, it was on the grounds that Poland lacked 
procedures and regulations to ensure that RR was able to make "an informed 
decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not in good time."985 
Notwithstanding the role of RR's doctors in frustrating her access to 
diagnostic tests that would have sanctioned of her abortion, fundamentally, 
the reason that RR could not get an abortion was because her pregnancy 
exceeded the state's legal time limit on abortion (20-weeks).986 Instead of 
impugning Poland, the Court presented individual actors as the perpetrators 
of RR’s forced pregnancy and childbirth. 
To be sure, in terms of requiring States to implement domestically 
recognized abortion rights, commentators suggest that international human 
rights law can do important work in protecting women from arbitrary refusal 
of care by health professionals.987 As with the human rights law approach of 
categorizing abortion as an issue of 'domestic morality,' scrutiny of state 
 
981 LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507, ¶ 3.11.  
982 Tysiac, supra note 392 ¶18. 
983 Id. at ¶ 107 
984 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12. 
985 Id.at ¶203. 
986 Id. at ¶204. 
987 See also Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in Abortion Law in 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman & 
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014). 
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measures that control women is displaced. The power dynamics that restrict 
women’s access to abortion go unperturbed. 
Departing from the sex and gender-blind approaches of the 
aforementioned litany of cases, the CEDAW Committee, and more recently, 
the Human Rights Committee has displayed a willingness to examine the 
discriminatory basis of abortion denial in its jurisprudence. In a decision that 
was considered as a potentially innovative juridical resource for reforming 
abortion laws,988 the CEDAW Committee’s decision in LC989 characterized 
the denial of reproductive rights as a discriminatory restriction on a woman’s 
right to health under Article 12 of CEDAW (the duty to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care).990 As in the 
preceding cases, per national law, the plaintiff should have been able to access 
an exception-based legal abortion (in this case, under Peru's risk to life 
exemption). The Committee recognized LC's suffering upon being denied an 
abortion and condemned it as discrimination.991 In articulating the source of 
her discrimination, the Committee described LC’s mistreatment as stemming 
from ‘her status as a pregnant woman.’992 Thereby submitting that LC had 
been discriminated against because of her reproductive capacity. 
While it is welcome that the CEDAW Committee held that LC was 
discriminated against as a woman, the fact that women have a different 
reproductive capacity to men does not explain why States deny women the 
right to abortion. States restrict women from accessing abortion because the 
state decides it appropriate to deny women access and designs limits 
accordingly. Invariably, the logic behind such restrictions include gendered 
judgments about whether women's authority over reproduction can be 
usurped and what burdens can be imposed on women.993 Moreover, when 
discrimination is conceived as rooted in the biological differences between 
women and men, the required form of redress is moderated. The state's 
responsibility in ending any sex or gender discrimination becomes one of 
"accommodating women's differences"994 and achieving de facto equality. 
Rather than upending socially engineered gender hierarchy, the state is asked 
to respond to differences between the sexes. 
To a certain extent, the CEDAW Committee appears to have attempted 
to recognize the gender dynamic in LC: as well as citing her status as a 
 
988 See, e.g., Charles Ngwena, A Commentary on LC v Peru: The CEDAW committee's first decision on abortion, 57(02) J. OF 
AFRICAN L. (2013). 
989 LC v. Peru, supra note 374. 
990 Id.at ¶ 7.5 
991 Id. at ¶ 7.7. 
992 Id. at ¶ 8.15. 
993 See, e.g., Neil Siegel and Reva Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. 160 (2013); Anita 
Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POLY 419, (1994). 
994 Rebecca Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences, supra note 17. 
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pregnant woman as the reason for her ill-treatment, the Committee reasoned 
that LC had been denied access to a legal abortion because of "the stereotype 
that protection of the fetus should prevail over the health of the mother."995 
Though the phenomenon identified by the Committee as a stereotype is not, 
in fact, a stereotype, the reasoning is welcome for its indication that the 
Committee understood the role played by gendered expectations in denying 
women abortion rights.  
The landmark cases of Mellet996 in 2016, and the almost identical case of 
Whelan v Ireland997 in 2017, are the only international human rights decisions 
in which a human rights body (the Human Rights Committee) has explicitly 
held that criminalizing and prohibiting abortion violates international human 
rights law; and that, at least in certain circumstances, States must make 
abortion legal. To recap, both Mellet and Whelan challenged Ireland’s abortion 
ban in situations where pregnancies have fatal fetal abnormalities. 
As stated elsewhere in this dissertation, the Committee's decisions in these 
cases marked a significant development in abortion law jurisprudence 
because the underlying legal framework, not just the state's failure to 
implement its own law, was impugned for its non-compliance with the 
ICCPR. Successes notwithstanding, the Human Rights Committee pursued 
a strange line of reasoning to reach its finding of discrimination. Engaging in 
a formalistic comparative analysis, the Committee compared how Ireland 
treated the applicants 'as women who decided to terminate their non-viable 
pregnancies' to the state's treatment of 'women who had non-viable 
pregnancies but decided to carry the fetus to term.998 The women who did 
not choose to end their pregnancies continued to receive the full protection 
and care of the public health system in Ireland, and all medical needs were 
covered by health insurance, while women who decided to abort non-viable 
pregnancies had to travel for care abroad at their own expense.999 This 
differential treatment was judged to violate the right to equality before the 
law on the basis of both socio-economic and sex under Article 26, ICCPR.1000  
While acknowledging that the criminalization of abortion inflicts socio-
economic burdens on women who are forced to travel for abortions is 
welcome, the Court's holding is limited in a number of ways. There was no 
explanation for how the differential treatment between the two sets of women 
amounted to 'sex discrimination. And the finding of discrimination related to 
a small cross-section of women—women with non-viable pregnancies—
 
995 LC v Peru, supra note 374 at ¶11.3. 
996 Mellet, supra note 35. 
997 Whelan, supra note 35. 
998 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1 
999 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.3; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.4 
1000 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1 
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rather than all of the women who faced widespread discrimination in 
accessing abortion in Ireland. Blind to the implications of the abortion law 
for women as a class, the majority decision was blind to gender.  
Notably, the concurring opinions of Professor Sarah Cleveland in Mellet 
and Whelan took a different approach to make a finding of sex discrimination. 
Rejecting the Irish Government’s claim that there can be no invidious 
discrimination in relation to a pregnant woman because “her physical 
capacity or circumstances in a state of pregnancy are inherently different to 
that of a man”1001Cleveland cited the CEDAW Committee's approach in LC 
to make a finding of sex-based discrimination.1002 Observing that there was 
no equivalent burden on men’s access to reproductive health care in 
Ireland,1003 and that the state had not justified this differential treatment,1004 
she asserted that the inability of Irish women to get abortions legally in Ireland 
amounted to sex discrimination under international human rights law.1005 
Again, while it is welcome that Ireland's abortion law was impugned as 
discriminatory on the basis of sex, the traps of physiological sex-based 
reasoning could have been realized in this case. In the first instance, 
Cleveland identified the "protection, on an equal basis, in law, and in 
practice, the unique needs of each sex"1006 as among the state's responsibilities 
towards women in the abortion context - a limited approach to ending gender 
subordination. And as with LC, Mellet and Whelan did not suffer abortion 
denial because their biology was different to men’s; the state's criminal 
abortion laws prevented women from having abortions in Ireland. These 
were laws that were motivated and sustained by gender stereotypes. However, 
Cleveland's individual opinion contains the seeds of positive developments 
and could signal a new phase in the Committee's abortion jurisprudence. 
Distinct from other human rights-based approaches to abortion to date, 
Sarah Cleveland added to the biological sex-difference approach and 
recognized that Ireland’s abortion law differentiated between men and 
women “based on gender stereotypes” in a way that gave “rise to gender 
discrimination.”1007 For Cleveland, the ICCPR’s right to equal protection 
and protection against gender discrimination forbid “traditional stereotypes 
 
1001 Mellet supra note 35 at ¶ 4.13. For more on the risks of emphasizing the different biology of men and women, 
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1732 
(1974) (“That women may and do become pregnant is the most significant single factor used to justify the 
countless laws and practices that have disadvantaged women for centuries.”); See also, Wendy Williams, The Equality 
Crisis: Some Reflections. On Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REV. 175 (1982); Wendy Williams, 
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325-
380 (1984-1985). 
1002 Sarah Cleveland, Annex II at ¶ 11.1 
1003 Id. at Annex II ¶11.3. 
1004 Id.  
1005 Id.  
1006 Id. at Annex II, ¶ 7. 
1007 Id. at Annex II ¶ 16. 
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regarding the reproductive role of women.”1008 Additionally, in a stark 
departure from the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Cleveland dismissed the state's argument that the abortion restrictions 
reflected domestic morality and emphasized that justifications for abortion 
restrictions based on "tradition, history and culture" could not justify gender 
discrimination or gender stereotypes.1009  
Interventions in the aforementioned concurrences in Mellet and Whelan 
aside, when presented with the denial of abortion rights, human rights bodies 
have thus far insulated states’ perpetuation of gender inequality from review. 
A correct interpretation of anti-abortion laws requires engagement with the 
gendered roots of laws that deny women’s reproductive autonomy and an 
understanding of the mechanisms through which this manifestation of 
discrimination sustains itself. By contrast, in obscuring the role of gender bias 
in abortion law and policy, international human rights law hides the 
discriminatory purposes of anti-abortion laws and contributes to their 
maintenance.  
 
b. The Hidden Harm 
 
In 2011, the then UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Anand 
Grover, powerfully articulated that laws criminalizing abortion lead to higher 
numbers of maternal deaths and poor mental and physical health outcomes 
while "infring[ing upon] women's dignity and autonomy by severely 
restricting decision-making by women in respect of their sexual and 
reproductive health."1010 This marked the first time that abortion was 
explicitly conceived as part of the right to health by the mandate of the UN 
Special Rapporteur and was perceived as a milestone. As noted in Chapter 
2, the CESCR Committee followed suit in 2016 and explicitly embraced 
access to abortion as part of the right to health in General Comment 22.1011 
In a world where an estimated 8-15% of maternal deaths are associated with 
unsafe abortions, conceiving of abortion access as critical to women’s health 
seems both urgent and indisputable.  
But this framing is complex. When abortion is principally conceived as a 
matter of health and medical treatment, the critical importance of 
reproductive control to a woman’s equality is overlooked. KL v Peru is 
expositive of this approach. Rather than engaging the applicant's claim that 
the state had interfered with her right to make autonomous decisions about 
 
1008 Id. 
1009 Id. at Annex II ¶ 15. 
1010 Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, supra note 462, ¶21. 
1011 CESCR General Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health, supra note 349. 
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reproduction and parenthood, the Committee held that the "state interfered 
arbitrarily in her private life by denying her the opportunity to secure medical 
intervention."1012 While “medical intervention” is one way to characterize her 
request, KL’s reason for wanting an abortion was to be free of an unwanted 
pregnancy — a decision and desire that implicates much more than medical 
needs. As described in Part 1, the decision to carry a pregnancy to term can 
impact every aspect of a woman’s life – her education, her career, her 
relationships, her economic status, and, more broadly and her ability to live 
the life she chooses.1013 The state's attempt to take that decision away from 
women represents a fundamental rejection of women's status as equal citizens. 
But by confining its assessment to a medical view of pregnancy, the 
Committee lets the state off the hook for its discriminatory treatment of 
women. 
Such health-focused reasoning is also reflected in the CEDAW 
Committee’s approach to abortion in individual decisions and concluding 
observations: as described, the Committee addresses abortion as an aspect of 
healthcare—“medical services that only women need”—the denial of which 
is discriminatory under the CEDAW Convention.1014 A majority of the 
Human Rights Committee applied this reasoning in  Mellet and Whelan, 
holding that Ireland’s abortion law violated the women’s right to privacy by 
arbitrarily interfering with their decision “as to how best cope with a non-
viable pregnancy.”1015 For Mellet and Whelan, however, the state's intervention 
impacted more than their medical decisions. In their time of need, the state 
criminalized the women's response to pregnancies with fatal fetal anomalies 
and exiled the women from the state. Such dignitary harms receive no 
airtime, and the state's responsibility was reduced to providing the equal 
medical treatment. 
Moreover, in practice, the health paradigm can result in a medical model 
for abortion, where abortion becomes a matter of physician (or hospital) 
authority rather than a matter of women's rights.1016 The litany of cases in 
this dissertation reveal numerous controversies involving doctors and hospital 
 
1012 KL v. Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.4. 
1013See also Jennifer Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, (2010) 45 HARV. 
CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 330; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Postscript to Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799, 
800 (2010); Anita Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection fix for abortion law: reflections on citizenship, gender and the constitution, 
18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 419, (1994). 
1014 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Oman, 
¶41, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/1 (2011); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ¶31, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6 (2011). 
1015 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶7.8; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.7. 
1016 This has been realized worldwide, with endless cases and controversies involving doctors and hospital boards 
refusing to carry out legal abortions or creating additional barriers.  Some of these cases have reached the IHLR 
courts, including Tysiac, supra note 392. RR v Poland ,supra note 472; K.L. v. Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.4; L.M.R. v. 
Argentina, Committee, supra note 507; Kristin Lucker and others have commented on the conflict between the 
vision of feminist abortion rights groups mobilizing on behalf of women and the goal of medical professional to 
ensure professional autonomy.  
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boards refusing to carry out legal abortions or creating additional barriers to 
women’s access. But to date, the law has not vested the abortion decision in 
the woman alone. In some cases, it has even buttressed the physician’s role. 
In LMR v Argentina,1017 the applicant claimed that the state arbitrarily 
interfered in her private life by making a decision concerning her life and 
reproductive health on her behalf.1018 In finding in her favor, the Human 
Rights Committee again downplayed LMR’s claim to a right to make 
decisions about her life. Instead, the Committee held that Argentina had 
violated LMR’s right to privacy by interfering in an issue that “should have 
been resolved between the patient and her physician.”1019  
It is recognized that focusing on the impact to a woman's life and health 
is not as contentious as is her right to make decisions about her own body and 
life plan and that in the battlefield of abortion lawfare, muting controversy 
can seem imperative.1020 But by diverting attention away from the impacts of 
abortion restrictions on women's autonomy and freedom from 
discrimination, health-based claims ignore why abortion restrictions exist in 
the first place: the conditions of inequality that enable the state to control such 
aspects of women's lives. Even in parts of the world with high maternal 
mortality rates from unsafe abortion, recognizing the ways that abortion 
restrictions violate the right to health are not enough. The underlying causes 
of morbidity and mortality from unsafe abortion are not blood loss and 
infection but, rather, laws and policies borne of apathy and disdain toward 
women.  
 
3. The Victim Trap 
The feminist critique of international law also problematizes the law’s 
reinforcement of stereotyped understandings of women as powerless and 
vulnerable victims.1021 Without denying that, in reality, women are frequently 
victims of abhorrent levels of human rights abuse; a number of scholars have 
contested the law's reliance on overly generalized depictions of women as 
disempowered victims, which may not be liberating. On one level, the trope 
imperils the application of human rights law to women who do not conform 
 
1017 LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507 at ¶ 7.2 (UN Human Rights Committee 28 Apr. 2011). 
1018 Id.at ¶ 3.2. 
1019 Id.at ¶ 3.2. 
1020 See, e.g., Joanna Erdman, The Politics of Global Abortion Rights 22(2) BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 39; Lindgren, 
Yvonne, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013) (arguing that 
recognizing abortion as healthcare may create broader appeal for the right by casting it in a gender-neutral 
context). 
1021 See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Lost in translation: Re-scripting the sexed subjects of international human rights law in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS  320 (Anne Orford eds. 2006). (Otto contends that the stereotyped 
understandings of women in international human rights law takes three main forms: female subjectivities as wife 
and mother, the woman who is the 'formal equal' of men in the public sphere (but not the private), and the 
"victim" subject who is produced by colonial narratives of gender and women's sexual vulnerability). 
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with traditional gender scripts of victimhood that emphasize vulnerability, 
passivity, and respectability. Securing human rights protection for sex 
workers, women with minority sexual orientations and/or gender identities, 
and women who are members of minority religious or belief communities (but 
who do not reject their religion identity) has been, and continues to be, 
wrought with tension and backlash, if not outright rejection.1022 On another 
level, scholars caution against the woman-as-victim narrative because it 
presents women as objects in need of protection rather than subjects of 
affirmative rights.1023 For post-colonial feminists, this paternalistic vision of 
women is reminiscent of the imperialist practice of portraying colonial 
subjects as ignorant and vulnerable “others.”1024 Recognizing that such 
narratives provided colonists with partial explanations for maintaining power 
over their colonial subjects, feminists question whether containing women’s 
presence in international law within the prism of ‘victimhood’ could operate 
to “keep women in their place.”1025 
Notably, most of the cases surveyed in this dissertation involve an extreme 
or tragic situation: women impregnated as a result of rape; women with 
pregnancies that are either nonviable; or women whose health and life are at 
risk. Often, but not always, the plaintiffs are young girls or are challenged 
with circumstances that gives rise to heightened suffering, such as disability 
or bereavement. In each of these "exceptional cases," the woman is viewed as 
a victim in need of the law's protection. Indeed, the greater her victimhood, 
the more protection the law owes her. This trend can be attributed to the 
legal strategy of advocates who correctly consider tragic cases to be likely 
winners before adjudicators. But there is an inherent tension to this approach: 
by confining its recognition of abortion rights to 'exceptional' cases, human 
rights law remains blind to the rights of the majority of abortion-seeking 
women. As well as instituting a protection gap for women's rights, this 
doctrine reinforces narrow conceptions of the deserved abortion and the 
 
1022 See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-
Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002). 
1023 Id. 
1024 See, e.g., Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship (1993) 16 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L. J. 189 (explaining that “a discourse about the experience of oppression often participates in the 
imperially charged agenda of defining “Third World” women as victims of oppression”); See Anne Orford, 
Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 275, 290 (2002); Saba Mahmood, 
Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (2001); See also, Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal 
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 528 (1997). 
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WOMEN’S L. J. 189 (1993) (explaining that “a discourse about the experience of oppression often participates in 
the imperially charged agenda of defining “ Third World”  women as victims of oppression”); See also Anne 
Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law 71 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 275, 290 (2002); Ratna 
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal 
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Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (2001); See also Brenda Cossman, 
Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 
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deserving woman.1026 Only the women who have “innocently suffered” are 
recognized by human rights law.1027 As young girls who had been raped, LC, 
KL, LMR, RR, and P could elicit recognition of their suffering. And as women 
who had only chosen abortions because their pregnancies would not survive, 
Mellet & Whelan were not rejecting motherhood. In fact, both women framed 
their decisions to get abortion as motivated, in part, by their desire to protect 
their unborn fetuses.1028By contrast, women who have consensual sex and 
want abortions to control their lives fail to engender compassion, and as such, 
fall beyond the law's protection. Their abortion decisions cannot be excused 
as a response to rape or a natural motherly instinct. Echoing the themes of 
responsibility and irresponsibility that play a prominent role in rhetoric 
opposing reproductive choice, human rights law further entrenches abortion 
in a moralistic rather than rights-based framework. 
Additionally, even when a woman falls within one of the exceptional and 
tragic cases, the law does not afford women with the primary decision-making 
authority over their reproduction. Even the most ‘deserving’ women remain 
subject to the State’s final say on whether she falls within one of the exceptions 
for a legal abortion.  
Furthermore, it seems that only particular tragedies are compelling 
enough for human rights law. In practice, the discriminatory impacts of 
exceptions-based abortion laws are felt most acutely by women in lower socio-
economic groups. Women with financial resources are more likely to be able 
to access private clandestine providers who will fudge the criteria for a legal 
abortion for a price or will travel to states with fewer restrictions.1029 Without 
these options, women from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more 
likely to endure unsafe abortions,1030 and are more likely to face legal penalties 
for obtaining illegal abortions.1031 Being poor and desperate to end a 
pregnancy to the point that you will risk your life and health to get an abortion 
is apparently not tragic enough a situation for human rights law to rescue you. 
To be sure, human rights law's increasingly progressive jurisprudence on 
abortion has delivered long-awaited recognition of the abuse women suffer 
when they are denied access to abortion. In this regard, Yadh Ben Acor's 
description, in his concurring opinion, of the harm perpetrated by Ireland's 
abortion law stands out: 
 
1026 See Lisa M. Kelly, Reckoning with Narratives of Innocent Suffering in Transnational Abortion Litigation, in ABORTION 
LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEs 303, 317–18 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. 
Dickens eds., 2014). 
1027 Id.  
1028 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶2.8; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 2.1. 
1029 See, e.g., Andrea Hunnes et al., Induced Abortion According to Socioeconomic Status in Chile 33(4) J. OF PEDIATRIC AND 
ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 415 (2020); Haina Zafar, Low Socioeconomic Status Leading to Unsafe Abortion-related 
Complications: A Third-world Country Dilemma 10(10) CUREUS 2018. 
1030 Susheela Singh, Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, GUTTMACHER (2018). 
1031 See Natalie Sedacca, Abortion in Latin America in International Perspective: Limitations and Potentials of the Use of Human 




 [T]hrough its binding, indirectly punitive, and stigmatizing effects, 
the prohibition of abortion in Ireland targets women by virtue of 
being women and places them in a particular situation of 
vulnerability.1032 
 
Similarly, in holding that Peru had violated KL's rights to privacy and freedom 
from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the Human Rights 
Committee stressed KL's "special vulnerability as a minor girl."1033 
Emphasizing that LC was "a minor and a victim of sexual abuse," the 
CEDAW Committee agreed with the claimant that Peru had violated her 
right to health.1034 In recognizing the applicants’ suffering in P. & S. v Poland, 
the European Court described P as a “vulnerable and distraught teenager in 
a difficult life situation.”1035 Similarly, in concluding that the State was 
responsible for the violation of the claimant's right to be free from cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment in P & S v. Poland1036 the European Court 
emphasized the claimant's "great vulnerability," this time arising from her age 
and status as a rape victim.1037  
On one level, by recognizing aspects of a victim’s identity and 
circumstances that exacerbate their suffering, the doctrine offers valuable 
insights into how human rights violations can be compounded by age and 
other status.  The emphasis on the victim’s vulnerability, however, runs the 
risk that ‘vulnerable’ becomes a fixed attribute for women, with little 
discussion of the social and political—gendered—reasons that give rise to 
such vulnerability.1038 "Woman" in international law is conceived as being 
innately vulnerable, whereas, in reality, women are forced into contexts that 
unjustifiably heighten their vulnerability to human rights abuses. In abortion 
rights' jurisprudence, as currently applied,1039 the vulnerability lens does not 
address the underlying structural causes of women's vulnerability in the 
abortion context. A woman's suffering appears to be attributed to her age, her 
history of being an assault victim, or her status as a bereaved mother. While 
it is likely that such experiences exacerbate a woman's distress, the root cause 
of a woman's suffering when refused abortion access is the underlying legal 
 
1032 Mellet, Annex 1 at ¶3.2. 
1033 KL v Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.5. 
1034 KL v Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 8.15. 
1035 P. & S. v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶13.1 (2012). 
1036 Id. 
1037Id. at ¶162. 
1038 See, e.g., Finnoula Ní Aoláin, Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian Emergencies, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2011) (describing the social nature of the vulnerabilities experienced by women in the context of humanitarian 
emergencies).  
1039 Id. (proposing a different framework for vulnerability that takes account of its gendered processes). 
 
 177 
framework that cedes her reproductive autonomy to the State and/or to 
doctors.  
It also seems counterproductive when international human rights law 
provides accounts of women’s victimhood that are near totalizing. In P & S, 
the European Court held treatment of P was degrading in that it aroused 
"fear, anguish, and inferiority capable of […] debasing [her].1040 The 
Committee Against Torture observed that a woman who is compelled to 
continue a pregnancy after rape experiences “constant exposure to the 
violation committed against her,” which leads to traumatic stress and long-
lasting psychological problems.1041 Attesting that "[w]omen who are legally 
prevented from accessing abortion services are powerless.…," scholar Ronli 
Sopris explicitly relies on the idea that women are helpless victims when 
arguing for abortion rights.1042 Trading in stereotypes of women as passive 
and defenseless, women’s status as victims is further entrenched. Framed as 
passive containers of their abuse, it seems as though there is no escape.  
As a consequence, when women escape, survive or resist, the law has 
trouble recognizing them as victims. In certain cases, the women who 
extricate themselves from their disempowered position and overcome barriers 
to abortion access are stripped of their status of victims in human rights law. 
In A, B, & C v. Ireland, the European Court recognized that the State had 
infringed A and B's right to private life, but the fact that the two women 
traveled abroad to get abortions meant that the State would not be held 
accountable for violating their human rights.1043 In other words, by 
overcoming the burdens that Ireland placed on them—by exercising their 
agency—the women lost their status as rights-holders. No longer fitting the 
passive victim trope, the women who defied Ireland’s abortion regime were 
dismissed by human rights law. 
 
C. Implications for doctrine 
It is relevant to consider whether the current framework of international 
human rights law could accommodate the dissertation’s proposition that 
abortion rights should be conceived of as gender equality rights. To date, 
there have been some gestures in this regard.  
As a general principle, non-discrimination guides the way each human 
right is to be respected, and as a substantive right, equality and non-
 
1040 P & S v Poland, supra note 569 at ¶158. 
1041 Concluding Observations of the Comm. Against Torture: Nicaragua, ¶16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1 
(2009); see also Conclusions & Recommendations of the Comm. Against Torture: Peru, ¶23, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006) (recognizing the physical and mental pain associated with being compelled by the 
law to seek an illegal and unsafe abortion as a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment). 
1042 RONI SOPRIS, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, TORTURE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CHALLENGING THE MASCULINISATION OF TORTURE, 184 (2013). 
1043 A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 12, at ¶230-240. 
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discrimination provisions are omnipresent in the framework of the United 
Nations human rights system and most regional systems. To recap from 
Chapter 2, among the many formulations of the right to non-discrimination 
in international law, Article 2 of the ICCPR establishes the prohibition 
against discrimination, proscribing "distinctions, exclusions, or restrictions" 
of any kind in the exercise of any rights promulgated by the Convention, on 
a number of protected grounds, including on the basis of sex.1044 This is 
reinforced by Article 3 of the ICCPR, which explicitly addresses gender 
equality by stating that States must ensure the equal rights of men and 
women. Similarly, Article 3 of CEDAW mandates states to guarantee 
women's equal enjoyment of Convention rights and fundamental freedoms as 
compared with men. International human rights law also provides a 
freestanding right to equality before the law for all persons and equal 
protection of the law, in Article 26 of the ICCPR.1045 
Notably, international human rights law recognizes that sex-based 
discrimination amounts to gender-based discrimination.1046 which is 
understood as discrimination arising from the socially constructed roles, 
behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate 
for the different sexes, "resulting in hierarchical relationships between women 
and men and in the distribution of power and rights favoring men and 
disadvantaging women."1047 Furthermore, the CEDAW Convention is 
explicit in Article 5(a) that harmful gender stereotypes are among the forms 
of gender discrimination that States must address. Elaborating on this 
responsibility in General Recommendation no. 28, the CEDAW Committee 
outlined that “inherent to the principle of…gender equality is the concept 
that all human beings, regardless of sex, are free to make choices without the 
limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles, and prejudices."1048 
Taken together, the right to equality and the right to nondiscrimination 
in human rights oblige States to refrain from carrying out actions that create, 
 
1044 See also, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 18, ¶7, 
U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (November 11, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No. 18] Similar accessory provisions 
against discrimination can be found in most other human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, CRC, the 
IMWC, the ICRPD, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 562. 
1045 No such general provision for equal protection is found in the European Convention. However, Protocol No. 
12 to the European Convention, promulgated in 2005, extends the non-discrimination principle beyond the scope 
of conventional rights by providing for a general prohibition of discrimination, which applies to any right set forth 
by law.  
1046 See, CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28: The Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28, 
¶ 5 (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28]) (stipulating that ‘although the Convention only 
refers to sex-based discrimination . . . [it] covers gender-based discrimination against women.) 
1047  CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28, supra note 89, at ¶5. The "Istanbul Convention," a legally binding treaty in 
Europe, adopts a very similar definition as follows: "gender" shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviors, 
activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men. See, Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, November 5, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 
210 ¶ 3(c)): [hereinafter Istanbul Convention]. 
1048  CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28, supra note 189. 
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whether directly or indirectly, gender-based discrimination, a category which 
is broad enough to encompass freedom from gender roles and the burdens 
such roles place on women's autonomy. The obligation encompasses positive 
obligations such that to protect and fulfill these rights, States must adopt 
measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations in their societies on 
the basis of the idea of equality and the principle of nondiscrimination.  
Recent views emanating from the Human Rights Committee have 
demonstrated the Committee’s willingness to include protection against 
harmful gender stereotypes within the meaning of “equal protection” under 
the ICCPR.1049 Even at the European Court of Human Rights—an 
institution often partial to a formal conception of equality—several judgments 
have impugned harmful stereotypes regarding groups such as the people 
living with HIV,1050 people with intellectual disabilities,1051 and the Roma 
community1052 as violations of non-discrimination. 
As outlined in this Chapter, both the purpose and effects of abortion 
restrictions violate women's right to equality and non-discrimination in 
human rights law. On the one hand, abortion restrictions contravene the 
nascent anti-stereotyping principle in international equality law.1053 because 
they are rooted in a gendered ideology that prescribes normative roles for 
women. On the other, the burdens that abortion restrictions place on 
women’s autonomy perpetuate discrimination based on gender. As Yadh Ben 
Acor articulates in his concurrence in Mellet, through its "punitive and 
stigmatizing effects," abortion restrictive regulation "targets women, by virtue 
of being women." 1054 And because laws denying an individual's ability to 
obtain an abortion not only deny autonomous choices but also devalue an 
entire group of people, abortion restrictions have equality implications for 
women's status in society more broadly. 
Arguably, the implications of abortion policies on women’s autonomy can 
— and to an extent have been — conceptualized as violations of the right to 
privacy in international law.1055  The interplay of both equality and autonomy 
was explicitly articulated in the concurring opinion of Mellet; noting that 
Ireland's abortion restrictions reduced Amanda Mellet to "an instrument of 
procreation" constitutes discrimination and infringes at once her freedom of 
 
1049 See, e.g., Prof. Sarah Cleveland in Mellet & Whelan supra note 12. 
1050 Kiyutin v Russia (2011) Application No 2700/10, Merits, March 10, 2011. Regarding HIV-based prejudice, see 
also I.B. v. Greece, App. No. 552/10, (October 3, 2013). 
1051 Kiss v Hungary Application No 38832/06, Merits (May 20, 2010). 
1052 DH & Ors v. the Czech Republic App. No. 57325/00, (Grand Chamber final judgment) (November 13, 
2007). 
1053 See, Alexandra Timmer, Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of. Human Rights Can Borrow from American and. 
Canadian Equal Protection Law, 63(1) AM. JOUR. OF COMPARATIVE L. 239 (2015). 
1054 Mellet & Whelan supra note 12. 
1055 See supra, Chapter II, Section iv. See also HRC General Comment 36 on the Right to Life outlining that while 
state restrictions on abortion are permissible, they must not arbitrarily interfere with women's privacy. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 36, supra note 71, at ¶ 8. 
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self-determination and her right to gender equality and personal 
autonomy."1056 But for both substantive and pragmatic reasons, this 
dissertation contends that international human rights law should locate the 
abortion right in human rights law’s protection for equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of gender.  
As a matter of strategy, for advocates, in particular, international law 
provides States with little room to justify discriminatory laws and practices 
against women. While non-discrimination is not an unqualified right, only in 
very limited circumstances can sufficient "objective and reasonable criteria" 
be invoked to justify exemptions from general laws and standards for 
combatting discrimination.1057 Strict scrutiny must be applied, and the 
burden of proof rests with the State. Such a high level of scrutiny for the 





















1056 Mellet, Annex I, at ¶¶7, 9. 
1057 See, H.R. Comm., General Comment No.18: Non-Discrimination, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
(November 10, 1989) and H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (Equality of Rights Between Men 
and Women), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).  
1058 UN human rights law prohibits arbitrary interference with one's privacy while doctrine under the European 
Convention of Human Rights, States are afforded significant difference in limiting an individual's privacy rights 
"in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 





On January 18, 2018, Michael Martin, then the leader of the opposition in 
Ireland, stunned the country (in particular his own socially conservative party) 
by backing repeal of the 8th amendment. In an impassioned speech to the 
Dáil, Martin spoke of how despite always having described himself as "pro-
life," he had come to recognize the profound concerns which people had with 
the 8th amendment.1059 "Women known to the public only by letters of the 
alphabet" had exposed the cruelty of the law, he said, before commenting 
that "if we are sincere about respecting their choices, we must act."1060  
As is now well-known, Ireland did act. The Government proposed a 
referendum to repeal the 8th amendment, and the Irish people voted, 
overwhelmingly, for its removal. While the strength of the public's support for 
repeal—over two-thirds of those who voted favored reform—suggests that 
reform had been a long time coming, the triumph for abortion rights activists 
in 2018 contrasts sharply with the recalcitrance they confronted in decades 
past. Pro-choice activists had fought against the draconian law since its 
inception, but as described in Chapter 1, their efforts were chronically 
overpowered by anti-abortion campaigns and government impasse. Anti-
abortion forces successfully pushed injunctions against family planning 
clinics, secured prosecutions against students for distributing abortion 
information, and even attempted to stop a 14-year-old rape victim to stop her 
traveling to England for a termination. Consumed with resisting even more 
restrictions on abortion access, pro-choice advocacy was almost exclusively 
defensive. 
Taking a case on behalf of three women who had been denied abortions 
in Ireland to the European Court of Human Rights marked a new era. As 
described in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, this was the first time in the 
trajectory of Irish abortion politics that pro-choice actors proactively 
challenged Ireland's abortion law. And though the Court rejected the human 
rights claims of all but one of the litigants, the A, B, & C case produced both 
direct and indirect gains for the movement. The limited win for C forced the 
government to pass legislation in 2013 to clarify when a woman could access 
a life-saving abortion—an action the movement had sought for years. But the 
real strategic value came from the process surrounding the new law rather 
than the policy is produced. Placing abortion in the public and political 
domain as a woman's rights issue, the hearings for the implementation of A, 
B, & C initiated a change in the contours of public discourse on abortion. 
 






Beginning a move towards the eventual public understanding of abortion as 
a right rather than a sin or crime, this discourse captured new audiences at 
different levels. Established human rights NGOs, who had shied away from 
engaging the thorny issue of abortion reform, launched public campaigns for 
abortion rights. Grassroots pro-choice activists who had long been shunned 
and stigmatized gained legitimacy in the public eye. And younger women 
who experienced public deliberations on their reproductive freedom for the 
first time organized in outrage at what they heard. 
Similarly, the movement’s iterative human rights challenges to the 8th 
using UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies engendered both legal and political 
benefits. During the four years preceding the May 2018 referendum, abortion 
rights advocates targeted the UN human rights processes every year to 
highlight the conflict between Irish abortion law and international human 
rights standards. Securing recognition of these claims by international human 
rights bodies provided important legal precedents with which the movement 
could criticize the State while also helping to educate the public on the harms 
of Ireland’s abortion law. And by facilitating collaboration and networking 
among disparate groups and providing a training ground for new advocates, 
human rights processes helped increase the organizational power of the Irish 
abortion rights movement.  
But as Chapter 2 explains, as the abortion rights movement gained more 
and more power, international human rights law ran out as a resource. By 
mid-2017, the question in Irish abortion politics was no longer whether the 
government would hold a referendum to reform the 8th, but what shape that 
legal reform would take.1061 As some politicians began to propose legislation 
that would permit women to have abortion in the so-called "hard cases" of 
rape, women's health, and fatal fetal abnormalities, many abortion-rights 
advocates emphatically argued that excluding women who choose abortion 
for other reasons was untenable.1062 Within this context, human rights law 
lost much of its former utility. Because human rights law protects abortion 
rights in limited cases—to protect a woman's life and health, following rape, 
and to terminate pregnancies with fetal anomalies—international standards 
contradicted the movement's demand for "free, safe and legal" abortion for 
all women. 
 With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the abortion rights 
movement was vindicated in its rejection of proposals for more modest 
reform: when the public voted for Repeal of the 8th, they also voted for 
prospective regulation guaranteeing access to abortion without restriction as 
 
1061 Fiona de Londras, Politicians left with nowhere to hide on abortion, THE IRISH TIMES (April 26, 2017) 
1062  See supra note _ and accompanying text. See also, Pat Leahy, Varadkar rejects ‘hard cases’ suggestions from No campaign 




to reason up to 12th weeks of gestation. Replacing a near-total ban on 
abortion, Repeal was a stunning victory for abortion rights and a decisive 
repudiation of gender inequality it serviced. 
 As Chapter 3 explains, the 8th amendment was a bulwark of gender 
inequality in Ireland. The amendment was not introduced to criminalize 
abortion in Ireland – this was already unequivocally the status quo. Rather, 
the campaign for an anti-abortion amendment was motivated, in large part, 
out a desire to safeguard the traditional role of Irish women as child-bearers 
and rearers.1063 Concerned by the State’s legalization of access to 
contraception in the late 1970s, social conservatives were vexed that the 
nations patriarchal order may come undone. To gain ground against any 
other gestures towards women’s equality, they launched a constitutional 
campaign to reassert Irish women’s role as mothers. Proposed as the “pro-
life” amendment, the law guaranteed “the right to life of the unborn” with 
equivalence to the right to life of the “mother”. Without much difficulty, anti-
abortion campaigners secured the support of the political elites to hold a 
referendum on the amendment, and shortly after, they won the support of 
the voting public. 
As a consequence of the anti-abortion campaign’s success, the 8th 
amendment and its gendered ideology controlled Irish abortion law for 35 
years. Criminalizing access in all cases except where a woman’s life was at 
risk, only the dying woman was permitted to shirk her role. The notion of 
women as child-bearing vessels was so strong even in cases where the 
pregnancy was not viable; the law required a woman to continue her 
pregnancy. Rejecting women's decisions about pregnancy, the law treated 
women as reproductive instruments rather than as autonomous, rights-
holding citizens. 
Chapter 2 describes how women challenged this gender hierarchy 
through public campaigns for law reform, but in Chapter 3, we see how 
women's lived experiences under the law also contested the State's dictates. 
Every year, thousands of abortion-seeking women "traveled" (as it 
euphemistically became known) or bought abortion pills illegally online. 
Despite the law's attempts to control their decisions, women persistently 
asserted their agency. But, for rejecting the State's normative ideals for 
women, they were punished. Criminalized or expelled from the State for 
making their own decisions about motherhood and pregnancy, women 
endured significant burdens of exclusion, stigma, and shame.  
Assessed in light of the Irish abortion story, international human rights 
law seems devoid of an understanding of the gendered implications of 
abortion restrictions. This happens in three main ways. First, the gender 
 
1063 Chapter 3, section II. 
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biases that animate anti-abortion law receive little scrutiny in human rights 
law jurisprudence. By treating abortion as a matter of cultural morality—and 
thus an issue on which States are entitled to wide deference—the European 
Court abdicates its power to review the discrimination caused by abortion 
restrictions. In parallel, the doctrine tends to narrow its review of 
discriminatory State action by holding individuals, rather than law and 
policy, accountable for the wrongs inflicted upon women.  Blind to gender, 
international human rights law is ‘blind’ to the source of the problem. 
Second, the jurisprudence appears critically inattentive to the ways that 
anti-abortion legislation injures women's autonomy or impairs women's status 
more broadly. The doctrinal approaches pursued—recognizing abortion as 
an aspect of the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, the right to health, the right to privacy, and to a limited extent, the 
right to non-discrimination— presents the harms of abortion denial as an 
encroachment upon women’s health, rather than women’s socio-political 
freedom. Underplaying the gendered nature of women’s injuries when denied 
abortions, the law fails to understand women’s interests as sufficiently 
systematic and political so as to implicate rights guarantees.  
Third, human rights law’s conception of women runs the risk of devaluing 
women’s agency in much the same way as restrictive abortion laws. By 
conditioning its recognition of abortion rights to cases of rape, fetal 
abnormality, or to where necessary to protect a woman's life or a woman's 
health, the law institutes a hierarchy of rights-holders. And the less agency a 
woman displays, the more likely she is to be recognized as worthy of rights.  
Common to all threads of this critique is international law’s failure to be 
sincere about “respecting women’s choices.” The insincerity excludes most 
abortion-seeking women from the law's protection. But it also tracks in the 
doctrine's failure to interrogate the real reasons for why women are denied 
abortions. Blind to the invidious gender stereotypes and disdain for women’s 
autonomy that drive anti-abortion legislation, current doctrine could be 
impugned for sanctioning gender inequality.  
This dissertation concludes by warning that international human rights 
law's struggle to meaningfully engage gender may have implications beyond 
abortion rights; in the current political environment where regressive 
actors—also known as "anti-rights"1064 or "anti-gender" actors—are waging 
legal and political campaigns against gender equality, human rights law's 
relative inability to give sustained treatment to gender may even be urgent. 
The anti-rights actors who call on States to roll back human rights protections 
for women and LGBT+ persons forcefully allege that gender is an ideology 
 
1064 See, e.g., Observatory on the Universality of Rights, Rights at Risk: The Observatory on the Universality of Rights Trends 
Report 2017, https://www.awid.org/publications/rights-risk-observatory-universality-rights-trends-report-2017 
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that is set upon harming families, children, freedom of religion or belief, and 
even women's "sex-based" rights.  And such attempts to rollback myriad 
rights, including rights to abortion and contraception, same-sex marriage, 
parental rights for same-sex couples, self-determination rights for gender-
diverse persons, access to assisted reproductive technologies, and to 
comprehensive sexuality education, are increasingly breaking ground.1065 
Attempts to mitigate these movements without addressing gender will not be 














1065 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief (2020) 
A/HRC/43/48. 
